Essays on the regulation of the telecommunications industry by Sand, Jan Yngve
Essays on the Regulation of the
Telecommunications Industry
by
Jan Yngve Sand
A dissertation submitted for the degree of dr.oecon.
Acknowledgements
There area number of people that have contributed to this thesis at various stages of
the process and in a variety of ways, and I wish to express my gratitude to them. First
of all, I am grateful to my supervisor Kåre Petter Hagen for his encouragement and
detailed comments and suggestions, without which this thesis would have been of
inferior quality. I would also like to thank the other two members of the supervising
committee Derek Clark and Nils-Henrik von der Fehr. They have both contributed
with very valuable comments to this thesis. In addition, Petter Osmundsen has
provided me with valuable advice and comments throughout the process.
Furthermore, I would like to thank colleagues and friends at both the Institute of
Economics (NHH) and at the Department of Economics and Management (University
of Tromso) for support and encouragement. In particular, I would like to thank
Øystein Foros who has been a constant source of ideas through our collaborations,
and always available for discussions about topics related to the telecommunications
industry (some ofwhich appear in this thesis). Discussions with various people in
Telenor (in particular Bjørn Hansen) have been beneficial for my understanding of the
industry, and this is highly appreciated.
In the process of writing this thesis I have, on two occasions, been given the
opportunity to spend longer periods overseas.In 1998, I spent a year in Toulouse at
the Universite de Toulouse 1, Gremaq, which was an exciting year. I worked under
the supervision of Professor Patrick Rey, who, in addition to several of the other
scholars there, provided me with many suggestions for improvement on several of my
papers. In the spring of 2001, I was at the Department of Economics and Related
Studies at the University of York, during which I had several valuable discussions
with Professor Gianni De Fraja. His, and the Department's, hospitality is appreciated.
I would like to thank Telenor, the Foundation for Research in Economics and
Business Administration, the Norwegian Central Bank's research fund and lngegerd
and Ame Skaug's legacy for financial support. I am also grateful to the University of
Tromso, NFH, for letting me use some of the time that I should have been teaching to
work on my dissertation.
Finally, I would like to thank my family - Mariann and Martin - for being patient and
supportive.
Tromso, 08 January 2002
Jan Yngve Sand
Contents
Introduction
Part 1:Qualify regulation
Essay 1:Network infrastructure quality regulation
Essay 2: Regulation of a vertically differentiated duopoly
Part 2: Access charge regulation
Essay 3: Regulation and foreclosure
Essay 4:Market structure and regulation
Essay 5: A note on first- and second-best access charge regulation
Part 3: Investment incentives and regulation
Essay 6: Demand-side spillovers and semi-collusion in the market for
mobile communications
Introduction
The communications markets are typically characterised by their vertical structures,
with one or more firms providing essential facilities necessary to produce products
sold to end-users. In telecommunications markets, access to the localloop (the last
mile of the telecommunications network) is still often considered to constitute an
essential facility.
Until the early 1980's, the policy on telecommunications pricing was more
guided by distributional goals rather than efficiency concerns, and competition was
almost non-existent. Consequently, competition policy and regulatory policy was
limited to pricing policy and investment decisions. The industry usually consisted of
one single firm that provided both network and end-user services, and this firm could
either be a state-owned enterprise or a privately owned utility. Investment decisions
were taken as part of the budgetary process of the respective national parliaments. The
main economic argument for a monopolised market structure was that the
telecommunications market has the characteristics of a natural monopoly. The
common understanding now among most economists working on the regulation of the
telecommunications industry is that the only part of the market that exhibits·the
characteristics of natural monopoly (or possibly natural oligopoly) is the local loop.'
The ensuing deregulation process in Europe and the USA has put a firmer
emphasis on efficiency, but has also raised new regulatory issues that need to be
addressed. Some of these issues are:
• Access to essential facilities and the requirements imposed on operators
with significant market power (this is referred to as SMP in EU
legislation). This relates to both pricing (access pricing) and technical
issues (the choice of interface between interconnected firms, the degree to
which firms without infrastructure should be given controlover parts of
the network etc.).2
• Should there be sector specific regulators or should the industry simply be
subject to general competition rules?
1For more about the history of the deregulation in the US and UK, see Woroch (2001) and Armstrong,
Cowan and Vickers (1995).
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• Should operators be allowed to vertically integrate, or should the regulator
impose vertical separation (i.e., separating the infrastructure provision
from the production of end-user services)?
• Universal service obligation (USO), or how to ensure that all inhabitants
are given access to necessary communications infrastructure at reasonable
rates.'
If effective competition is the ultimate goal for regulators, it is necessary for
firms that want to offer communication services (be it simple voice telephony, or
broadband services) to be given access to the telecommunications infrastructure,
which is (potentially) an essential facility. Without such access there will be no entry
by non-facility based firms (virtual operators). Some regulators have put the emphasis
on encouraging facility-based competition, whereas others have focused on
determining a regulatory regime that encourages non-facility based entry. The cost
associated with duplicating the existing infrastructure is often very high, and the
social costs of duplication must be weighed against the benefits of competition.
Assuming that there is only a single firm providing local access, there are various
methods of ensuring access to the essential facility. These methods range from the
simple resale of the local access provider's (LAPs) services (the consumer pays to the
reseller, who in turn purchases transmission capacity from the local access provider)
to complete localloop unbundling (LLU).4 Whether such access generates new, or
differentiated services, will depend on the degree to which the entrant can control the
traffic generated by its own customers. With simple resale, the choice of signalling
and switching technology is left entirely to the LAP. With localloop unbundling, the
entrant may to a larger extent be able to control crucial technological decisions and
thereby exercise greater controlover the traffic (depending on the form ofLLU). The
terms at which firms without infrastructure should be given access is subject to
discussions by most regulators and competition policy authorities, and is debated in
2 This can be described as the price and quality of interconnection between networks.
3 The issue of USO is, however, not discussed in any detail in this thesis. Much of the problem related
to USO deals with the financing of the burden of universal service. Currently EU legislation includes
voice telephony and fax and voice band data transmission via modems - i.e., access to the Internet (see
COM (1999) 539), but as new technology becomes more widespread it is reasonable that more
advanced services will be included in the USO.
4 See, e.g., Regulation (EC) No. 288712000 of the European Parliament and of the Council, or COM
(2000)1237 Unbundled Access to the Localloop.
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detail in several of the papers in the present thesis. In the policy debate it is often
argued that independent (non-facility based) firms should be given access at the same
terms as the network provider's competitive subsidiary. This is highlighted in EU
policy documents that call for cost based access charges (when the access provider is
in a dominant position, where dominant position is defined as having a market share
of more than 50%).5 The choice ofpricing rule should reflect the degree of
competition in the market. However, the exact interpretation ofwhat is meant by cost-
based access prices is more difficult to ascertain, but it is reasonable to assume that a
cost-based access charge should cover some measure of long-run marginal cost (or,
alternatively, long-run incremental costs - LRIC). Note that using the LRIC as a
pricing rule will imply an arbitrary allocation of fixed costs.
In some circumstances and markets, it is reasonable to assume that there are
several firms providing the essential facility. This is in particular true for the market
for mobile communications, and it may also be a reasonable description of the market
for some types of broadband access. Inmodels with several networks, most notably
Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a,b) and Armstrong (1998), one of the main issues is the
use of the access charge as a collusive device when the access charge is unregulated
(or two-way access charges). This is not an issue that is analysed in this thesis. The
greater part of this thesis deals with the regulation of the access charge in a situation
with a monopolist provider of network services - one way access. This somewhat
simplified setting captures most of the relevant issues from a policy perspective,
related to, for instance, the socially optimal pricing of the access charge or the socially
optimal investment in the quality of the network infrastructure. The simplest set-up
that still captures the important aspects consists of one network monopolist upstream,
and two downstream firms producing a final output. The upstream monopolist mayor
may not be vertically integrated with downstream firm Dl.
The typical market structure investigated in the present dissertation is
illustrated in figure 1 (firms Dl and D2 are two downstream firms producing a final
output using the network services of the upstream firm):
5 See, e.g., Directive 97/33ÆC of the European Parliament and of the Council. If the access provider
has significant market power (SMP - defined as a market share in excess of 25%), the access charges
should normally be determined through commercial negotiations.
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Upstream
monopolist
The terms at which the producers of the final product gains access to the
network monopolist's facilities is composed of a price to be paid for the access service
and a quality level attached to that particular service. Regulation often requires that
the same price be charged to all firms utilising the network. In the case of a vertically
integrated firm such a payment is, of course, only a transfer payment and the
magnitude is naturally not affecting the equilibrium output. However, the levd of the
access charge will affect the market share of independent firms, and the upstream
monopolist may, ifvertically integrated, have incentives to foreclose (some of) the
downstream firms. This is, in particular, true when the access charge is unregulated,
in which case independent downstream firms may be foreclosed through setting a
sufficiently high access charge. Foreclosure may, however, also take place even in a
regulated environment, by the use of non-price discrimination (for some examples of
analysis of non-price discrimination see, e.g., Economides, 1998a, Foros, Kind and
Sorgard, 2001, and Beard et. al., 2001). The incentives to use non-price discrimination
when the access charge is subject to regulation is also the topic of essay 3 in this
thesis, and the main results of that analysis will be presented shortly.
Whether there should be restrictions on the network operators' opportunity to
integrate vertically into the downstream market is an important question. In the US,
the Bell system was broken up in regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) and
AT&T (i.e., the formerly vertically integrated Bell system was vertically separated).
The RBOCs offered local access services only (often as regional monopolies) and
were not allowed to enter the long-distance market, whereas AT&T were operating as
a long-distance operator. The main thrust of the 1996 Telecommunications Act in the
US has been to increase the competition in the local access market, and move back
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towards allowing vertical integration again." The RBOCs will be allowed to enter the
long-distance market provided that there is sufficient competition in its own local
market. In the EU, vertical separation in the telecommunications industry between
network provision and service provision has not been an issue in the market for
traditional telephony. However, BT in the UK has been restricted from offering cable-
TV services. The network infrastructure has to some extent characteristics that
resemble that of a public good, and the issue of access charges may be seen as the
pricing of access to a public good. When there is vertical separation, the pricing issue
is relatively uncomplicated. One argument against such separation may be that
economies of scope between network provision and service provision will not be
exploited, which is inefficient. In addition, if non-linear pricing for access cannot be
used there will be a problem of double marginalisation when there is vertical
separation," With vertical integration the problem is that the integrated firm may have
incentives to foreclose rival firms, and regulation of access prices becomes an
important issue, which is discussed briefly above (and in more detail in several of the
essays below).
The communications industry is an industry where the rapid pace of
technological advances means that the issue of investment incentives should be placed
high on the agenda. This is also an issue that is closely related to the policy on
allowing non-facility based firms access to the infrastructure. There have been a
number of cases where small (virtual) operators have complained to national
regulators about the lack of access or the terms at which access has been granted.' By
granting access (for a given level of infrastructure investment), competition may
increase which is beneficial for consumers' welfare. However, allowing such access
may also deteriorate investment incentives. In addition, allowing access implies that
the investments undertaken will have a larger positive external effect on consumers'
surplus. The main trade-off (from a regulator's point of view) when determining
whether virtual operators should be allowed entry is between the positive effect of
competition and the negative effect on investment incentives.
Following the deregulation process that has taken place throughout most of the
western economies, there has been a debate about whether there should be sector
6 See, e.g., Laffont and Tirole (2000) and Economides (l998b).
7 The classic reference on double marginalisation is Spengler (1950).
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specific regulation, or if the industry should be subject to general competition policy
oversight only. The main trend until now seems to be that there is a combination of
both these aspects of regulation (with the exception of New Zealand).9 The European
Commission suggests in the 1999 Communications Review that there should be a
greater reliance on general competition rules when competition becomes more
effective. The main argument for using sector-specific regulation is that the
competition policy authorities do not have the competence to evaluate the technical
side of the industry. It is certainly so that the sector-specific regulator is often
concerned with technical issues related to interoperability, but in some countries also
the pricing of access to the network infrastructure and other issues related to terms of
access. Many of the decisions regarding non-facility based firms' access to the
network is not only a technical issue, it is most certainly also an issue that affects the
competitive environment in the industry. Thus, such decisions should also involve the
competition authorities. Current EU legislation on access to infrastructure is that
telecommunications operators with significant market power are required to grant all
reasonable requests for access. From a static efficiency point-of-view it may be a
sensible idea to allow alloperators access, whereas dynamic considerations may call
for restricting access to ensure that the incentives to invest in infrastructure are
maintained. The issue of sector-specific regulation versus general competition policy
rules is, however, not discussed further in this thesis.
What has already been accomplished in the literature?
The literature on access pricing is quite abundant, and I will not attempt to give a
complete overview over that literature her. Armstrong (200 1) and Laffont and Tirole
(2000) provide a more thorough review.
A majority of the literature has chosen to focus on access pricing when the rival
firms do not have market power, and more specifically, model rivals as a competitive
fringe.'? The implication of such an assumption is that the fringe firms price their
8Notably Sense Communication's case against Telenor and Netcom, and Teletopia's case against
Telenor (both in Norway).
9 In the UK, the telecommunications industry is overseen by Oftel (Office of Telecommunications), the
FCC (Federal Communications Commission) in the US, and by the Norwegian Post and
Telecommunications Authority (PT) in Norway.
10 Some exceptions are Lewis and Sappington (1999), Vickers (1995) and Armstrong and Vickers
(1998).
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products equal to perceived marginal costs and earn zero profits. This means that the
rival firms' profits play no role in the regulator's welfare function. The general feature
ofmany ofthese models (and indeed with a more general validity than access charge
pricing) is that the socially optimal access price should reflect the cost of providing
the service plus the opportunity cost:
Access charge =marginal cost of providing access + opportunity cost
The opportunity cost of selling access to independent firms may, for instance, be
the profit foregone in the end-user market by the network provider, which is the main
idea of the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR or Baumol- Willig rule; see Willig,
1979). However, the ECPR considers the best access charge for a given price in the
final product market, such that the efficiency aspect of the rule depends on the
efficiency of the final product market pricing. If there is monopoly pricing in the final
product market, the mark-up over costs will be too high from a social point of view
that will result in insufficient entry. InArmstrong (200 1) a variety of versions (or re-
interpretations) of the ECPR are considered, with the main difference between them
being the magnitude of the mark-up over costs."
Ifwe were in a first-best situation, with marginal cost pricing in all but the access
market (including the final product market), then the socially optimal access charge
would imply that access should be priced at marginal cost. In such a case, the ECPR
implies pricing access at marginal cost. However, as we have learnt from the theory of
second-best, if pricing in some markets diverge from the first-best, then it is not
necessarily socially optimal to induce marginal cost pricing of access.V Consequently,
levelling the playing field by setting access charges equal to marginal cost is not in
general the socially optimal policy. Another reason for a departure from marginal cost
pricing of the access charge is if there are fixed costs that need to be covered or more
generallya budget constraint that must be satisfied. In this case, the access charges
may need to be in excess of marginal cost of providing access for Ramsey reasons;
i.e., there will be a mark-up over marginal costs to ensure coverage of fixed costs or
11 In Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996) the ECPR is generalised to account for substitutability
between the incumbent's and entrants' final products. In this case the mark-up over the marginal cost is
larger the closer substitutes the incumbent's and entrants' products are.
12 The seminal paper on second-best theory is Lipsey and Lancaster (1956).
7 .
to capture the substitutability or complementarity between different products.F The
latter interpretation is closely related to the analysis inArmstrong, Doyle and Vickers
(1996).
Yet another reason for the socially optimal access charge to differ from the
marginal cost of providing access is related to non-price discrimination. The
relationship between access charges and the incentive to foreclose rival firms is
discussed, e.g., in Economides (1998a), Foros, Kind and Sorgard (2001), and Beard
et. al. (200 1).14In Economides (1998a), of which one of the papers of this thesis is an
extension, does not (at least explicitly) consider regulated access charges. If the access
charge is unregulated and an upstream monopolist is active in a related downstream
market, he may have incentives to foreclose his rivals by setting a high access charge
(e.g., if his own downstream subsidiary is not too inefficient to rival firms or if there
is product differentiation). In the telecommunications industry, the access charge is
more often than not subject to regulation, but there may be other means by which the
network monopolist may foreclose rivals (e.g., by degrading the quality of access sold
to rivals). Thus, it is of interest to examine if and how the socially optimal access
charge may differ from marginal cost if the network provider can degrade the quality
of access. It seems reasonable that the network provider will be less inclined to refuse
(or degrade quality of) access to rivals if the profit margin is high in the access
segment. Consequently, if access is priced at marginal cost the network provider will
most likely wish to deny rival firms access by degrading quality to such an extent that
the rivals do not find it profitable to enter. Thus, another reason for distorting the
access charge in excess of marginal cost may be to limit the degree of (potentially)
socially costly quality degradation.
When considering the optimality of entry in the competitive segment, it may be
necessary to distort access charges from marginal cost and only in the special case of
a perfectly competitive downstream market will marginal cost pricing of access be
socially optimal. Using the ECPR to price access will under certain conditions ensure
that entry will take place only if such entry is efficient. More specifically, entry will
take place if the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent in which case entry is
socially desirable. In the simplest formulation of the ECPR, it will be the most
13 See Laffont and Tirole (1994) for details. They develop a model in which the mark-up over marginal
cost depends on the super-elasticities, where the super-elasticities incorporate possible
complementarities or substitution between products.
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efficient firm that provides the final product, and if this firm is the entrant then the
network provider will provide network services only. However, pricing access using
ECPR will compensate the incumbent for any loss in the competitive segment, which
implies that the incumbent will be indifferent between allowing entry and not
allowing such entry (i.e., the incumbent does not have any incentives for foreclosure).
Consequently, this (access) pricing rule ensures that there is no business stealing
effect, which may be the case if pricing access does not take into account the correct
opportunity cost measure. However, with a (partially) deregulated downstream
segment where the pricing and output decisions of firms is not subject to regulation
and where there is imperfect competition, newentry may result in business stealing.
This implies that the private incentives for entry may diverge from the social
incentives for such entry, and with Coumot competition there may be a tendency
towards excess entry if there are no restrictions on entry (see Mankiw and Whinston,
1986).15
The main topics of the thesis
The major part of the literature on access pricing problems has focused on situations
where the independent firms producing a final product do not possess market power;
i.e., they either act as price takers (or a competitive fringe). In this thesis the main idea
is to examine, among other things, access pricing in the presence of independent firms
with market power. When rival firms do not have market power and if there is
marginal cost pricing in the final product market by the incumbent, then I have argued
that it is socially optimal to price access at marginal cost (cf. the ECPR). However, if
there is imperfect competition in the final product market the pricing will in general
diverge from marginal cost. Some of the contribution of this thesis is to capture such
situations, and to explain how (and it) the socially optimal access charge should be
different from marginal cost of providing access when there is an imperfectly
competitive and unregulated final product market.
In essays 3,4 and 5 presented below, the model is static and there is no
explicit consideration of the dynamics between access charges and investments. The
cost ofproviding access may in those models be the (static) equivalent of the long-run
14 Rey and Tirole (1997) is a more general treatment of the theory of foreclosure.
IS In their model. Mankiw and Whinston (1986) do not consider vertically related markets.
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incremental cost. Cost-based access charges (based on LRIC) may thus be interpreted
to mean that the access charge is equal to the marginal cost of providing access. If
there is imperfect competition in the downstream market (more specifically, Cournot-
competition) the socially optimal access charge is in general below marginal cost of
providing access to counter the distortion caused by imperfect competition. However,
in these papers, it is shown that the access charge should be in excess of marginal cost
if, for instance, the regulated firm can degrade the access quality. It is also shown that
if there is entry into the downstream market the access charge should be in excess of
marginal cost to eliminate too much costly duplication of fixed costs. It is also shown
in this paper that the excess entry result obtained by Mankiw and Whinston (1986)
does not necessarily carry over to vertically related markets, and in particular,
imposing vertical separation and leaving the access charge unregulated will result in
socially optimal entry. In essay 1, the interaction between the level of the access
charge and the incentives to invest in infrastructure quality is examined. This analysis
is related to both the literature on strategic R&D investments and the literature on
(monopoly) quality choice.l" Essay 1 also discusses how the socially optimal
regulation is affected by the choice of market structure. The final essay also discusses
issues related to investment incentives and regulation, more specifically between the
regulation of roaming quality and investment incentives in the mobile
communications market.
Outline of the thesis
In the first essay "Network infrastructure quality regulation", it is assumed that there
is one upstream monopolist who may, or may not, be vertically integrated with one
(of the two) downstream firms. I study how different vertical arrangements (more
specifically, vertical integration versus vertical separation) affect both the private and
social incentives to undertake quality investments in the infrastructure. The
investments undertaken are either subject to regulation or decided by the upstream
monopolist, and it is assumed throughout that the access charge is determined outside
the model. A central assumption is that the firms know more than the regulator about
the effectiveness of the investments on demand. This implies that the regulator must
leave some socially costly information rent to the regulated firm in order to reveal
16 See D'Aspremont et. al. (1988) on R&D investments, and Spence (1975) for an analysis of the
quality choice of a monopolist.
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truthfully the relevant information. There are positive external effects due to the
investments, which is an argument for regulation of quality. However, due to the
asymmetry of information about demand, regulation is socially costly. Consequently,
the socially optimal regulation is a trade-off between these effects. The choice of
market structure affects the information rent. The value of possessing private
information to the upstream monopolist relates to the profitability of operating in the
upstream and downstream segments. Under full information, the socially optimal
quality level is higher under vertical integration due to the vertically integrated firm's
ability to internalise the vertical externality (and produce a higher output in
equilibrium). When there is asymmetric information it is shown that the information
rent to the regulated firm is higher when vertical integration is allowed, and when
access is priced at marginal cost the full information solution can be implemented if
there is vertical separation at zero information rent. The socially optimal quality level
is, in some circumstances, higher under vertical separation. This is the case if the
access charge is sufficiently small, since this means that the vertical externality in the
case of vertical separation is small (i.e., the cost disadvantage in the vertical
separation case is negligible). Thus, ifthe access charge is sufficiently close to
marginal cost the level of welfare is higher if vertical separation is imposed.
Furthermore, the unregulated outcome may be better in terms of welfare compared to
regulating the investment decision. This is in particular true when the effect that the
investment has on demand is small.
The second essay "Regulation of a vertically differentiated duopoly" considers
the regulation of quality when there is asymmetric information about the firms'
efficiency levels (or marginal costs in production) and with the assumption that the
market is covered. The regulatory mechanism specifies a quality level for each of the
two firms, which depend on the efficiency levels of both firms, and a monetary
transfer. It is shown that the information rent awarded one firm depends on the choice
of quality for the other firm, which implies that there are cross-effects or fiscal
externalities in the information rent. This has the effect that the optimal provision of
quality cannot be separated from the rent extraction. The choice of quality affects the
equilibrium outputs, and the information rent to the firms is based on the output. It is
shown that the socially optimal quality levels for the firms are such that the more
efficient firm is induced to provide a higher level of quality than the less efficient firm
does. The reason for this is that this distorts the market shares in favour of the more
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efficient firm, which implies that the total output produced is produced at lower cost
(note that the total size of the market is exogenously given). The consequence is that,
if firms have different efficiency levels, it is socially optimal to induce some degree of
vertical differentiation to influence the information rent necessary to induce truthful
revelation. The model is extended to capture the effects of cost complementarity
between network traffic and the quality of service; i.e., as output increases the
marginal cost of providing access is reduced. The presence of cost complementarity
affects the information rent. It is less costly to increase the quality provided by the
less efficient firm since this increases its output and effectively reduces the marginal
cost ofproviding access. Thus, the presence of cost complementarity partly "finances"
the increase in quality.
The third essay, "Regulation and foreclosure", examines the interaction
between the access charge and the regulated firm's incentives to use non-price means
to foreclose rival firms. Both firms producing the final product possess some degree
of market power. If the access charge is unregulated, the upstream monopolist will
foreclose rivals by setting a high access charge. When the access charge is subject to
regulation, the upstream monopolist may still have incentives to foreclose rivals. This
can be achieved by degrading the quality of the input offered to rival firms, which is
qualitatively equivalent to raising the cost of rivals. Such foreclosure activities are
assumed to be costly for the upstream monopolist. Faced with this problem, the main
question in the paper is how the optimal regulation of the access charge should be. In
the absence of non-price foreclosure and under full information about the upstream
monopolist's cost structure, the socially optimal access charge may in some situations
be below marginal cost of providing access to counter the distortion caused by
imperfect competition in the downstream market. This, however, creates strong (and
socially excessive) incentives to foreclose rivals by non-price means. Since non-price
foreclosure is costly, it implies that the regulated firm will require higher transfers (all
other things equal) to ensure that the participation constraint is satisfied, and such
transfers are socially costly. By distorting the access charge upwards and in excess of
the marginal cost of providing access, the foreclosure incentives are weakened.
Essays 4 and 5 are closely related, and focus on many of the same problems.
The main difference between these essays is that essay 4 covers a situation with
endogenous entry whereas entry is exogenous in essay 5. The fourth essay "Market
structure and regulation" investigates the sub-game perfect regulatory policy, where
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the policy instruments at the regulator's disposal are both structure (vertical
integration versus vertical separation) and conduct regulation (access charge
regulation). In contrast to the other essays in 'this thesis, this essay assumes that the
independent rival firms enter as long as profit is non-negative. There are no formal
restrictions on entry by independent firms. Mankiw and Whinston (1986) show that
there is a tendency towards excessive entry with imperfect (Cournot) competition. In
my model, there are vertically related markets and one of the main questions
examined here is whether the excess entry result holds in this setting. When
comparing the degree of entry by independent firms under free entry with the socially
optimal degree of entry, I find that the excess entry result does not carry over to all the
situations I consider. Free entry may result either in excess entry, insufficient entry, or
exactly the socially optimal degree of entry depending on the combination of vertical
structure and access charge determination.
The fifth essay "A note on first- and second-best access charge regulation"
examines the same problem as the third paper with the difference being that the
number of downstream firms is exogenous in contrast to the free entry model of the
third paper. The main motivation for this paper is to investigate how access charges
should be determined when the regulator can use transfers at no extra (social) cost,
and compare this access charge. to the access charge when transfers cannot be used.
When the regulator can use transfers at no extra (social) cost, the first best outcome
can be achieved. This involves setting an access charge below marginal cost to obtain
the competitive outcome in terms of quantity.
The final essay "Demand-side spillovers and semi-collusion in the market for
mobile communications" (co-authored with Øystein Foros and Bjørn Hansen)
considers roaming policy in the mobile market, when there are both facility-based
firms and a virtual operator present in the market. I have included this paper in the
thesis to provide an analysis of the problem of awarding access to a network from a
different perspective from that of the previous papers. This paper analyses the choice
of roaming quality in the market for third generation mobile communications
(UMTS), and the interaction between regulation and investment incentives. The
decision on roaming quality can be seen as a choice of interface between different
mobile operators. Higher roaming quality is assumed to result in higher product
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quality and therefore higher willingness to pay for the final product.l" One question
the paper addresses is whether the investing firms should be allowed to co-ordinate
their investments in, and share infrastructure, which is an issue that has become
highly topical with the deployment and planning of the next generation mobile
communications network. The model presented is a three-stage game, and the choice
of roaming quality is decided in the first stage of the game prior to the decision on
investments. The regulator may either mandate the roaming decision (in which case
the roaming quality is a part of the operators' licenses), or the investing firms may
voluntarily choose it. fu the final stage of the game, firms compete (non co-
operatively) in a Cournot fashion.I8
We find that in the present model it is welfare optimal to allow firms to co-
operate at the investment stage, since this allows some of the effects of the
investments to be internalised. By allowing the firms to co-operate, the unregulated
firms will choose the socially optimal level of roaming quality, which again induces
the socially optimal level of investments. If co-operation is not allowed, an
unregulated firm will choose a lower investment level than what is socially optimal to
the detriment of the consumers. Furthermore, a welfare maximising regulator will find
that allowing the virtual operator access to the mobile infrastructure is better than
denying such access.
17 Infrastructure sharing in mobile markets is called roaming, and the quality of roaming affects the
degree to which investments in infrastructure by one firm benefits the other firms. A high quality of
roaming implies that investments are (almost) as beneficial to the non-investing firms as for the
investing firm.
18 This timing of the game may, of course, lead to incentives for re-negotiation after investments are
sunk, but we assume that full-commitment contracts can be written. The commitment problem is only
present if the virtual operator is not allowed access to the mobile infrastructure.
14
References
Armstrong, M. (1998), "Network Interconnection in Telecommunications", Economic
Journal108,545-564
Armstrong, M. (2001), "The theory of access pricing and interconnection", in Cave,
Majumdar and Vogelsang (eds.), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics,
North-Holland, forthcoming 2002
Armstrong, M. and J. Vickers (1998), "The access pricing problem with deregulation:
A note", Journal of Industrial Economics 46, 115-121
Armstrong, M., S. Cowan and J. Vickers (1995), Regulatory re/orm: Economic
analysis and the British experience, MIT -Press
Beard, T.R., D. Kaserman and J. Mayo (2001), "Regulation, vertical integration and
sabotage", Journal of Industrial Economics, 319-333
Bergman, et. al. (1998), Europe's Network Industries: Conflicting Priorities,
Monitoring European Deregulation 1, CEPR, London
COM (1999) 539 Communication from the Commission, "Towards a new framework
for electronic communications infrastructure and associated services", European
Commission
COM (2000) 237 Communication from the Commission, "Unbundled Access to the
Localloop", ApriI2000, European Commission
D'Aspremont and A. Jacquemin (1988), "Cooperative and non-cooperative R&D in
duopoly with spillovers", American Economic Review 78, 1133-1137
Directive 97/33ÆC of the European Parliament and of the Council, "On
interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and
15
interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision
(ONP)". Official Journal L 199,26/0711997 p. 0032 - 0052
Economides, N. (1998a), "The incentive for non-price discrimination by an input
monopolist", International Journal of Industrial Organization 16,271-284
Economides, N. (1998b), The telecommunications Act of 1996 and its impact",
forthcoming, Japan and the WorldEconomy
Foros, 0.,H.J. Kind and L. Sorgard (2000), "Access pricing, quality degradation and
foreclosure in the Internet", Journal of Regulatory Economics, forthcoming
Laffont, J.J. and J. Tirole (1994), "Access pricing and competition", European
Economic Review 38,1673-1710
Laffont, J.J. and J. Tirole (1996), "Creating competition through interconnection:
Theory and practice", Journal of Regulatory Economics 10, 227-256
Laffont, J.1. and J. Tirole (2000), Competition in telecommunications, MIT-Press
Lewis, T. and D. Sappington (1999), "Access pricing with unregulated downstream
competition", Information Economics and Policy 11, 73-100
Lipsey, R. and K. Lancaster (1956), "The general theory of second-best", Review of
Economic Studies 24, 11-32
Mankiw, N.G. and M.D. Whinston (1986), "Free entry and social inefficiency", Rand
Journal of Economics 17,48-58
Regulation (EC) No. 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18
December 2000 "on unbundled access to the localloop"
Rey, P. and J. Tirole (1997), "A primer on foreclosure", in Armstrong and Bresnahan
(eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 3, North-Holland, forthcoming
16
Spence, M. (1975), "Monopoly, quality, and regulation", Bell Journal of Economics 6,
417-429
Spengler, J. (1950), "Vertical integration and anti-trust policy", Journal of Political
Economy 58, 347-352
Vickers, J. (1995), "Competition and regulation in vertically related markets", Review
of Economic Studies 62, 1-17
Willig, R. (1979), "The theory of network access pricing", in Issues in Public Utility
Pricing, H. Trebing (ed.), Michigan State University Press
Woroch, G. (2001), "Local network competition", in Cave, Majumdar and Vogelsang
(eds.), Handbook ofTelecommunications Economics, North-Holland, forthcoming
2002
17
Part 1:
Quality regulation
ESSAY 1
Network infrastructure quality regulation
Jan Y. Sand*
University of Tromso, NFR
Department of Economics, N-9037 Tromso,
Norway
Jan.Sand@nfh.uit.no
December 2001
Abstract
The paper considers the optimal regulation of network infrastructure qual-
ity when the impact of investments on demand is private information. The
socially optimal investment level is contrasted to the unregulated levels under
vertical integration and separation. The choice of market structure has an
impact on the information rent, and it is shown that the value of the firm's
private information is reduced under vertical separation.
JEL Classification: D82, LI3, L22, L5I
Keywords: infrastructure regulation, vertical relations, duopoly
*1would like to thank Kåre P. Hagen, Derek Clark, Nils-Henrik von der Fehr, Patrick Rey and
Jean Tirole for very helpful comments and suggestions on a previous version. Financial support
from Telenor, NFR, and Norges Banks Fond til Økonomisk Forskning is gratefully acknowledged.
I
1 Introduction
A major issue in the communications industry at the present deals with access to
broadband networks and services. The exact definition of what broadband changes
with time, but it now seems common to define broadband as the capability of sup-
porting bandwidth greater than 2 Mb/s to the consumer. The industry envisions a
huge increase in the demand for services which require broadband capacity to oper-
ate satisfactorily. Such services may include video-on-demand, high definition TV
(HDTV) , video-conferencing, games, and interactive information services. Many
of these services are likely to be using the network services intensively, with the
end-user terminal as an interface. Significant investments are necessary to upgrade
the existing networks to be able to offer the broadband capacity. In some of the
Scandinavian countries, there have been political discussions regarding whether the
government should become involved in building (or financing) broadband networks
to guarantee access to high speed network to everyone.
There are two main issues addressed in the present paper: Should the network
operator be induced to invest in quality (i..e., should network investments be subject
to regulation), and should the network operator be allowed to enter the service
market (the content market)? The former issue is closely related to the quality choice
problem analysed by, e.g., Spence (1975), where it is shown that the monopolist
may have incentives to either over- or under-invest in quality.' The latter issue
is related to whether there should be limitations on the (potential) entry of the
network owner into the markets for end-user services. The paper investigates the
effect that changing the vertical structure (i.e., vertical integration versus vertical
separation) has on the optimal regulatory policy. The paper addresses questions
related to optimal infrastructure quality and market structure issues when the effect
of investments on demand is private information to the investing firm. The issue of
infrastructure quality is often the concern of a sector-specific regulator, whereas the
lThe unregulated monopolist's choice of quality reflects the value of that quality to the marginal
consumer, whereas the socially optimal quality level is related to the value of quality to the average
consumer.
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appropriate market structure is a concern for the competition authorities.P
In this paper, it is assumed that a non-facility based firm is allowed to enter the
services market (the end-user market), and the focus of the regulator is to provide
consumers with the appropriate level of quality in the network. The main con-
cerns of many politicians and (potential) users of broadband access and services are
whether the market will provide adequate coverage of broadband access, and also
the timing of such investments (i.e., will they make these infrastructure upgrades
quickly enough). This is, in particular, a major concern among information tech-
nology users in less densely populated areas. Obviously, one fiber cable will not be
able to serve as many homes in less densely populated areas as in urban areas. Con-
sequently, the investment costs associated with upgrading the network to provide
broadband access will necessarily be convex in coverage. The concerns voiced by
some people regarding the capability, or rather the willingness to supply broadband
access voluntarily to all areas of a region, may well become a real issue.
In the present model I find that an unregulated profit-maximising firm in general
chooses a level of infrastructure quality which does not coincide with the socially
optimal level. In general, the (unregulated) level of quality can be either higher
or lower than the socially optimallevel, since the profit-maximising firm does not
internalise the effects on consumers' surplus and on rivals' profits. However, as is
shown in the paper, the facility-based firm will in the present model choose a lower
level of infrastructure quality compared to the socially optimal level when there
is full information. Furthermore, the choice of market structure will also have an
impact on the value of the private information to the regulated firm. In particular,
vertical separation reduces the information rent compared to the vertical integration
case. As a consequence, the socially optimal quality level is always lower under
2There are many regulatory issues related to broadband, and many of these are essentially the
same as those encountered in the market for narrowband networks. Regulatory issues common for
both narrowband and broadband could, for instance, be whether the regulatory authorities should
encourage facility-based competition or allow non-facility based entrants access to the network.
Furthermore, on which terms should they gain access if entrants without their own facilities are al-
lowed to enter (i.e., should the localloop be unbundled, how should access charges be determined)?
Many of these issues are discussed in for instance Laffont and Tirole (2000).
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vertical integration. Both of these factors are, in isolation, arguments in favour of
vertical separation. The value of the regulated firm's private information will depend
critically on the level of the access charge.
Throughout the paper I will maintain the assumption that the downstream in-
dustry is not subject to price regulation. The number of firms in the industry is
exogenously determined, and this may be interpreted as the result of entry restric-
tions (e.g., through a licensing process). Inaddition, the level of the access charge is
not included in the regulatory contract and is exogenously given, but I will examine
how the level of the access charge impacts on the regulatory contract.
Furthermore, it will be assumed throughout the paper that the cost structure of
the firms does not involve economies of scope between upstream and downstream
activities. This is clearly a simplification. It is often argued that there are significant
economies of scope between providing network services (transpo~ation) and the
services that run on top of the networks. If we allow for economies of scope between
the production of network services and the production of the final product, the
costs of producing downstream will be lower if we allow for vertical integration.
Any such economies of scope will of course imply that there are welfare gains to
vertical integration - welfare gains that are not taken into account in the analysis
below.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In section 2, the framework for
analysis is presented, together with a characterisation of the Cournot equilibrium
of the game. In section 3, I consider the socially optimal regulation with full in-
formation and the unregulated cases under vertical integration and separation. In
section 4, asymmetric information is introduced and the optimal qualities for the
cases of vertical integration and separation are characterised, and the effect of the
vertical structure on regulatory policies is also investigated. In the final section,
some concluding remarks are made.
4
2 The framework
In the model presented below there are vertically related markets (an upstream and
a downstream market), with one firm upstream and two firms downstream. The
downstream firms purchase an essential input from the network monopolist. To
simplify, I will only consider the case where the number of firms in the downstream
industry is determined exogenously, and will not consider issues related to entry
and exit here. The regulatory mechanism that is offered consists of a quality level
and corresponding transfers necessary to induce truthful revelation of information,
and will be based on a signal about the effect of investments on demand that the
regulated firm sends to the regulator. 3
I assume that the game is played in several stages, and the timing of the game
is as follows:
Stage 1: The regulator offers a menu of contracts to the regulated firm, which
4
consists of the quality level of the infrastructure and transfer.
Stage 2: The regulated firm reports a demand level (type) to the regulator, and
the contract is executed.
Stage 3: Firms compete in quantities in the downstream segment (the final stage
of the game is unregulated, and it is assumed that firms move simultaneously).
In addition, the welfare effect of vertical integration versus vertical separation
will be discussed. It is assumed that the choice of vertical structure is made prior
to the start of the game (i.e., prior to the investment decision).
The regulator must take into account the expected effects the regulation he
proposes have on all subsequent stages to be able to internalise the effects of the
proposed regulation. The model is solved using backwards induction. We first solve
for the outcome of the Cournot competition stage. Using his knowledge of the
outcome at this stage, the regulator designs a regulatory mechanism.
3A more complete regulatory mechanism would also include the access charge. However, to
simplify and maintain focus on investment in infrastructure, I will only discuss how the magnitude
of the access charge affects the solution.
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2.1 The demand side
In the downstream market, firms face an inverse demand function of the following
form: P = P (Q, K), where K = {3B denotes the overall quality of the network, Q
is the total production downstream, B is the quality of the infrastructure, and {3
denotes the impact of changes in the infrastructure quality has on demand.
Gross consumers' surplus is in this case given by:
es (Q, B, {3) = lQ P (Q', {3B)dQ' (1)
The quality level may be subject to regulation, in which case we can think of this
as a quality requirement in the incumbent's universal service obligation (USO).4 It
is assumed that any increase in the level of quality upstream translates directly into
increases in quality downstream and increased value to consumers. The parameter
{3 can be interpreted as a spillover parameter, and is identical for both firms. One
•
reason for having equal spillovers may, for instance, be that all firms are perfectly
interconnected. If firms are symmetric in all other respects, there is no reason that
the market expansion should be asymmetric." It is assumed that all firms know the
exact value of {3 whereas the regulator knows only the distribution and support.
Assume PK, > O, PK,K, ::; O, and PQK, = o. Thus, the higher the spillover, the larger
is the effect of increasing the quality of the infrastructure on the willingness to pay.
The assumption PQK, = O rules out the possibility that both the parameters B and
{3 may affect the slope of the in'verse demand function. Thus, quality investments
affect the demand downstream through parallel shifts of the (downstream) demand
4Incumbent firms subject to usa may be reluctant to introduce new services and technology to
a majority of its customers, fearing that regulators may be tempted to include these in the USO.
For instance, normallya USO does not incorporate ISDN or ADSL. However, if these technologies
become widespread, it is reasonable to suspect that regulators may want to include these in the
USO.
sIn the R&D literature, these spillovers can typically take on different values for different firms,
with a higher level of spillover for the investing firm (the regulated firm in the present model). In
the context of R&D investments, it is often reasonable that it is more difficult to transfer knowledge
between firms unless they set up joint-venture R&D facilities, with perfect information sharing.
See, e.g., d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
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function, and the degree of spillover simply adjust the magnitude of this shift. This
implies that changes in the quality level affects consumers' surplus only indirectly
through a market expansion effect." I assume furthermore that the inverse demand
function is decreasing and concave in Q (PQ < O, PQQ ::; 0).7 When comparing
quality levels and information rents, I will for simplicity use a linear inverse demand
function of the form: P (Q, f3, O) = a + f30 - Q.
2.2 The supplyside
The three main elements to the profit function of the vertically integrated firm are;
the profit from its downstream activities, the profit from upstream sales, and the
investment cost function (for investments in infrastructure quality). The cost of
investment is given by the function K (O), which is assumed to be an increasing and
convex function. It is assumed that the network provider (i.e., the upstream firm)
undertakes the investments in network infrastructure quality. The profit function of
6The implication of assuming that changes in quality does not affect the slope of the inverse
demand function is that the willingness to pay for quality is identical for the average and marginal
consumer. However, in contrast to the literature on the monopolist's quality choice (Spence, 1975),
the present paper considers a situation with vertically related markets and imperfect competition
in which the investing monopolist cannot capture the entire surplus of the investments in quality.
Consequently, even if the average and marginal consumer value quality equally, which in the pure
monopoly case would imply that the monopolist chooses the socially optimal level of quality, this
is not the case in the present paper.
7The assumption of a concave inverse demand is not necessary to ensure stability of the equilib-
rium. Normally the following regularity conditions are imposed on models of Cournot competition:
i) PQ+PQQq < O(where q is the downstream output of an individual firm), and ii) 3PQ+PQQQ < O
(where Q is total downstream output). These regularity conditions imply that the demand function
cannot be too convex in Q, and implies that the reaction curves are downward sloping. Condi-
tion (i) is identified by Hahn (1962) as the condition required to ensure (local) stability of the
equilibrium. Hahn allows for non-linearities in costs and includes the condition Cqq - Pq > O in
his requirements, where Cqq is the second-derivative of production costs. These two conditions
ensure that the own effect on marginal profitability of changing own quantity dominates the (sum
of) cross-effects of changing other firms' quantities, and put together they yield condition (ii) in
the present model. In the present model, these conditions are trivially satisfied since demand is
assumed to be concave.
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the vertically integrated firm is given by:
(2)
where qV is the downstream production of the vertically integrated firm, QV is
the total production downstream if there is vertical integration, and t is the transfer
from the regulator. The marginal cost of purchasing all other inputs besides local
access is assumed to be identical for both downstream firms, and is normalised to
O. The variable w is the (exogenously determined) price all downstream firms pay
per unit for the inputs purchased from the upstream firm. Below, Iwill discuss the
effects of varying the level of the access charge w. Iwill assume the following about
the level of the access charge:
Assumption 1
The access charge covers the marginal costs of providing access; i.e., w ~ c.
The main reason for assuming that the access charge must cover marginal cost
of providing access is that regulators often argue (and require) that the network
providers should be able to provide their services without relying on subsidies from
the government."
The profit function for upstream operations only, which is also the profit earned
by a vertically separated firm, is given by:
IT' = (w - c) Q - K ((J) + t (3)
The profit function of the (independent) firms competing downstream is given
by:
(4)
BIn the present paper I am only considering linear access charges. If we allow for non-linear
access tariffs, the per unit access charge does not necessarily have to be in excess of the marginal
cost of providing access.
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where qi is the production level of firm i = 1,2. It is assumed throughout that
there is always two firms in the downstream market. Consequently, if there is vertical
separation, I assume that there are two independent firms competing.
2.3 Welfare
The regulator maximises the utilitarian welfare function given by (for vertical inte-
gration and vertical separation):
w={ cs - PQv + ITv+ ITi - (1 + A) tes - PQs + ITU+ E;=l ITi - (1 + A) t (5)
where A > Ois the shadow cost of public funds, which is assumed to be strictly
positive due to efficiency losses from distortionary taxation. The welfare function is
assumed to be concave in (). The regulator has imperfect knowledge of the degree of
spillover, and therefore only imperfect knowledge about the exact effect investments
in the infrastructure quality has on demand. The regulator knows only the distri-
bution, G (f3), with the strictly positive density function 9 (f3) > Oand the support
of the level of spillovers, f3 E ~,Ø]. The case of f3 = Ocorresponds to a case where
investing in the quality of the network infrastructure has no effect on demand. To
avoid such a trivial case, I will assume that spillovers are always strictly positive;
i.e., f3 > O.
2.4 Cournot competition
Firms compete in quantities in the final product market. The vertically integrated
firm v chooses the level of quantity to maximise ITv, where ITv is defined by eqn.
(2). The independent firm i solves a similar maximisation problem, maximising (4)
with respect to qi. The equilibrium quantities for firm v and firm i are defined as
q*v and q": Total equilibrium quantity when there is vertical integration is defined
as Q* = q*v + q*i. When there is vertical separation, i = 1,2, and Qs = qi + q2'
where subscript S denotes vertical separation.
9
The vertically integrated firm's optimal quantity choice q*v is given by:
PQq*V+ (P (Q*, ØO) - c) = O (6)
For an independent firm i optimal quantity q*i is implicitly given by:
PQq*i+ (P (Q*, ØO) - w) = O (7)
To ensure that the independent firm(s) produces a positive level of output in
equilibrium, we need to assume that P> w.
Vertical integration I will first consider the Cournot equilibrium in the case
where the network monopolist is allowed to integrated vertically into the downstream
market. Using the system of first-order conditions defined byequations (6) and (7),
we can solve for the effects that changing exogenous variables have on q*v and q*i.
Whereas the equilibrium output of the firm i (when there is vertical integration)
is increasing in O and ø, both the effect of changing the infrastructure quality O,
and of changing the spillover level ø, on firm v's equilibrium output are ambiguous.
I will however, make the following assumption to ensure that firm v's output, and
therefore both firms' output, is increasing in both O and ø:
Assumption 2
Provided that PQQ ~ O, the following condition ensures that firm v's output is
increasing in equilibrium: PQ/PQQ 2:: (q*v _ q*i).
If inverse demand is strictly concave in Q, then necessary conditions for both
firms' outputs to increase as O and ø increase are: PQ/ PQQ 2:: (q*v _ q*i) > _PQ/ PQQ.9
The first inequality ensures that firm v's output increases, whereas the second in-
equality ensures that firm i's output increases. Note that a necessary condition for
9If , for instance, we consider the strictly concave inverse demand function P (Q,O) = a+ {30 -
bQ2/2, the set of inequalities are satisfied (the requirement is that the rival firms has a non-negative
market share, which is obviously satisfied).
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the latter inequality to be satisfied is that firm v has a larger market share than firm
i, which is ensured by assumption 1. The first inequality is satisfied if, for instance,
the inverse demand function is not too concave. If the inverse demand is sufficiently
concave, an increase in output from increased quality (or spillover) results in a large
reduction in price. This implies a significant loss on inframarginal units of the final
product for the firm with the larger market share (i.e., firm v). Consequently, it
may be desirable for a dominant firm to reduce its own quantity when infrastruc-
ture quality (or spillover) increases to maintain a relatively high price on the final
product.
Under assumption 2 and the assumptions made on the inverse demand func-
tion, the profit-maximising quantity choices made by the firms have the following
properties.l"
Lemma 1 (Vertical integration)
Firm v's supply has these properties: oq"'VI ow > O, oq"'VIoc < O, oq"'VI oj3 > O,
and oq"'V100 > O.
Firm i 's supply has these properties: .oq"'iI ow < O, oq"'iI åc > O, oq"'iI oj3 > °
and oq"'iloO > O.
The effect on total downstream demand in equilibrium, Q"', is simply the sum of
the effects on q"'Vand s", and is summarised in lemma 2.
Lemma 2 (Vertical integration)
Total downstream production has the/ollowing properties: oQ'"loj3 > O, oQ'"100>
O, oQ'"Ioc < O, oQ'"low < O.
In equilibrium, the total quantity depends only on the sum of the (perceived)
marginal costs of the two firms, with the perceived marginal cost equal to c and
w for firms v and i, respectively. As is expected, the total equilibrium quantity is
decreasing in the cost parameters. Furthermore, the total quantity is increasing in
the infrastructure quality and the spillover parameter.
lOSeeAppendix 1 for details.
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Vertical separation When there is vertical separation, the downstream firms
are symmetric and each independent firm's Cournot quantity is in equilibrium given
implicitly by eqn. (7). It can then be shown that the properties of the equilibrium
are qualitatively the same as for the independent firm i in the vertical integration
case. Note that Assumption 2 is not necessary in the vertical separation case.
3 The benchmark cases
The main issue of the present paper is to investigate how different vertical market
structures affects the socially optimal level of infrastructure quality and how this
relates to the unregulated solution. Furthermore, I will examine how the presence
of asymmetry of information about the effect of changes in infrastructure quality
impacts on the regulator's socially optimal investment strategies. Inorder to evalu-
ate the effect of asymmetry of information, the socially optimal solution under full
information must be used as the benchmark case. The socially optimal solutions
will also be compared to the unregulated solutions in order to identify the situations
in which a regulator should avoid interference in the market place.l!
3.1 Infrastructure quality regulation
When there is vertical integration, the regulator solves the maximisation problem
given by eqn. (5) with respect to B, subject to Cournot equilbrium outputs and the
participation constraint for the regulated firm (the participation constraint will be
binding for all types in the full information case since the shadow costs of public
funds is positive):12
11It should, however, be noted that since the downstream. market is assumed to be unregulated .
and involving firms with significant market power, the benchmark case is not a first-best scenario.
12The welfare function can be rewritten as follows (taking into account that the participation
constraint for firm v is binding): W = JoQ•p (Q', Bf3)dQ' - cQ* - K (B).
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The socially optimal infrastructure quality under full information, ()FI, is defined
implicitly byeqn. (8). O'S" is defined as net surplus to consumers, or GS - PQ·v,
where Q.v is the total downstream output in equilibrium with vertical integration.
It is assumed that net surplus to consumers is increasing in network infrastructure
quality.P Since it is assumed that quality does not affect the slope of the inverse de-
mand function, the only effect on consumers' surplus of changing quality is indirectly
through an increase in the output in equilibrium.
From condition (8), we observe that optimal policy under full information with
respect to the vertically integrated firm's upstream efficiency level, depends in part
on the effect of infrastructure quality on the competitor's profit, dITi/d(). Ifthe sign
is positive (negative), this means that the investment imposes a positive (negative)
externality on the competitor. This is analogous to the industrial organisation liter-
ature on strategic investments where an action taken in the first stage of a game may
affect the intensity of the second-period competition (see Tirole, 1988, or Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1984). The sign of dITi/d() is determined by the following relationship.l"
Investing in infrastructure quality has an unambiguously positive direct effect on
firm i's profit, through its effect on demand (increasing the quality in effect increases
the size of the market; i.e., it shifts the demand curve outwards). This is the term
/3PK,q·i. However, there is another effect which is related to the strategic interaction
I31t can be shown that in equilibrium 8feS = 2/30P,.PQQ* / (3PQ + PQQQ*) ~ O and 8;f,.S =
2/3PQ/ (3PQ + PQQQ*) (/3p,.,.Q* + 3PQP,. 82J· / (3PQ + PQQQ*)). The latter expression is posi-
tive if P,.,. =Oor sufficiently small.
I4We can write this in more general terms as (assuming that firm imaximises profits with respect
to its ~ quantity): ~i = 8H;i + 8a~:i~9'"
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and this effect is negative. The strategic effect is the impact on prices given by
the term q*i PQ 8£". For a given level of production for firm i, increasing O implies
increased production by firm v, which again implies reduced price. This is a negative
effect on firm i's profit.P Under the assumption of a concave demand function and
perfect spillover, the externality is indeed always positive. Consequently, we only
need to consider the case of a positive external effect.!"
Assuming that welfare, W, is concave in 0.17 Since an increase in infrastructure
quality has a positive external effect on firm i's profit (under our quite general
assumptions), then optimal quality is higher than it would be in the absence of the
effect on firm i.IB
The welfare maximising regulator takes into account the effects that changes
in the quality level of the network infrastructure has on downstream competition
and consumers' surplus. The effect on consumers' surplus is a positive externality,
which the regulator internalises. If it is appropriate to include the rival's profit
in the welfare function, there is an additional positive external effect imposed on
competitors by increasing quality, represented by the expression dIIi / dO. Since both
these externalities are positive, this implies that the marginal social cost of increasing
. infrastructure quality is less than the marginal private cost. A welfare maximising
I5We observe that if (,BPI\:+ PQ aZ;") > O, then quality investment makes the regulated firm
"soft"; i.e., it increases firm i's profit. If, on the other hand, the expression is negative, then
investments make the regulated firm "tough", to use the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole
(1984). For our situation it is perhaps more appropriate to use the term negative (positive)
externality instead of "toughness" ("softness").
I6dlli Id() = 2,Bpl\:q*i (PQ + PQQq*") I (3PQ + PQQQ*). Thus, the concavity of demand ensures
that increasing () imposes a positive external effect on the rival firm. Note that if P is linear in (),
then IIi is increasing and convex in ().
I7The second-order condition on welfare with respect to () is given as (assuming that PI\:l\:=
O)· 821f - ( 2,BPcs )2 (P(Q" ,9,B)-C~Qq 2R R Q*) - Kli «()) C . f W· ()• 89 - - 3PQ+PQQQ" 3PQ+PQQ" + Q + QQ . oncavity o ID
implies that the investment cost function is sufficiently convex in ().
I8H, for instance, the rival firm is a subsidiary of a foreign multinational corporation it is reason-
able that the effect on firm i's profit is excluded from the welfare function. In such a case, most of
the profits earned by the rival is transferred overseas and, consequently, ignored by the (domestic)
regulator.
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regulator will internalise the gain to the rival's profit and to consumers' surplus of
an increase in the infrastructure quality.
The first-order condition (8) which determines the socially optimal level of in-
frastructure quality under full information can be rewritten as:
(P (Q'k,8(3) - c) 8~k + (3P/tQ'k - K' (8) = O (9)
where k = {vertical integration I, vertical separation S}. From the rewritten
first-order condition (9) the socially optimal infrastructure quality under both ver-
tical integration and separation is implicitly given, with the difference in optimal
quality being only due to differences in the total equilibrium output. Eqn. (9)
defines implicitly 8fl, where k = (I, S). In the rewritten form, the various real eco-
nomic factors are more easily noticed. First, the two last elements, (3P/tQk - K' (8),
are the effects on welfare through raising the willingness to pay for the final prod-
uct for a given quantity supplied and the costs associated with increasing quality,
respectively. The first element, (P (Q*,8(3)- c) lJ~i,indicates the value of raising
quality through its effect on quantity, where the difference between price and cost
(P - c) represents the value to consumers of each extra unit they consume.
In general, the socially optimal infrastructure quality differs depending on the
choice of market structure (l.e., whether there is vertical integration or vertical
separation), since equilibrium quantity will be different when w > c. However,
the socially optimal level of network infrastructure quality is independent of the
market structure (i.e., independent ofwhether there is vertical integration or vertical
separation) when the regulator has full information and the access charge is equal
to marginal cost of providing access (i.e., if w = c). In that case, there are no
vertical externalities that the vertically integrated firm can internalise to create a
cost advantage over the vertically separated situation. However, as will be shown
below, the choice of market structure does playa role in determining the optimal
level of quality when there is asymmetric information even when there is marginal
cost pricing of access. This is due to the effect that changing the market structure
has on the information rent to the regulated firm.
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3.2 Optimal versus unregulated level of quality
(10)
Will there in general be a need. for governmental intervention in the market? Or,
put differently, what is the relationship between the socially optimal level of quality
and the unregulated, profit maximising level of quality? The answer to this question
obviously depends on how the investment decision taken by the network monopolist
affects consumers and independent firm(s), and whether the firm providing network
services is vertically integrated or not. The case of vertical integration will be
discussed first.
3.2.1 Vertical integration
Let us assume that the upstream monopolist is allowed to enter the downstream
market. Then, firm v will choose a quality level to maximise its profit, given by eqn.
(2) while taking into account the Cournot outputs in the final stage of the game.
The result can be summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Assume a concave welfare function. Then, an unregulated, profit-
maximising choice of quality for a vertically integrated firm results in a socially
suboptimal level; BfI ~ B~r. FUrthermore, the unregulated firm will choose not to
invest at all (i.e., B~r = O) if the degree of spillover is sufficiently small.
Proof. Maximisation of (2), subject to q" = q*" and qi = q*i, yields a quality level
B~r implicitly defined by (assuming an interior solutionj.'?
The first two elements of eqn. (10) are the direct effects of investments in quality,
and the latter element is the strategic effect which is negative.2o Observe that the .
left-hand side of (10) is smaller than the left-hand side of (9), which together with
19The total derivative of firm v's profit with respect to () is given by: ~" = 8~;"+ 8f}q:" 83;' +
8r:" 8g;". By utilising the envelope theorem, we can eliminate 8£:" 8h;" .
~OThis can be derived from the firms' profit maximisation problems. Assume
[(w - (3) + PQq*"J > O. The first-order condition for the profit-maximising quantity choice for
the vertically integrated firm is given by: (*) [PQq*" + (w - (3)J + p - c - w = O. Then, the'
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Kli > O implies that of! ~ or. Observe that if f3 is sufficiently small ~" < O ,
which implies that o't = o. •
There are positive external effects on both consumers' surplus and the rival firm's
profit associated with the investments in infrastructure quality. The profit of the
downstream subsidiary of firm v will also be increasing in the level of quality. An
unregulated firm will, in general, choose a level of network infrastructure quality
which does not coincide with the welfare maximising level, since the external effects
imposed on the rival firm's profit and on consumers' surplus cannot be internalised
by firm v. However, a vertically integrated firm will be able to internalise parts of
the external effect; i.e., the effects changes in infrastructure quality has on the profit
of its own downstream subsidiary.
The negative sign of the strategic effect seems contrary to results obtained in the
literature on strategic R&D investments, but can be explained as follows. In many
of the models analysing strategic R&D investments, firms may have an incentive
to over-invest for strategic reasons. Investments in the quality of the infrastructure
have very similar features to investments in research and development (R&D), in
that there are spillover effects associated with the investments. In the present model
there are perfect spillovers, meaning that any investment undertaken by the facility-
based firm has equal impacts on the demand faced by all firms. Perfect spillovers may
be due to perfect interconnection of networks, which may be a reasonable assumption
if, for instance, there is localloop unbundling (LLU) and the non-facility based firm
is entirely in control over the choice of signaling technology used in the local loop.
In R&D models, however, the general feature is that the degree of spillover often is
less than perfect, partly due to difficulties in obtaining perfect information sharing
between firms in an industryr'! Since spillovers are perfect in the present model,
an investing firm will not be able to gain from a product differentiation effect, and
condition [PQq*v + (w - .B)) > Oimplies P - w < c. The first-order condition for the rival firm is
given by: (**) PQq*i +P - c - w =O. Consequently, [PQq*v + (w - .B)) > O is not consistent with
profit maximisation in the duopoly case.
21See e.g., D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). In the literature on strategic R&D investments
there is typically more than one firm investing.
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the non-facility based firm will free-ride on the investment. With less than perfect
spillovers, the (strategic) under-investment result above will be modified, since there
will be a product differentiation effect which generates additional returns on the
investment, and the free-riding effect becomes less pronounced.F
3.2.2 Vertical separation
Let us now briefly examine the case of unregulated investments if there is vertical
separation. When there is vertical separation, it is assumed that there are two in-
dependent firms competing in the downstream market. The socially optimal level
of quality is defined as O~I if there is vertical separation. The result of compar-
ing the unregulated and socially optimal quality choice with vertical separation is
summarised in the following porposition:
Proposition 2 Assume a concave welfare function in quality. When there is ver-
tical separation, we find that the socially optimal level of quality is in excess of the
unregulated choice of quality. No investment will take place if the access charge is
equal to marginal cost of providing access.
Proof. The vertically separated firm, which we denote with superscript u, max-
imises the profit function (3) with respect to O, which defines 0'8:23
(w - c) 8Qs - K' (Os) = O
80 (11)
I
where subscript S denotes vertical separation, and where 8Qs/80 > 0.24 Compare
eqns. (9) and (11). Since P > w and {3PKoQ'k > O, together with Kli > O,we must
22Another factor that may modify the no-investment result may be modified is if the downstream
firms have different marginal costs. If the downstream subsidiary of firm v is sufficiently inefficient
relative to firm i, we may have (w - c+ PQQ*1J) > O,in which case firm v may choose a positive level
of investment in quality (i.e., differences in marginal costs and imperfect spillovers yield equivalent
results).
23The second-order condition for firm u is always satisfied under the assumptions in the present
model, and is given as: a;1 = (w - c) a;~'- Kli (8) < O.
24By comparing eqns. (11) and (9) when there is vertical separation, wewill be able to determine
whether an unregulated, vertically separated network provider chooses to invest more or less in
quality than a welfare maximising regulator with the same market structure.
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The first element (w - c) lJr;i in eqn. (11) measures the marginal gain to gross
profit from expanding the market (i.e., from investing in infrastructure quality),
whereas the latter element K' (Bs) gives the marginal cost of the investments.
First, the unregulated choice of network quality will never be identical to the
socially optimal level of quality, except for the case where both are equal to zero.
The reason for this is that the regulator will be able to internalise a larger part of
the marginal gain due to investments, and in addition, will be able to internalise the
increased willingness to pay for the inframarginal units (i.e., the direct increase in
consumers' surplus). This implies that Bsr s B~I.
Furthermore, we observe from eqn. (11) that if the access charge is set equal
to marginal cost of providing access (i.e., w = c), the first-order condition for the
vertically separated firm is always negative. Thus, the unregulated choice of infras-
tructure quality will be to set B as lowas possible, where the minimum quality level
is normalised to O. This observation is quite intuitive. Since the network provider's
only income is from the sale of access, he has no incentives to improve the quality
of the infrastructure if he is not allowed a return on his investments.
3.2.3 Quality comparisons with a linear inverse demand function
Assume that the demand function is given by P (Q, {3, B) = a+{3B - Q. In this case,
changes in the infrastructure quality will affect the elasticity of demand, making
demand less elastic when the quality level is high. Consequently, investment in
infrastructure is beneficial (from the point of view of the firms) for two reasons;
it raises consumers' willingness-to-pay for any given level of quantity, and demand
becomes less elastic.25 Furthermore, let us normalise the marginal cost of providing
access to zero (i.e., c = O)without loss of generality, and let the cost of investing
in quality be given by the quadratic cost function K (B) = cpø; . I will restrict my
attention to parameter values such that both downstream firms are active. To ensure
this, the following must be satisfied: a> w.
25The elasiticity of demand is in this case given by: e = +P] (a + {3() - P).
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With these specifications, the model gives us the following explicit solutions for
infrastructure quality investments in the three cases discussed abover"
OF! _ (Ba - w) {3 (12)
! - 9<p - B{32
OF! _ (Ba - 2w) {3 (13)
s - 9<p - B{32
our _ (2a + 5w) {3 (14)
I - 9<p - 2{32
Our _ 2w{3 (15)
s - 3<p
Observe that contrary to case with a generalised demand function, the quality
level is strictly positive if w > O (i.e., if the access charge is in excess of the marginal
cost of providing access) in all cases.F Note also that an unregulated, vertically
separated firm will choose not to invest at all if w = O, since it has no other way of
internalising the increased value of the higher quality level than through the price
of access. Furthermore, we observe that O:! = of! when w = o.
By comparing eqns. (12), (14) and (15), we can rank the investment levels. This
ranking is summarised in the following lemma:28
Lemma 3 When demand is linear, investment cost quadratic and there is full in-
formation about the spillover level, the socially optimal quality level is always higher.
than the unregulated levels. FUrthermore, if firms are unregulated, the level of qual-
ity provided by a vertically integrated firm is always higher than the corresponding
choice of a vertically separated firm (that is, Of! > O:! > o~r > Os J.
The reason that the socially optimal solution is always strictly higher than the
unregulated cases is discussed above, and is due to the fact that a benevolent reg-
ulator is able to internalise the positive external effects on consumers' surplus and
261assume that all the relevant second-order conditions are met, which amounts to requiring
that the investment costs are sufficiently convex: 9cp - 8/32 > O. This condition is sufficient for all
three cases under full information.
27Note that /3 > Oby assumption.
28Note that a sufficient, but not necessary condition for the second inequality is a 2: ~!w.
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the rival firm's profit of increasing the network quality. An unregulated and ver-
tically integrated firm can internalise the benefit increasing the quality has on its
own downstream subsidiary's profit. For an unregulated and vertically separated
firm, investing in infrastructure quality has only the effect of increasing the total
sales of access to independent downstream firms, and such a firm will only be able
to internalise the gain of investing in the infrastructure through the price of access.
Consequently, if the market is unregulated, a vertically integrated firm will choose
to invest more in quality than a vertically separated firm.
4 Asymmetric Information
A realistic assumption is that the regulator does not know how investments affect
demand perfectly. We assume that only the distribution and support of the demand
scaling parameter (3 is known to the regulator. 29 He must therefore offer a regu-
latory contract which induces the regulated firm to reveal its true demand. The
regulator will then maximising welfare, subject to incentive and participation con-
straints. As we will see, the optimal policy with respect to infrastructure quality
depends, contrary to what is the case when there is full information, on the choice
of market structure. The reason for this is that the information rent will be affected
by the choice of market structure, and consequently, the real cost to the regulator
of inducing a specific level of quality will be different.
The regulator offers the incentive compatible contract of the form (() (/3) , t (/3) )
to the upstream firm to maximise the welfare function (5), using his knowledge
about the distribution and support of the unknown parameter and the structure
of the game.30 The contract specifies infrastructure quality, (), and transfer to the
regulated firm, t.
The regulator maximises the expected value of the welfare function, with expec-
tations taken over the level of spillovers, {3, subject to participation and incentive
29Lewis and Sappington (1988) considers the regulation of a monopolist when demand is uncer-
tain.
3073 is the report from the regulated firm to the regulator.
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constraints.P! In addition, the regulator knows that if the network owner is also
present downstream, truthful revelation must be based on the joint profit function
for the vertically integrated firm, i.e., equation (2). The reason for this is that the
report of demand made to the regulator will internalise any effects that the report
(and resulting infrastructure quality) has on its own downstream profits. If, on
the other hand, there is vertical separation the relevant expression for the incentive
constraint would be equation (3).
Lemma 4 When there is vertical integration, (first-order) incentive compatibility
requires the following:
dITV ( Bq*i ) *v Bq*i
d{3 = (JP,.+ PQ B{3 q + (w - c) B{3
Proof. Apply the envelope theorem to (2), given that qV and qi are chosen opti-
mally at stage 3. More generally, we can write the first-order incentive constraint as:
dIIV 8ITV 8ITV 8q-' 8ITV 8q-V H . th fir d diti d ..
d{3" = 8{3 + 8q' 8{3 + 8qV 8{3· owever, usmg e st-or er con lon etermining
*v this si lifi t dIIv 8ITv + 8ITv 8q-' •q, SImp es o d{3 = 8{3 8q' 8{3·
We can distinguish between three different effects in the incentive constraint with
vertical integration. The first component of the incentive constraint, (JP,.q*v, is the
direct effect, which would also be present in the absence of competition. The effect
of increasing the degree of spillover implies that the value to the marginal consumer
of a given level of infrastructure quality is higher and the downstream subsidiary
of firm v can, all other things held constant, sell its output q*v at a higher price.
Furthermore, increasing the degree of spillover implies (under the assumptions I
have made) that the rival's output q*i increases, which raises firm v's profit in the
local access segment (this is (w - c) 83;'). The expression PQq*v 8fø' in the incentive
constraint deals with the indirect effect on downstream profit of increasing the degree
of spillover. Since increasing spillover implies a higher total output in equilibrium,
there is a loss on all inframarginal units. It is easily shown that the sign of the
31The degree of spillover is common knowledge among all firms, and is revealed prior to the final
stage of the game.
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incentive constraint is greater or equal to zero, when demand is concave (or more
generally, not too convex), for the whole support for (3.
In the case of vertical separation, the incentive constraint is positive for all
(3 E ~,Ø] provided that w ~ c, but takes on a simpler form as the provider of local
access does not internalise the effects on downstream profits:
Lemma 5 When there is vertical separation, (first-order) incentive compatibility
requires the following:
Proof. More generally, we can write the first-order incentive constraint as: ~; =
a£u + ~~:~ + ~r::~. Contrary to the case of vertical integration, the envelope
theorem is not utilised here. Note that aaIIu= aaIIu= (w - c). The proof makes useql fl2
of the properties of the equilibrium quantities (proven in appendix 1; insert for the
symmetric equilibrium quantities in the vertically separated case) to determine that
!!!li + !!!li 28P" > O •aø aø = - 3PQ+PQQQs - .
We observe that dIP' / d(3 ~ Ofor all (3 E ~,Ø], with equality only for B = O
and/or w = c. When there is vertical separation, asymmetry of information benefits
the regulated firm since changes in the degree of spillover affects the total size of the
access market. The equilibrium profit of the vertically separated firm is increasing in
the degree of spillover, which must be taken into account by an incentive compatible
mechanism (i.e., the transfers will have to be increasing in the degree of spillover). A
high degree of spillover implies that investing in infrastructure quality increases the
demand for the final product, and consequently, the demand for access substantially.
However, the value of the increase in demand for access naturally depends on the
profit margin in the access segment. A vertically separated firm can only recoup
the benefit from the investments by capturing some of the increased value of the
downstream output through a positive profit margin on access (as opposed to the
vertical integration case, where the regulated firm is able to internalise some of the
value creation of the investment through its downstream subsidiary). Consequently,
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the value of the private information vanishes if the regulated firm does not make
positive profits on the sale of access. A regulated firm will not be able to gain
anything from pretending to have a different level of spillover than the realised level,
since the access revenue is identical and equal to zero no matter what is reported.P
In such a case, the transfer from the regulator will only have to cover the investment
costs.
If the mechanism is not designed to achieve truthful revelation the regulated firm
will, by imitating a firm with lower degree of spillover, be able to get a higher transfer
combined with the profit of a high spillover firm. This implies that the firm is able
to capture some additional profits. If the informational asymmetry is not taken into
account when designing the regulation, a firm reporting a high degree of spillover
will end up with a smaller transfer (information rent) than a firm (mis)reporting a
lower degree of spillover. Thus, to be able to reveal the degree of spillover truthfully,
the transfer must take this opportunity of misreporting into account.
4.1 Optimal policies
The regulator's optimisation problem is given by:
mr-1;[es (/1, O) - cQ' (/1, O) - K (O) - Alli (/1, O)ldG (/1) (16)
where j = (v, u) subject to either
(ICVI)
n- (,8) ;?: O (PCVI)
32This result is similar to what Lewis and Sappington (1988) finds for a monopolist when demand
is uncertain. In their model, the monopolist earns no information rent and has no incentives to
report a demand different from the true demand.
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if there is vertical integration, or
dIIU 2(}PK.
d{3 = - (w - c) 3PQ + PQQQs (ICVS)
IIU ({3) ~ O (PCVS)
if there is vertical separation. In addition, the following constraint must be taken
into account in both cases:
(Cournot)
The last constraint is simply the Cournot equilibrium from the final stage of
the game. Obviously, in the vertical separation case the equilibrium outputs are
symmetric. The participation constraint ensures non-negativity of profits and must
be satisfied. In addition to the constraints set out above, we also need to ensure
that the optimal solution satisfies the second-order incentive constraint."
Integrating the incentive constraint by parts, assuming that [PC] binds for the
lowest level of spillover, {3, we get an expression for the regulator's virtual surplus
(i.e., welfare adjusted to take account of the informational costs of inducing truthful
revelation) .
In the case of vertical integration, the virtual surplus is given by:
VS;., = 1;{J.Q p (Q',O)dQ' - cQi - K (O) (17)
+A 1 ~ ~~(3) [((w - c) + PQq*V) ~;i+ (}PK.q*Vl} dG ({3)
33Provided that dfIk /d/3 is increasing in e, where k = v, u, then the second-order incentive
constraint requires that the optimal solution for e must be increasing in /3. The proof of this is
standard and is omitted. For details, consult Guesnerie and Laffont (1984).
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If there is vertical separation, virtual surplus is:
vs,.". = ;: {J.Q p (Cl, 9)dCl - cQ's - K (9) (18)
-A 1- G (,8) [(W - c) 2BP/t l} dG (,8)
g (,8) 3PQ + PQQQ'S
4.1.1 Optimal infrastructure quality
Maximising the integrand of expression (17) and (18) pointwise with respect to B,
we obtain the following first-order condition for optimal quality under asymmetric
information B1! for J' = I 8.34, 3 ' , •
The only difference from the full information solution is the information cor-
rection term, I eTj• The exact characteristics of the incentive correction terms is
summarised in Lemma 6:
Lemma 6
a) If there is vertical integration, the incentive correction term is given by:
(20)
b) If there is vertical sepamtion, the incentive correction term is given by:
The information correction term I eT! is positive if the information rent increases
in B, or equivalently, 82rr*v/8B8,8 > 0.35 If the incentive correction term is positive,
34The second-order incentive constraint is assumed to be satisfied. The following conditions are
sufficient, but not necessary, to ensure this (subscripts denote partial derivatives): i) d~ (l~(Jf)) ~
0, ii) II,88 ~ 0, iii) II,8,88~ 0, iv) Q,88 ~ 0, and v) C8,88 ~ O. It can be shown that the necessary
conditions for second-order incentive compatibility are satisfied in the linear inverse demand case.
35This is the single-crossing condition on equilibrium profit.
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this has the effect of increasing the regulator's costs, which implies that optimal
quality should be lower than in the full information case. In addition, there is "no
distortion at the top". These are standard results in many models of asymmetric
information. The term correcting for the asymmetry of information is, however, not
unambiguously positive and the sign is difficult to determine in general.
If leTs is positive, then the asymmetry of information dictates a lower level
of quality compared to the full information solution. If w > c, then leTs> o if
the following inequality is satisfied: (3PQ + PQQQ:sl + 2/3BPItPQQ ;:::0.36 This is
equivalent to saying that the rate at which equilibrium output increases with the
spillover level is increasing in the level of quality. This inequality will be satisfied
for, e.g., linear and quadratic inverse demand functions.
Observe that if w = c .when there is vertical separation, the term correcting for
the asymmetry of information vanishes. In such a case, we have seen that the value of
the regulated firm's private information vanishes. Consequently, the socially optimal
policy on quality investment will be unaffected by the asymmetry of information if
access is priced at the marginal cost of providing the access service, and the socially
optimal solutions under full and asymmetric information coincides. The regulator
will, ifw = c, simply set a transfer equal to the cost of investing in the infrastructure
and leave the regulated firm zero economic profit.
4.1.2 Optimal quality levelswith linear demand
Let us now examine the explicit solution when the demand side and costs are speci-
fied as above. I assume here that the degree of spillover is uniformly distributed on
the interval ~,Øl. Solving first the regulator's maximisation problem in the vertical
integration case when there is asymmetric information about the level of spillover,
we find that the socially optimal level of quality is given by:37
BAI _ ...;_(8_a_-_w..;,_)/3_+~(2_a_-_w~) _A ~(/3~-_Ø)...!..
I - 9cp - 4/3 (2/3 + A (/3 - Ø) ) (22)
36This inequality is obtained by inserting for 8Qs/88 in lGTs.
371 assume that the second-order conditions are met, which ensure that the denominators in the
expressions for optimal quality are positive.
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If the upstream firm is not allowed to compete downstream, but must produce
access for two independent downstream firms, the socially optimal level of quality
is given by:
OAI _ (8a - 2w),8 + 6WA (,8 - 'Ø)
S - gCP _ 8,82
Observe that when there is asymmetric information about the degree of spillover
(23)
and the regulator must pay the regulated firm an informational rent, it may happen
that the optimal quality levels as defined byeqns. (22) and (23) are negative for
some parameter combinations, which cannot happen when there is full information.
This may, in particular, happen if the degree of spillover is sufficiently small and the
shadow cost of public funds is sufficiently large. I assume that quality investments
cannot be negative, so in those cases, the regulator will induce the regulated firm
not to invest at all. In the linear demand case, we obtain the standard result that
the quality for all but the highest spillover type is distorted downwards; i.e., the
socially optimal level of quality is always higher under full information relative to the
asymmetric information solution when there is vertical integration and separation,
respectively (i.e., Of I ~ Of for j = I, S).
Note that from eqn. (23) we see that the optimal level of infrastructure qual-
ity is strictly positive when W = O, and that this level corresponds to the socially.
optimal level under full information given by eqn. (12). The reason for this has
been discussed above, and relates to the fact that the regulated firm does not pos-
sess valuable private information when the access charge is equal to marginal cost.
However, if there is vertical integration and asymmetric information, the regulator
will want to choose a level of quality which is different to the full information case
even if w = O, except for the highest level of spillover ,8 = ,8 (i.e., no distortion at
the top). With vertical integration the cost of inducing truthful revelation is, for
,8 =I ,8, never zero. Thus, the presence of asymmetry of information will influence
the solution even with marginal cost pricing of access. By distorting the quality
level downward relative to the full information solution it becomes less profitable
to imitate firms with lower degrees of spillover, which lowers the information rent.
A lower level of quality implies that the value of the final product is lower at the
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margin, and furthermore, it lowers the profit from the access segment due to a lower
total equilibrium output. Both these effects reduce the incentives to imitate lower
spillover types. However, lower quantity implies higher prices for the inframarginal
consumers in the downstream market, but this effect is dominated by the two former
effects.
4.2 The effect of the vertical structure on regulatory policies
In this section I will discuss how changes in the choice of the vertical structure
affects the choice of regulatory policy. As we have seen, the vertical structure has
an impact on the incentive compatibility constraint, and consequently, changes in
the vertical structure may affect the level of information rents necessary to induce
truthful revelation. This may have an impact on the socially optimal quality levels
under vertical separation and integration.
Before the formal analysis is undertaken, I will briefly discuss the intuition behind
the results. The positive external effects on the downstream market of investments
is an argument for regulating the infrastructure quality. We have seen above that
the socially optimal level of quality is higher with vertical integration than with
vertical separation when there. is full information. This is due to the vertically
integrated firm's ability to internalise the vertical externality, and produce at lower
cost than when there is vertical separation. When there is asymmetric information
about the spillover levels, however, the informational cost is in itself an argument
against regulation of quality. The cost of regulation in terms of the information rent
must then be weighed against the benefit of regulation (internalising the positive
external effect) to determine whether regulation should take place. The magnitude
of the information rent will naturally be important in this trade-off, and as we will
see below, the choice of market structure is important in determining the level of
the information rent. In the asymmetric information case, we find that the socially
optimal quality in some cases is higher under vertical separation than under vertical
integration due to the effect that differences in the vertical structure has on the
information rent.
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4.2.1 Comparison of the information rents
The information rent in the case of vertical separation may be written as (assuming
that the participation constraint binds for the type with the lowest level of spillover,
or the least efficient type):38
r [ 8Q* lfis (,8) = Jf!. (w - c) ; dr (24)
and for vertical integration:
Subscript S and I refer to vertical separation and vertical integration, respec-
tively. The difference in information rents is defined as: ~R = fii (,8) - fis (,8).
The sign of ~R clearly depends on optimal infrastructure quality (under vertical
separation and integration), among other things, and is determined by the following
expression:
Proposition 3 The information rent to the regulated firm is higher under vertical
integmtion compared to vertical sepamtion.
Sufficient conditions for the expression (26) to be non-negative; i.e., ~R 2:: O, is
that the inverse demand function is concave and that assumption 1 is satisfied."
Consequently, under the assumptions in this paper, the information rent to a verti-
cally integrated and regulated firm will always be at least as large as the information
rent if there is vertical separation.
38To save on notation, I only include the variables related to upstream costs and the infrastruc-
ture quality. Subscripts S and I refer to the cases of vertical separation and vertical integration,
respectively. Note that the derivatives of the equilibrium downstream quantities are functions of
the parameter {j.
39The result is maintained even if the inverse demand function is convex, provided that demand
is not too convex (see, e.g., Hahn, 1962).
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4.2.2 Comparison of optimal quality
When comparing the optimal quality under vertical separation and integration, re-
spectively, we need to compare the first-order condition (19) for j = I, S. We have
seen that when w = c, the full information solution is identical both under vertical
integration and separation. Thus, the only difference between these two conditions
when w = c will be due to differences in how the asymmetry of information af-
fects the solution, and in that special case we need only compare the information
correction terms, leTs and leT/, given in Lemma 6.
Let us first examine the difference in the incentive correction terms, before ex-
amining the difference in optimal quality in the two cases (the comparison of quality
will only be undertaken in the simplified case of linear inverse demand and convex
investment costs).
Define ~IeT = leTs - leT/, which is given by:
~IeT =
The sign of the expression (27) is difficult to establish with a general demand
function. I will therefore only consider the case with a linear inverse demand, with
p (Q, 8) = a+ f38- Q. The marginal cost of access provision is normalised to zero;
i.e., c = O. In this case, the difference in the information correction terms can be
rewritten as:
~IeT = -). 1- G (f3) (3a + 5f3(1)
9 (f3) 9
(28)
From eqn. (28) we observe that the sign on ~IeT will be negative, and strictly
negative for f3> f3,which means that the information correction term under vertical
integration is always strictly larger than in the case of vertical separation. This tells
us that the marginal information rent is larger if there is vertical integration, which
in isolation tends towards lower quality under vertical integration than with vertical
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separation. However, with vertical integration some of the vertical externalities be-
tween the upstream and downstream markets can be internalised which implies that
the cost of providing a certain output downstream is lower with vertical integration.
This tends towards higher quality when there is vertical integration than when there
is vertical separation. Consequently, the only reason for the socially optimal level of
quality to be higher under vertical integration when there is asymmetric information
is that the cost advantage due to internalisation of the vertical externality becomes
sufficiently large. When this happens, the benefit of a lower marginal information
rent with vertical separation is dominated by the cost advantage of producing with
vertical integration.
Since the marginal information rent (or information correction term) always is
higher under vertical integration, we know that the socially optimal level of infras-
tructure quality is strictly higher under vertical separation when there is marginal
cost pricing of access.
More generally (i.e., when w > c) it can be shown that the regulated access charge
with vertical separation is larger than under vertical integration if the following
inequality is satisfied:
(9<p- 8/12) (-w/1 -.\ (/1 -73) (2a - 7w))
-4/1.\ (/1 -73) ((8a - 2w) /1+ 6w.\ (/1 -73)) ;:::O
(29)
We observe that for w = O,the inequality is indeed satisfied, which implies that
marginal cost pricing of access results in a higher quality level with vertical separa-
tion than with vertical integration. By continuity, this also holds for small access
charges in excess of marginal cost. When the access charge becomes sufficiently
large, the inequality (29) switches sign. The reason for this is that when there is
vertical separation and the access charge becomes sufficiently large, the cost disad-
vantage imposed by the vertical externality of the vertical separation case will come
to dominate the difference in the incentive correction terms. This is summarised in
the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Let us assume that the inverse demand function is linear.
32
a) If the access charge is sufficiently low (where Wcrit ~ W ~ O), then the so-
cially optimallevel of infrastructure quality is strictly larger under vertical separation
compared to the case of vertical integration; i.e., (J:I ~ (Jfl.
b) If the access charge is sufficiently high (i.e., W > Wcrit), then the socially
optimal quality level is larger under vertical integration; i.e., (Jfl > (J:I.
c) For the highest spillover level {i.e., {3 = (3), the socially optimal quality level
is highest under vertical integration.
Proof.
since W ~ Oper assumption, then (Jf ~ (J:I. •
The intuition behind this result can be explained by examining how the (first-
order ) incentive constraints are affected by changes in the regulated quality, given by
lemmas 4 and 5. The profit of the regulated firm at the margin increases faster when
the degree of spillover increases if the firm is vertically integrated, which results in a
higher marginal information rent. The value to the regulated firm of having superior
information depends on whether there are restrictions on which segments the firm
can operate in, and the value of private information comes from both the upstream
and downstream segments. Restricting the regulated firm's opportunity to operate
in both markets will also restrict the earning potential of the firm (i.e., it willlimit
the value of the information, and thereby the level of the information rent).
When the degree of spillover is equal to the upper support (i.e., (3 = (3), we
observe that the socially optimal quality is higher if there is vertical integration
compared to the vertical separation case. This is equivalent to the situation under
full information. This is, of course, due to the fact that there is "no distortion at
the top"; the regulator chooses to distort all types' allocations except for the highest
spillover type.
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4.2.3 Optimal versus unregulated quality under asymmetric information
Is it necessary for the regulator to regulate infrastructure quality? In this sec-
tion I will examine how the socially optimal solutions under vertical integration and
separation correspond to the unregulated outcomes. The main point is then to char-
acterise when the the industry should be subject to regulation of the infrastructure
quality, and when should the regulator leave the market to itself? To say something
about this, we need to compare the socially optimal outcomes and the unregulated
outcomes under vertical integration and separation. To simplify the analysis, I will
only examine the case with linear inverse demand and quadratic investment costs
(as described above).
Vertical integration Assume that there are no vertical restrictions on the up-
stream monopolist, and that this firm finds it profitable to enter the downstream
market. If the firm is subject to regulation, we know from eqn. (25) that the reg-
ulator must pay the vertically integrated firm a strictly positive information rent,
which is socially costly. Furthermore, if the quality level in the regulated case is
lower than the unregulated outcome, we get a lower level of quality at a higher cost.
Thus, it is in society's interest to avoid regulation if this is the case.
Define fl.] = of - Ojr, where of is defined by eqn. (22) and Ojr is defined by
eqn. (14). Then, we have the following:
fl.] = 2Ø2 [21wØ + (2a + l1w) A (Ø -:8)]
+9r,o [6 (a - w) Ø+ (2a - w) A (Ø -:8)]
(30)
It is difficult to determine the sign of eqn. (30), as there are opposing effects, but
some observations can be made. First, we see that the magnitude of the spillover
parameter Ø plays an important role. For Ø = Ø, we find that fl.] > O,which implies .
that an unregulated, vertically integrated firm will choose a socially suboptimal
level of infrastructure quality when the spillover is at its highest. However, fl.]
becomes smaller when the degree of spillover is reduced, and for a sufficiently low
level of spillover the sign on fl.] changes and becomes negative.t? Furthermore, these
40Numerical calculations suggest that switching level for the spillover parameter may be as low
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opposing effects are present even when the access charge is set equal to zero (i.e.,
equal to the marginal cost).
For a sufficiently low degree of spillover the unregulated firm will choose a higher
level of quality than the regulated quality level, and we know that an increase in the
level of quality has a beneficial effect on welfare (ceteris paribus). Furthermore, no
regulation implies that the regulator does not have to pay socially costly information
rents, which is also a benefit. Consequently, if the degree of spillover is sufficiently
low and there is vertical integration, then there should be no regulation.'!
Vertical separation Let us now assume that the upstream monopolist is pro-
hibited from entering the downstream market. In this case, the information rent
payable to the regulated firm is given by eqn. (24), and we have already seen that
the level of information rent approaches zero when the access charge approaches the
marginal cost of providing access.
Define ~s = 0:1 - Os, where Of is defined byeqn. (15) and OST is defined by
eqn. (15). Then we have the following:
~s = (24 (a - w) {3+ 18w>. ({3 - Ø)) rp + 16w{33 (31)
Again, as in the vertical integration case, there are opposing effects which make
it difficult to determine the sign on eqn. (31). However, some observations can be
made. First, if either w = Oor {3 = {3, then we find that ~s is strictly positive
(provided, of course, that {3 > O). In this case, we know from eqn. (15) that
an unregulated firm will invest nothing in quality. Thus, marginal cost pricing
of access together with vertical separation implies that regulated level of quality is
strictly larger than the unregulated level for all positive degrees of spillover (contrary
to the vertical integration case). Furthermore, we know from eqn. (24) that the
as /3 :::::0.29, but the switching level changes when both the level of the access charge and the
shadow cost of public funds change. More specifically, the switching level is increasing in both w
and A.
41This essentially tells us that a socially optimal regulatory mechanism should specify: 1) a
contract which depends on the level of spillover reported only if /3 is larger than some criticallevel,
and 2) no regulation below this level.
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information rent to the regulated :firm is zero in this case. Consequently, with
marginal cost pricing of access and vertical separation, the regulator should regulate
the quality level, provided that the social cost of investments (which is transferred
to the regulated firm) is smaller than the welfare loss due to the lower unregulated
quality level. However, for an access charge in excess of marginal cost, W > c, we
have a similar story to the vertical integration case above. Then, for a sufficiently
low level of the spillover parameter {3, the sign on !:l.s changes from positive to
negative.P
4.2.4 Welfare considerations
From eqn. (21) we can deduce that if the access charge is cost-based and, more
specifically, equal to the marginal cost of providing access, w = c, then vertical sep-
aration implies that the full information solution can be implemented.P The only
transfer necessary is to cover the investment costs. Thus, if the regulator invokes
vertical separation prior to the start of the game, he will in the present model be able
to implement the best possible outcome at no extra cost when there is asymmetric
information about the effect of investments on demand. Under vertical integration
the socially optimal quality level will be strictly less than the full information solu-
tion, and the regulator must pay the regulated :firm a strictly positive information
rent in addition to the cost of investment. This implies that a welfare maximising
regulator will be able to generate a higher level of welfare in the vertical separation
case relative to the vertical integration case if the infrastructure quality is subject
to regulation and if the regulated quality level is higher under vertical separation.
As we have seen above, the latter will be satisfied for a sufficiently low level of the
access charge and is certainly satisfied for marginal cost pricing of access.
If, however, infrastructure quality remains unregulated no information rent is
necessary, which is beneficial in terms of overall welfare. On the other hand, in some
42Numerical calculations suggest that, for an access charge in excess of marginal cost, the switch-
ing levelon the spillover parameter is increasing in A (the shadow cost of public funds).
43Ifw > c then the solution under asymmetric information and vertical separation will, of course,
be closer to the full information solution the closer w is to c.
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cases the socially optimal level of quality (the regulated level of quality) is higher
than the level an unregulated, profit-maximising firm would choose. This is the case
if, e.g., the degree of spillover is sufficiently high. Since quality increases overall
welfare, a suboptimal level of quality is detrimental to welfare. If the regulated
quality level of higher than the unregulated level, the gain in terms of welfare of
the higher quality level must be weighed against the social cost of awarding the
regulated firm an informational rent.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has analysed the regulation of infrastructure quality in vertically re-
lated markets in the presence of asymmetric information about the effect of these
investments on the demand for the downstream product. FUrthermore, the effects
of differences in market structure - vertical integration versus vertical separation -
are investigated. There are some external effects associated with the investments,
both on the consumers' surplus and on the profit of rival firm(s), which can be inter-
nalised through regulation; This is, in isolation, an argument in favour of regulating
the infrastructure quality investment decision. The vertical structure of the market,
and the assumptions about the firms' cost structures in the present model, also im-
ply that the socially optimal quality is higher under vertical integration because the
vertical externality is avoided. However, the presence of asymmetric information
about the effect of investments on demand has an impact on the information rent,
which may reverse the result.
The results in the paper also suggest that regulating the infrastructure quality
is not necessarily the socially optimal policy, even if the regulated quality is shown
to be higher than the unregulated quality levels. When the government regulates
quality, truthful revelation necessitates the payment of an information rent and
transfer to cover (in part or in full) the investment costs, which is assumed to be
socially costly due to distortionary taxation. Provided that the effect of investments
on demand is sufficiently low, it is better to let the quality investment decision be
taken by the investing firm without interference, since no transfers are necessary in
37
the unregulated case.
The cost structure of the present model does not incorporate economies of scope
between network and end-user services. This is obviously a simplification, and may
not be a reasonable assumption for some potential applications of the model. The
presence of economies of scope may modify some of the results. With regulation I
show that the information rent is lower under vertical separation relative to vertical
integration, which in isolation is an argument in favour of invoking vertical separa-
tion. I argue that welfare is higher with vertical separation in the regulated case
at least if the access charge is sufficiently low. However, with economies of scope
the result may be reversed for a given level of the access charge. Put differently, for
vertical separation to yield higher welfare than vertical integration in the presence
of economies of scope it is necessary to reduce the access charge compared to the
scenario without economies of scope.
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7 ·Appendix
Appendix 1
Proof of lemmas 1 and 2
In this appendix we will show the properties of the equilibrium quantities of the
final stage only. The system of first-order conditions is given by:
anV .-a = PQq*V+ (P (Q*,{30) - c) = oqV (32)
and
ani .-a . = PQq*' + (P (Q*, (30) - w) = oqt (33)
Equations (32) and (33) defines a system of first-order conditions, which can
be used to determine the effects on equilibrium quantities of changing exogenous
variables. The exogenous variables at the final stage of the game are: w (access
charge), O (infrastructure quality), {3 (spillover), and c (upstream marginal cost).
To save on notation, let us define x to be the vector. of exogenous variables at
the final stage of the game: x = (w, o, c, (3). Total differentiation of the system of
equations yields:
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or by rearranging:
(!!fe.) ( 8
2
n" )8x _ _ 8x8q"
8q*i - &ni
8x 8x8qi
Let us call the 2 x 2 matrix A. This system can be solved using Cramer's
rule. The determinant to the matrix A, lAI = [PQ (3PQ+ PQQQ)J, is positive under
assumption 2. This yields the following:
8q*" _ ,8P,.(PQQ(q*"-q*')-PQ) 8g*' _ ,8P,.(PQQ(q*'-q*")-PQ)
8e - lAI 89 - lAI
8g*" _ ep,.(PQQ(q*"-q*')-PQ) 8g*' _ ep,.(PQQ(q*i_q*")_PQ)
8,8 - lAI 8,8 - lAI
8g*" _ PQ+PQQq*" > O 8g*' _ 2PQ+PQQq*" < O
8w - lAI 8w - lAI
8g*" _ 2PQ+PQQq*' < O 8g*' __ PQ+PQQq*' > O
8c - lAI 8c - lAI
The properties of total downstream demand is simply the sum of the effects
on the two firms' demands: åQ* lå/3 = -20PK.I (3PQ+ PQQQ*) > O, åQ* låO =
-2/3PK.I (3PQ + PQQQ*) > O, åQ* låc = åQ* låw = Il (3PQ + PQQQ*) < O.
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Abstract
This paper focuses on the optimal quality regulation of vertically differ-
entiated duopolies in the presence of asymmetric information. In the model
presented there are cross-effects on the information rent. Contrary to standard
single-agent models, the production levels are distorted in favour of the most
efficient firm, whose production level is increased under asymmetric informa-
tion relative to full information. The first-best outcomes can only be achieved
if both firms are of the most efficient types. The optimal degree of vertical
differentiation is also discussed. Furthermore, some extensions to the model
are examined (the presence of cost complementarity, quality as complements
etc.).
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1 Introduction
In a situation of increasing competition, many :firms will attempt to differentiate
their products from those of their competitors to earn higher levels of profits. In the
market for (tele)communications services, one way of doing this would be to vary
the degree of functionality (or quality) of a service. With the introduction of digital
technology, providers of telecommunications services have a wide range of options
on how to do this. The old copper wires previously used for analogue telephony
only, can now be used to supply, e.g., digital telephony, ISDN (Integrated Service
Digital Network) or ADSL (Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line). All of which no
doubt will increase the value of the subscription to consumers.
It is reasonable to assume that some kind of regulation will remain in this market
for some time still as efficient competition establishes itself. One type of regulation
which would be reasonable to investigate more closely is the regulation of quality. A
frequent (unwanted) consequence of competition is the degradation of quality. This
fear is certainly well-founded if the industry is regulated by price-caps, as price-caps
normally do not give benefits to firms for increasing the quality of the product they
sell, l Quality of access to services such as telecommunications is an important aspect
of the communications industry, and is often emphasised in the political debate. It
is therefore not unlikely that some sort of regulation of quality will be considered for
this sector, to ensure that the benefits of competition does not come at the expense
of the quality offered.
Here I focus on the case where a regulatory body induces the two firms to choose
certain levels of quality, using a direct revelation mechanism, which implies that the
extent of vertical differentiation is in fact induced through the regulation mechanism.
I show that the regulator may find it welfare improving to induce the firms to supply
different levels of quality. In a (tele)communications setting, this could amount to
supplying different speeds of connection, or different choices of technology.f These
lFollowing the deregulation of the UK telecommunications industry quality did not fall, but
did not increase as much as would be expected taking into account the technical advances which
were made (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994).
2We win see that the most efficient firm (with the lowest unit cost of producing quantity) is .
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issues are closely related to the literature on (strategic) investments in R&D, but the
majority of this literature considers situations with full information.f In the R&D
literature the external effect imposed on rival firms is (usually) positive provided
that the degree of spillover between firms is sufficiently high.
An alternative interpretation of the model could be the regulation of advertising.
In such a case, one could assume that the firms produce goods which are identical
physically, and the firms use advertising to attempt to distinguish their product
from that of the competitor and thereby capturing market shares. Such advertising
expenditure is socially wasteful. One concern could be that opening up a sector to
free competition results in, at best, no positive effect on welfare (or even a loss of
welfare) due to excess spending on advertising, and a regulator may want to limit
such behaviour. In such a setting the result that the most efficient firm is allowed a
higher level of the regulated variable (here, advertising expenditure) is interpreted
as a measure to allow this firm to capture a larger share of the market.
The main goal of this paper is to provide a starting point for further analysis of
the regulation of multi-agent settings, where the agents (firms) produce vertically
differentiated products. The level of quality is the means for differentiating the
. products. An analysis of multiproduct monopolies would have similar features as
the model presented below, but there is an important difference. In a model of
the optimal regulation of a multiproduct monopoly the incentive correction has the
standard property that allocations are not distorted for the most efficient type,
commonly known as "no distortion at the top". However, in the model of the
optimal regulation of single-product duopolies, this is not generally the case. The
result of "no distortion at the top" requires either that both firms are of the most
efficient type, or that firms are equally inefficient. Thus, the standard properties of
single-agent models does not necessarily carry over to multi-agent settings.
Optimal regulation of duopolies under asymmetric information is not very well
induced to supply high quality access (e.g., broadband, and possibly wireless access). The other
firm, which has a higher unit cost, is induced to supplyaccess of lower quality (access with lower
capacity and speed).
3D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992) consider the strate-
gic incentives to invest in R&D.
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covered in the literature. Furthermore, the literature on regulation and quality con-
cerns is relatively scarce. Other examples of regulation and quality can be found in
Laffont and Tirole (1993: chapter 4), Lewis and Sappington (1991), Auriol (1992,
1998), and Wolinsky (1997). Both Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Lewis and Sap-
pington (1991) considers the regulation of a monopoly. Wolinsky (1997) presents a
model where the quality choices of the firms cannot be controlled by the regulator,
and considers the regulation of prices and market shares. The results he obtains are
similar to some of the results in this paper (those obtained in the absence of cost
complementarity and for a simple demand and cost structure specification). My
work is closer to the paper by Auriol (1998), but there are some notable differences.
My model considers the regulation of two firms who produce a single product
each, in the absence of strategic interaction, whose cost characteristics are inde-
pendently distributed. The regulator designs a menu of contracts for the firms,
specifying quality and transfers as functions of reported types. The qualities of the
two firms are assumed to be substitutes, which corresponds to the case where firms
invests in quality to differentiate their products. The two firms' products are thus
assumed to be vertically differentiated. The regulator is unable to observe total
costs, and each firm has private information about its level of efficiency. Auriol
(1998) considers a setting which is similar to mine, but where qualities are comple-
ments. The products are supplied through a common network by two firms. The
only things that matters in the gross surplus function is total quality and whether
,
both firms produce at the optimum (diversity increases consumer surplus). This
implies that there is a public good aspect to quality; if one of the firms invests in
quality, both the investing firm's customers and the customers served by the other
firm benefit from the increased quality. This, together with unverifiable quality,
introduces a problem of free-riding in quality provision which is absent in my initial
model. 4 This point is, however, elaborated in the section on extensions to the basic
4The reason for this is of course that quality is observable, or verifiable, to the regulator in
my model. If quality is unverifiable to the regulator, the solution would be interior in the general
case. That is, both firms supply positive levels of quality. Furthermore, by rephrasing the model
to analyse qualities as complements, free-riding is a solution only if there is cost complementarity
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model. Furthermore, in Auriol's model quantity is regulated directly, whereas I con-
sider the regulation of qualities. The choice of quality levels affect the production
levels, which indicates that the regulation in my model is an indirect regulation of
quantities. Contrary to the model by Auriol, the quality provision and information
rent are not separated. In Auriol (1998), quantity is regulated and is independent
of the level of quality provided. This is not so in my model. The information rent
depends on the production levels, and the production levels are affected by the (reg-
ulated) quality levels. Thus, the level of quality affects the information rent. The
implication is that the regulator may choose to distort quality levels to affect the
firms' incentives. Furthermore, I obtain conditions which characterise the optimal
degree of vertical differentiation. I consider a more general cost function than does
Auriol (1992, 1998) which allows for cost complementarity, and I show that cost
complementarity may, or may not, decrease the marginal information cost.'
Olsen (1993) considers a model of multi agent regulation, where the (R&D) ac-
tions of the firms are substitute activites. He obtains the result that only if one
firm is close to being maximally efficient and the other firm is less efficient, then
the maximally efficient firm produces more than its full information level. If firms'
efficiency parameters are identically distributed, but not equally inefficient, nothing
can be said about the relations between full and asymmetric information produc-
tion levels. However, in my model, production levels are distorted in favour of the
relatively more efficient firm even for ex ante identical firms when total demand is
exogenous.
There may be several reasons for there being more than one operator in a market
that previously has been characterised as a natural monopoly (involving large fixed
costs). First of all, there may be a yardstick effect, in which competition among
firms with correlated costs reduces the information rent necessary to induce truthful
revelation/' Secondly, the natural monopoly argument may lose some of its validity
in some sectors (due to technological innovations). The telecommunications sector
between quantity and quality. This is briefly discussed in the extensions to the basic model.
5Auriol and Laffont (1993) consider, among other things, the yardstick effect as a reason for
socially valuable duplication of fixed costs.
5
is one in which possibly only the local access network is still considered a natural
monopoly" Thirdly, and possibly most importantly, by introducing competition one
may, at a later stage, be able to abolish regulations altogether. Thus, competition
may be seen as a substitute for regulation. However, even if the main reason for
allowing new firms into a market is to be able to use competition as a substitute
for regulation, there may still be scope for some sort of regulation. The reason for
this is that unregulated competition does not generally result in socially optimal
outcomes.
The paper is organised as follows: In section 2, the model is set out. In sec-
tion 3, the optimal solution under full information is analysed, section 4 examines
the requirements for implementation, and section 5 analyses the optimal solution
under asymmetric information. In section 6, some extensions to the basic model is
considered.
2 The model
The model consists of three basic elements: (1) The demand side and consumer
. welfare, (2) the firms' choice of quality, or functionality, and (3) the welfare max-
imising regulator. The market is of a fixed size, and regulating the firms affects
the distribution of market shares. Prices are exogenous to the model, whereas the
level of quality is endogenous. The assumption of an exogenous price is obviously a
simplification. A more complete regulatory mechanism where prices, in addition to
the quality levels, are included would be preferred. However, including prices in the
regulatory mechanism would not change the basic results of the model (and will in
some situations even strengthen the results).
The quality variable could be interpreted as the quality of access. For instance, .
whether the line is analog, or digital (the speed of the connection), or simply what
type of digital technology should be adopted. At the top-end, one could think
6Hansen (1996) finds evidence ofnatural monopoly when analysing the cost structure of Telenor.
In his model, if competition somehow reduces slack (by only a small amount), thus making the
firms produce more efficiently, competition may be welfare enhancing.
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of wireless broadband links, while at the bottom of the scale we would find fixed
analog connections. Firms have private information with respect to some efficiency
parameter, (3. The regulator is assumed to be a benevolent maximiser of welfare;
that is, he has no agenda of his own, and is purely interested in maximising a
utilitarian welfare function.
2.1 Consumers
The demand functions are in general given by qi = qi (s, 8), for i = 1,2, where
S = (Si, Sj) is the vector of qualities. The vector of qualities could for instance be
interpreted as the quality offered for access, as offered by the two firms operating
in the market. The market is of fixed size 8, which implies that qi = 8 - qj. The
demand functions have the following properties:
Assumption 1 Demand is increasing in oum quality, decreasing in the other
firm 's quality, and the marginal effect of quality changes on demand is decreasing in
the other firm 's quality.
Mathematically, 8qi/8si > O, 8Qi/8sj < O, 82qi/8si8sj < Ofor all (Si, Sj). In
addition, demand increases with the size of the market.
Consumers' net surplus is in general given by: S = S (s, 8), which implies that
net surplus is a function of qualities and the size of the market. Consumers' net
surplus has the following characteristics:
Assumption 2 Consumers' net surplus is increasing and concave with respect
to quality.
Th diti as O as O a2s O d a2s Oh· h a2s a2se con ItlOns-a. > '-a. > 'fF'!" < , an -a.a. < , toget er WIt fF'!" fF'!" -8, 8, 8i 8, 8, 81 82
[aa2aS] 2 > O, secures that net surplus is an increasing and concave function on81 82 -
(Sl, S2).
The assumption a~tsj < Otogether with the assumption a~§~j< O,ensures that
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the marginal value of Si to the regulator decreases in Sj if l,Bi - ,Bjl is sufficiently
small. In the definition of consumers' net surplus, S, the consumers' expenditures
for purchasing the products supplied by firms 1 and 2 are taken into account. Thus,
the fact that net surplus increases in quality indicates that the consumers prefer
higher levels of quality for given prices.
As noted, prices are exogenous and equal for both firms even if quality offered
by the two firms are different. An explanation for why some consumers still buy
from the firm providing the product with the lowest quality could be that there is
an unmodelled horisontal differentiation aspect. Thus, a consumer may prefer the
product from the low quality provider because it is closest to his preferred product.
An alternative explanation may be that some consumers for some reason are locked-
in (at least in the short run), and may continue to buy a product of inferior quality
even if there is a higher quality product available at an identical price.
2.2 Firms
The firms operate as profit maximising entities, and provide a single quality product
each. Prices are exogenous, and given as Pi = P > ,Bi \:li (see note above). Firm i
provides functionality level Si, where Si ~ §. ~ O,for i = 1,2. The lower bound on
the level of quality can be thought of as a minimum quality standard. The firms are
said to be vertically differentiated if Si =I Sj, for i =I j.
As for firms' information about each other's costs, it is assumed that each firm
knows only its own efficiency level. The firms' efficiency parameters are perceived
to be (independently) distributed according to common knowledge distributions by
the principal/regulator and the (other) firms/agents."
7The assumption of "ignorance" makes the analysis non-trivial. li firms have complete infor- .
mat ion about each other's efficiency parameters, the regulator could potentially force each firm to
report their true type by constructing a mechanism which results in an infinitely high penalty to
the firms if their reports do not coincide. Each firm is in such a mechanism assumed to report
the other firm's efficiency parameter in addition to its own. See Moore (1992) for more on this.
Of course, the realism of such a regulatory mechanism could be questioned. The assumption that
firms' efficiency parameters are independently distributed means that yardstick competition is not
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The firm maximises the following objective function:
where i= 1,2. E denotes the expectations operator. Expectations are taken over
firm j's efficiency parameter, since firm i does not know firm j's type. The transfer
from the regulator to firm i is given by ti, and f3i denotes unit (and marginal) costs.
f3i and f3j are assumed to be independently distributed. This would be the case if
the two firms utilise different technologies (e.g., wireless vs. fixed-line technologies),
which are subjected to independent technology shocks. Marginal cost of producing
one unit of good i is initially assumed to be independent of the level of quality.8
1/Ji (Si) defines firm i's costs of undertaking quality enhancing investments. The
cost function is a cost element that is independent of quantity produced, or can be
interpreted as investment costs, and is an increasing and convex function.
Total costs for firm i are thus defined as9
Assumption 3 Marginal cost of quantity increases with inefficiency.
Assumption 3 is the familiar single-crossing condition, which in this case is
- r;l,a~! = -1 < 0, for i = 1,2. Total costs are assumed to be unobservable to
the regulator.
an issue.
8See section 6 for the analysis of a case with a more general cost function.
9This cost structure bears resemblance to the model presented by Lewis and Sappington (1991).
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2.3 The regulator
The regulator is assumed to be benevolent (that is, he has no agenda of his own),
and maximises a utilitarian welfare function. By assuming that there are positive
shadow costs of public funds (the approach used in Laffont and Tirole, 1993), there
is a trade-off between information rents to the firms and economic efficiency.
The regulator's objective function is given as:
The regulator maximises a utilitarian welfare function, but takes into account
the welfare loss of transfers due to shadow costs of public funds. By inserting for
transfers and simplifying (using the fact that q1+q2 = O), we get the welfare function
(2):
w (p, s, A, 7rl! 7r2, 8) = S (s, 8) - (1+ A) ['Ij;1(Sl) + 'lj;2 (S2)]
+ (1+ A) [pO - {31q1(s, 8) - {32q2(s, 8)] - A7r1 - A7r2
where S is the vector (Sl ({3l!{32), S2 ({3I,{32)).
(2)
Assumption 4 The welfare function is increasing and concave on (Sl, S2) .
In the full information case, the regulator maximises W subject to the partici-
pation constraints only. In the c~e of asymmetric information, the regulator knows
only the support and distribution of the efficiency parameters, {31 and 132, and will
thus have to maximise expected welfare, with expectations taken over {31 and {32'
These (for the regulator) random variables have the (cumulative) distribution F ({3i),
with corresponding density function, which is assumed to be strictly positive over
the relevant range, with {3iE ~,.8]. Furthermore, F ({3i) = Oand F (.Bi) = 1, for'
i = l, 2. The efficiency parameters are assumed to be independently distributed,
and the monotone hazard rate property is assumed to hold (assumption 5):
Assumption 5 F({3i)/ f({3i) is non-decreasing.
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The regulator maximises the welfare function under the restrictions that the
firms report their true types (the incentive compatibility constraints), and that
firms choose to participate voluntarily (the participation constraints).
3 Optimal regulation under symmetric informa-
tion
The main purpose of this section is to provide the full information benchmark of
duopoly regulation of qualities. Below, I will compare optimal policies under sym-
metric and asymmetric information.
In the case of full information, the regulator can instruct the firms to implement
whatever qualities he finds to be optimal. He has, however, to consider the fact that
the firms may not wish to participate. By maximising the welfare function (eqn.
(2)), subject to the participation constraints that each firm is secured a non-negative
level of profit in expectation terms, E{3j1ri ({3i,{3j) ~ 0, or E{3j1ri (13i,{3j) ~ 0,10 we
obtain the optimal quality for firm i, S[I, as defined by equation (3):
å'I/Ji + ({3i _ (3j) åqi = _1_ åB (3)
Bs, ås, 1 + A åSi
for i = 1,2, and i =F j (by using the fact that the market size is fixed). Quality
is set such that the marginal cost of providing quality is equal to the sum of the
weighted marginal (net) consumer surplus and price-cost margins (weighted by the
marginal effect on demand from a change in quality). An unregulated firm i would
ignore the effect of a change in the level of quality on consumers' net surplus and
lOA note to the formulation of the participation constraints: Since the incentive compatibility
condition for firm i is strictly decreasing in the (in)efficiency parameter, l3i, for any given 13;, it .
suffices to require that the participation constraint for the least efficient type is satisfied. Then,
the participation constraint is satisfied for any type. In order for this to be true, the regulator
needs to design a mechanism such that the least efficient type gets a profit of zero for any report
made by the other firm, since firm i's profit is strictly increasing in the other firm's (in)efficiency
parameter.
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the cross-effect on firm j's profit.'! Since the outcome of an unregulated duopoly
competing in qualities is not generally identical to the socially optimal quality levels,
there may be some scope for the regulation of qualities.P There are external effects
due to investments that the unregulated firms cannot internalise. There are positive
external effects on consumers' surplus from investing in quality. In addition, the firm
that invests in quality imposes a negative external effect on the other firm from the
business stealing effect of the investments. Due to the opposing signs of the external
effects, the unregulated quality levels may be both too high or too low compared to
the socially optimal levels.
If firms' investment costs are identical, an exogenously given market size, and a
fully covered market (such that 8qi/8si = -8qj/8si), the most efficient firm always
provides the higher level of quality. Thus, we have the following result:
Lemma 1 If 'ljJi(Si) = 'ljJj(Sj) and 8qi/ 8si = -8qj /8si for 'Vi, j, i =1= j, then for
{3i < (3j we have sf I > sF·
Proof. Compare eqn.(3) for firms i and j. Using the assumptions on 'ljJ,S, and qi,
we observe that sf I = sf I only if {3i = {3j. It can be shown that in order to satisfy
the first-order conditions defined by eqn. (3), {3i < {3j must imply sf I > sf I. If this
is not the case, the first-order conditions with respect to Si and Sj cannot hold. •
4 Implementation
A set of contracts is incentive compatible if a set of first- and second-order conditions
are met. Local incentive compatibility (by using the first-order condition) requires
that the state variables (here, profits) vary in a certain manner with the efficiency
parameter. The second-order conditions ensure that the local optimum is also a'
global optimum.
11An unregulated profit maximising firm would choose its level of quality after the following rule:
~ = (p - f3i) ~, which generally differs from the socially optimal quality level.
121fsocial costs of public funds approaches infinity, optimal quality for the least efficient of
the two firms is the minimum quality whereas the more efficient firm produces a positive level of
quality.
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I assume that the regulator designs a (direct) revelation contract of the form
(utilising the Revelation Principle); Mi = {Si (.Bi, .Bj), ti(.Bi, .Bj) }, where .Bi is firm
i's report of its efficiency parameter to the regulator. Let 7ri ({3i) = Eø; [7ri ({3i, (3j)],
where E is the expectations operator.P In order for the regulator to maximise
welfare under asymmetric information, the following conditions must be met:
(le) Eø; [7ri ({3i,{3j)] ~ Eø; [7ri (.Bi,{3j)], for all ({3i,.Bi) ,Vi,
and
The requirements for implementation of incentive compatible contracts are sum-
marised in lemma 2 (local incentive compatibility) and proposition 3 (second-order
conditions) :
Lemma 2 When quality is verifiable to the regulator, local incentive compati-
bility requires (using the envelope theorem):
(4)
Both firms will earn information rents, except for firms of the least efficient
types, (3.14 The reason that both firm 1 and 2 earn rents is that the firms' efficiency
parameters are stochastically independent. Any information the regulator may have
on either firm is useless for the purpose of rent extraction. The information rent for
firm i is given by equation (5):
li
7ri({3i) = J Eø;qi (Si (Øi' (3j) ,Sj (~, (3j)) dØi + Eø;7ri (Øi, (3j) (5)
Øi
for i,j = 1,2.
I3Let Ep. [xl == Iff æ] (Øi) dØ,·
I4The regulator designs the contracts such that if a firm reports the highest Ø -value, he gets a
profit of zero no matter what the other firm reports.
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The first element on the right-hand side is the information rent a firm of type
(efficiency level) {3i earns (with expectations taken over firm j types). The informa-
tion rent is, of course, positive since the integrand is positive. Since rents to firms
are costly, the profit to firm i of type {3 is set equal tozero; i.e., Ef3j1ri (fti,{3j) = O.
The information rent is increasing in a firm's own quality level, but decreasing
in the other firm's quality level. This can be seen by differentiating the information
rent expression with respect to Si and Sj, respectively:
From assumption 1 we know that the partial derivative of qi with respect to Si is
positive, and with respect to Sj negative. All other things equal, distorting firm i's
quality downwards and firm j's quality upwards, reduces the information rent to firm
i since it reduces the quantity firm i produces. This implies that it is less tempting
for firm i (of any given level of efficiency) to imitate less efficient types. Thus, the
revelation process is made cheaper for the regulator .15 Note that there are two
different aspects to changing the level of information rent a firm earns. First, there
is the issue of distorting the production levels for less efficient types for a given firm
(the standard result in single-agent models). Second, we must consider incentives
between the two firms. This amounts to awarding the relatively more efficient of
the two firms a higher production level. Given that firm j is of the most efficient
type, distorting downwards the quality levels of all but the most efficient type of
firm i implies that firm i's incentives to imitate less efficient types is weakened.
This is so for two reasons: First (ignoring the other firm), reducing the quality
and thereby the quantity of less efficient types of firm i makes it less profitable
for a more efficient type to imitate less efficient type. Second, by imitating a less
15However,since qualities (and hence quantities) are substitutes, firm j's production level, and
hence information rent, is increased.
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efficient type, his level of quality and thereby quantity, is further reduced because
of the comparison between the two firms. Thus, because there are two firms in
the market, the incentives to portray oneself as less efficient are weakened further
relative to a monopoly situation.
Note that a more efficient firm is a firm which produces quantity, and not nec-
essarily quality, at a lower cost. Since the total size of the market is assumed to be
fixed, and fully covered, the fact that the distortion in quality levels (and market
share) in favour of the more efficient firm implies that total production is made at
a lower cost.
We have seen that the information rent of any given firm depends on the level
of quality of both firms. These cross-effects which affect the information rent may
be termed fiscal externalities. The provision of quality is therefore, unlike the result
in Auriol (1998), not separated from the rent extraction. The reason for this is due
to the difference in the regulation mechanism. In my model the production level
of each firm depends on the quality levels since quantity is not regulated directly.
Quantity is regulated indirectly through qualities, whereas Auriol (1998) considers
direct regulation of quantities.
The second-order sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility are given in
proposition 1:
Proposition 1 Given the assumption on single-crossing of cost curves, A.S,
sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility on the vector of control variables, s,
are: (i) ~ ~ O, and (ii) ~ ~ O for i,j = 1,2, and i =1= j.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in appendix 1.
This implies that quality, s, must be non-increasing in the firm's own inefficiency
parameter, {3, and must be non-decreasing in the other firm's (in)efficiency param-
eter. This is satisfied under assumptions 1, 5, and if the virtual surplus function
(expression (2) inserted for the informational costs) is concave in quality.
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5 Optimal regulation under asymmetric informa-
tion
In the case of asymmetric information, I assume that the regulator knows only
the distribution and support of the random variables /31 and /32 , and therefore
maximises expected welfare. Furthermore, the regulator needs to induce the firms
to reveal whatever private information they may have. By utilising the Revelation
Principle (e.g., Myerson, 1979), the regulator may formulate a direct mechanism in
which each firm will choose to reveal their types, provided that the transfer function
is constructed in such a manner that the mechanism is incentive compatible.
5.1 Optimal policies
The regulator's maximisation problem is the following:
subject to
(ICl)
(IC2)
(PCl)
(PC2)
Since transfers are costly, we can safelyassume binding participation constraints
for the least efficient firms (for both firms 1 and 2). Integrating by parts the incentive
constraints, taking into account that the participation constraints bind at type /3 for
16
both firms, and inserting into the welfare function (2), we obtain the virtual surplus
function. Let S denote the vector (Sl ({311{32) ,S2 ({311{32)):
Maximising the expression (7) with respect to Si, we obtain the formula for
optimal quality, sf I, for i= 1,2, and i =/:. j, given by:
a'l/i + ({3i _ {3j) aqi = _l_ as __ A_ [aqi F ({3i) + aq; F ({3j)] (8)
ås, aSi 1+ A ås, 1+ A ås, f ({3i) ås, f ({3j)
Note here that the formulas for optimal quality for the asymmetric information
case are identical to the full information formulas, exceptfor the incentive correction
component .. The right-hand side of the formula for optimal Sl is reduced by the
(incentive correction) term l~.\ [~~f::J + ~ ~f~J]·For firm 1, we have that the
quality level, Sl , should be distorted downwards if this expression is positive, since
the quality investment function is increasing and convex.
By assuming that the whole market is covered, wehave ~ = -~. This implies
that the increase in demand for the investing firm is fully offset by the reduction in
the other firm's demand. Then the incentive correction terms for sf I and stI are
reduced to expressions (9) and (10), respectively:
(9)
A [F ({3l) F ({32)] aq2
1+ A f ({3l) f ({32) aS2 (10)
If the sign of the bracketed term is assumed to be positive.l" then because of the
convexity of the quality investment functions, optimal quality for firm 1 is reduced
l6The sign is positive if /31 ~ f32 when distributions are identical using assumption 5.
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under asymmetric information. For firm 2 the exact opposite result holds; under
asymmetric information; optimal S2 is increased.
A note to the relevance of actual efficiency levels: When the principal is to
implement the optimal asymmetric information policies, he knows the true value of
the efficiency parameters. The reason is that he has already devised an incentive
compatible scheme, which induces firms to reveal their true types.
For the model presented here (with full market coverage), we have the following
results:
Proposition 2 If firm i is less efficient than firm j, i.e., {3i > {3j, then we have
the following relationships: (1) s[I ~ sf I, and (2) sfI s sf.
Corollary Assume that {3i =I {3j. Since the most efficient firm always provides
a higher level of quality under full information, the optimal policy under asymmetric
information leads to more differentiated products than in the full information case.
This result is quite obvious. From lemma 1 we know that the most efficient firm
always provides the higher level of quality under full information. The economic
intuition behind this result is that an increase in the degree of differentiation distorts
the division of the market in favour of the most efficient producer. Increasing the
quality level of the most efficient of the two firms and reducing it for the other firm
increases the production level of the most efficient and reduces the production level
of the other firm (see assumption 1).
Reducing the quality level of the less efficient firm and increasing it for the more
efficient firm implies that the most efficient firm's production level increases (and the
production level of the other firm decreases). Thus, contrary to standard one-agent
models, production levels under asymmetric information is higher for the most effi-
cient firm relative to the full information solution.?" The explanation for this is that
a departure from the full information solutions distorts the market shares in favour
of the firm with the highest level of efficiency. Increasing the most efficient firm's
17In standard one-agent models, production is distorted downwards to reduce information rent
payments. This, however, is not the case here. The reason is that it is the relative efficiency levels
(between the two firms) which matters.
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market share implies that the total production is made more cheaply, since efficiency
is related to the production of quantity (and not necessarily the cost of producing
quality). This result correspond to Olsen (1993), in which the most efficient agent
is required to have a higher R&D output in the asymmetric information case. The
reason for this result is, since actions are substitutes in his paper, "..the principal's
need to balance the gains from coordination of agents' outputs against the costs
associated with giving the agents rents .." (Olsen, 1993:p.535). In my paper it is
the fact that qualities are substitutes which gives rise to the similarity. This implies
that quantities/outputs are substitutes, and thus the analogy to the R&D result is
clear. However, there is a difference in the results. In my model, contrary to Olsen
(1993), the result that the production is distorted in favour of the more efficient
firm is obtained when firms' probability distributions are identical.l" This result
is obtained by assuming that total demand is given, and that the whole market is
served (or more precisely, that any increase in the demand for the investing firm's
product is exactly offset by the reduction in demand for the other firm's product).
Thus, if production is distorted in favour of the most efficient firm in the asymmet-
ric information case, this firm must also increase its production relative to the full
information case.
Since qualities are substitutes in the regulator's welfare function, the increase
in the necessary total information rents to the firms is balanced by the increase
in welfare. Optimal policies call for increasing the quality of the most efficient of
the two firms and reducing the quality of the other firm - thus the most efficient
of the two increases production and the less efficient reduces production, with the
result that information rents to the less efficient of the two is reduced, whereas the
information rents to the more efficient is increased. On the other hand, if qualities are
complements the regulator would attempt to increase both firms' qualities to increase'
welfare, but this would also result in an increase in both firms' productions and
information rents. Thus, the optimal policy in such a case would call for reductions
18In my model there is also the result that first-best levels are obtained if firms' distributions
are identical and firms are equally inefficient. In this case, the incentive correction terms vanish.
This is also different from Olsen (1993: p.536).
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in production under asymmetric information (see McMee and McMillan, 1991).19
If we consider the case where {31 < {32 , then the optimal quality for firm 1 is
increased, while firm 2's quality is decreased (again compared to the full information
solution). This is in accordance with the monotonicity condition, which requires that
quality be non-increasing in the parameter {3. This implies that market shares are
distorted in favour of firm 1; i.e., the firm with the highest actuallevel of efficiency.
This is an illustration rather than a rigorous proof of how the optimal policies under
asymmetric information in fact comply with the monotonicity conditions.
5.2 First best market shares under asymmetric information
From the analysis above we have the subsequent result:
Proposition 3 Contrary to standard results in single-agent regulation models,
first-best solutions {for market shares} are only obtained if both firms are of the most
efficient types, or if firms are equally inefficient.
The incentive correction terms for optimal qualities under asymmetric informa-
tion, eqns. (9) and (10), will vanish only if the firms' efficiency parameters are
identical.P" In such a case, even if the optimally regulated qualities (and indirectly,
market shares) results in first-best levels, the outcome is still second-best because
of the shadow costs of transfers. Generally, the specifics of a first-best solution de-
pends on the distributions, the-specification of the cost function, and the demand
structure. A sufficient condition for a first-best solution (in the general case where
we allow for firms' efficiency parameters being drawn from different distributions)
is that both firms are of the most efficient type.
19An increase in quantity may, in the case of complements, be a result of increased qualities,
ceteris paribus. Such an increase in quantity results in increased information rent payments to
both firms (since both firms' production levels are increased). Thus the cost of providing quality
to consumers is increased. E.g., for a given level of quality for firm 2, and increase in the quality
level of firm 1 would increase the production levels of both firm 1 and firm 2. This would increase
the informational costs of production. Thus optimal policy would be to reduce both firms' qualities,
and thus production levels.
2oFor a similar result in a different setting, I refer the reader to Osmundsen (1997).
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If firm i is of the least efficient type, f3i = f3i' and firm j's efficiency parameter is
f3j E ~,{3), then the market shares are distorted in favour of firm j. Observe that
in accordance with conventional wisdom, the most efficient of the two firms earns
a higher rent, for identical distributions. However, if we allow for non-identical
distributions, firms of equal efficiency levels may earn different information rents.F'
This is due to the fact that the inverse hazard rates are different for a given level of
efficiency,which again leads to a distortion in the market shares relative to the full
information solution.
6 Extensions to the basic model
6.1 Cost complementarity and optimal regulation of quality
In some cases, it may be natural to assume that there is cost complementarity
between, for instance, network traffic and quality of a service (where quality may be
interpreted as content, or functionality). For the case of telecommunications, it may
be reasonable to assume that the owner of a network has lower costs for the provision
of content, or functionality.22 It has also been argued that there is a link between the
provision of high-speed internet connections and size of the network. Higher-speed
is here interpreted as higher quality. Having a large network and a large customer
base implies that more of the traffic can move via fewer network links, and thus the
speed of the traffic can increase. Thus, the variant of the model presented in this
section could be interpreted as analysing the regulation of quality in the internet
infrastructure. However, it should be noted that the Internet, as such, remains an
unregulated industry, so the regulation is here interpreted purely as the regulation
of the underlying infrastructure (much of the Internet traffic is transported over
telecommunications networks, which currently are subjected to regulation).
Let us assume that each firm has its own network, with traffic level indicated by
21The exception is if both firms are of the least efficient types, in which case none of them earn
any information rents.
22A similar situation can be found in the software industry, where a supplier of both the operating
system and applications may have a cost advantage over a firm which only supplies applications.
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the size of q.23 The firm with the highest production level then has a cost advantage
in the provision of quality (interpreted as content or functionality). Below, I will
examine the effects of economies of scope on the optimal regulatory policy for two
alternative specifications of the cost function.
The model is augmented only on the firm's cost side to incorporate the concept
of economies of scope. One possible cost structure which allows for the idea of cost
complementarity is the following:
(11)
where
8Ci 8Ci 82Ci
8/3i > 0, 8si < 0, 8/3i8si < °
Note that the only difference to the model presented in section 2.2 is with respect
to marginal costs. Here, marginal cost is a function of both the efficiency param-
eter, /3, and the level of quality. To have cost complementarity, we need marginal
production costs to be decreasing in the level of quality, or equivalently, marginal
costs of quality to be decreasing in the production level.24 This could for instance
be the case if we assume that there are learning effects in production, such that
higher production levels lowers the marginal costs of providing quality. Another
interpretation could be that a large customer base, or equivalently a high level of
traffic, makes it possible for the firm to maintain a R&D department, which again
may be able to reduce the cost of functionality enhancing activities.
6.1.1 Symmetric information
For optimal qualities, we need to take into account that the marginal cost of pro-
ducing depends on the level of quality (still assuming a fixed market size):
8'l/i = _1_88 + (Cj _ Ci) 8qi _ 8Ciqi (s,O) (12)Bs, 1 + A Bs, Be, 8si
for i, j =. 1,2 and i =1= j. Compared to the full information qualities in section
3, the only difference is the additional term - (~) qi, which is positive if there is
231assume that the networks are interconnected.
24By assuming ~ < O , there is cost complementarity between q and s.
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cost complementarity between quantity and quality.25 Thus, all other things equal,
cost complementarity increases the optimal quality under full information.
6.1.2 Asymmetric information
The presence of cost complementarity affects the information rent expression. There-
fore, the incentive correction term is affected. The formula for optimal quality
changes somewhat, and is given by:
~ - _1_ as + (c. _ 1".) !!!li _ !!£iq.as; - 1+'>'as; 3 "t aSi as; ~
.>. [(1!£L!!!Ii ..ff!..sL) F(.8d 5_!!!li.. F(.8i)]
-H'>' a.8; as; + a.8ia8i qi 1(.8i) + a.8j aSi l(.8j)
for i,j = 1,2 and i =1= j. The incentive correction term has an additional element,
(a::8.) qi, which is assumed to be less than, or equal to zero.26 This implies that
the marginal information cost (the incentive correction term) of providing quality is
(13)
reduced when cost complementarity is introduced. Thus, optimal quality is increased
(or decreased less) compared to the solution in section 5. The intuition behind this
result is that cost complementarity, and thus the quality levels, affects the value of
having private information: It is the private information about the cost difference
which determines the information rent given to the firms. For the case where firm i
is less efficient than firm j (i.e., f3i > f3j ), an increase in firm i's quality level in effect
reduces the real cost difference in providing quality.27 By increasing firm i's optimal
level of quality, the regulator is able to reduce the value of private information to
firm i, and therefore reduce the information rent payment to this firm. This, of
course, reduces the (virtual) cost of providing quality, and optimal quality can be
increased relative to the solution in section 5.
250bviously, marginal costs are also affected. ITa firm supplies a positive level of quality, then,
if there is cost complementarity, marginal cost is reduced.
26ITc is linear in /3 and s, e.g., c = /3 - s , this term is equal to zero.
27The regulator is assumed to know the structure of the cost function, and thus he knows whether
there is cost complementarity or not.
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6.2 Quality as complements
The model analysed above can easily be transformed into a model where the quality
of access mandated by the regulator (or chosen by the firms) are complements. We
need to modify the assumptions on the demand functions and consumers' surplus
in the following manner:
Assumption l'
Quantity is increasing in both firms' quality, and marginal effect on demand of
increasing a firm 's own quality is increasing in the other firm 's quality.
Assumption 2'
The marginal effect of increasing quality of one firm on consumers' net surplus
is increasing in the other firm 's quality.
In such a model, the result with respect to optimal quality is qualitatively dif-
ferent from the substitutes case. The following proposition summarises the result in
the complements case:
Proposition 4
When individual quality contributions are verifiable to the regulator and in the ab-
sence of cost complementarity, the optimallevel of quality is reducedunder asymmet-
ric information relative to the full information case. Cost complementarity makes
the result more ambiguous.
The proof is omitted, but can be obtained from the author.
The intuition behind this result is that increases in quality for a given firm raises
the (marginal) consumers' net surplus (with respect to the other firm's quality), but
it also increases the information rent necessary for truthful revelation to both firms.
An increase in quality by firm i raises firm i's demand and also has positive spill-over
effects on firm j's demand. Thus, since a firm's information rent is increasing in
quantity, this leads to a higher cost of quality provision. Thus, the socially optimal
level of quality is reduced. However, if there is cost complementarity and this effect .
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is sufficiently strong, this may "finance" the additional information rents to firms 1
and 2 and make it optimal to increase quality.
6.3 Unverifiable quality
The unverifiability of qualities may have several justifications. There may be many
aspects of quality which is not readily observed by anyone but the user, and these
may be aspects which are difficult or expensive to ascertain for the regulator (see the
discussion in Laffont and Tirole, 1993: chapter 4). In this respect, we may see the
complete quality as a function of both observable and unobservable features. Based
on the observable features, the regulator is assumed to be able to set a minimum
quality standard. This would mean that the quality investments made by the firms
affect the network quality with respect to the unobservable features. Since it is as-
sumed that quality is the only regulatory instrument, the case of unverifiable quality
is in reality the unregulated case (with the restriction that prices are exogenously
given). I will analyse both qualities as substitutes and as complements in separate
subsections below.
The problem of optimal contracts for teams, when the action variables (here,
qualities) are complements has recently been analysed by Auriol (1998) and McAfee
and McMillan (1991).28 In Auriol's model, unverifiability results in a free-rider
problem in quality provision, whereas in McAfee and McMillan there is no such
problem.P The model by McAfee and McMillan suggests ''that the source of team
problem is not the unobservability of team members' efforts or abilities per se"
(McAfee and McMillan, 1991: p.571). They suggest that features such as risk
aversion, or collusion may be the source of such inefficiencies.
In my model, there are two main results when qualities are complements and ver-
ifiable. First, optimal quality is distorted downwards under asymmetric information
(relative to the full information case) for both firms, as both firms' incentive correc-
tion terms are unambiguously negative - a result which differs from Auriol (1998).
28Holmstrom (1982) is the seminal paper on the problem of team production.
29It should be noted that McAfee and McMillan does not consider quality provision, but their
models is a more general team model where the actions of the team members are complements.
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In her model, optimal quality is the same under both symmetric and asymmetric
information for verifiable quality: The quantity level determines the information
rent in both the present model and her model, but since quantity (in addition to
quality) is regulated directly in Auriol (1998) this implies that there is no effect
on the information rent of distorting the quality levels in her model. Second, in
the absence of cost complementarity and if prices are insensitive to the quality lev-
els, there is no problem of free-riding in quality provision. However, by assuming
that prices do change with the level of quality, free-riding is a problem - similar to
the result of Auriol (1998). The result of no free-riding corresponds to the result
of McAfee and McMillan (1991). Thus, in my model the unobservability of firms'
actions is not necessarily the source of the problem of free-riding. Free-riding is,
however, a problem in my model if either cost complementarity is present, and/or
prices are sensitive to the quality level. Either of these two factors in effect introduce
an advantage of having a large market share, or asymmetry between firms. Thus,
the reason for free-riding being a problem in my model is that firms' payoffs for
identicallevels of quality are different if their market shares differ. Cost comple-
mentarity implies that a firm enjoys a cost advantage in the provision of quality if
it has a larger market share than its competitor. Price sensitivity to the quality
level has an impact on the marginal revenue of changing quality. The more sensitive
prices are to the level of quality, the higher is the potential for increasing profits
by undertaking quality enhancing investments. Marginal profit of quality is higher
for the firm with the larger market share. The analysis of optimal quality choice
by the firms resembles the traditional analysis of monopoly pricing. First of all we
have the effect of changing the quality level through the effect on demand which in
reality is a second-order effect. Increased quality raises demand, and at given prices
and costs, revenue is increased. This effect would disappear if prices are determined .
optimally. Then there is the direct effect which works through the price and cost
effects. Increased quality raises the price the product can be sold for, and similarly,
in the presence of cost complementarity, reduces the marginal cost of providing the
product at a given level of quality.
To simplify the representation, I assume that the efficiency parameters are com-
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mon knowledge among the firms and symmetric (unless otherwise stated). I assume
that the firms maximise their profit functions given byequation (6), and choose their
respective levels of quality simultaneously. We consequently look for Nash equilibria
in the quality game.
6.3.1 Qualities as complements
In the substitutes case there is no problem of free-riding in quality investments,
whereas when qualities are complements this may be a problem. This analysis is
summarised in propositions 5 and 6. Propositions 5 and 6 assume that prices are
exogenously given. This implies that quality investments has no effect on the firms'
revenue except through the quantity effect. It may also affect their costs due if there
is cost complementarities. To focus on the effect of cost complementarities, I choose
to ignore asymmetries due to differences in the efficiency levels (i.e., I assume that
{3i = (3j except where stated otherwise).
One may then ask why firms choose to provide additional quality if such an
investment has no effect on prices and which increases costs? Increasing quality
does increase the quantity of the investing firm, but whether the firm will choose
to invest in quality will depend on the cost structure and the profit-margin. If the
firm chooses to invest when the price is fixed, it will certainly do so if the price is
increasing in quality.30
Let us assume that the first-order condition is binding for some interior value of
s. Let Si be defined by equation (14) when there is no cost complementarity:
(14)
for some Si E (.§., s) for a firm with marginal cost {3i. If the price-cost margin is
sufficiently high relative to the marginal investment costs, an interior solution will
3°It is reasonable to expect that prices are increasing in quality in the absence of any restrictions
on prices.
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exist. If there exists such a Si, then both firms provide positive levels of quality.
If there is cost complementarity (of the particular type considered here), the
profit maximising choice of quality is given by st and is defined byequation (15):
(15)
where 8Ci/8si < o. Observe that the (symmetric) level of quality provided when
there is no cost complementarity will be lower than the (symmetric) level provided
if there is cost complementarity; i.e., Si ~ st.
Proposition 5
Assume that individual quality contributions are unverifiable and firms are equally
efficient ex ante (i.e., /31 = (32). If prices are exogenous and there are no cost com-
plementarities, then there is no problem of free-riding in quality provision. Both
firms provide a positive level of quality unless the price is sufficiently low, or the
investment cost sufficiently convex.
Proposition 6
If there is cost complementarity and quality is unregulated, then the problem of .
free-riding in quality provision is introduced. The firm with the largest market share
will be the sole provider of quality.
The proof is found in appendix 2.
The intuition behind the result of Proposition 6 is that cost complementarity
between quantity (or network capacity) and quality gives rise to a cost advantage
for the firm with the largest market share.3l This factor indicates that there is an
advantage in having a large market share. Optimal quality is then increasing in
the market share, and it is the firm with the largest market share which invests in
31In addition, if prices are sensitive to quality changes the cost of increasing quality is partly
offset by the increase in price.
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quality, whereas the firm with the smallest market share free-rides on the investment
made by the other firm.
The result in proposition 5 can be explained by observing that the absence of
cost complementarity makes firms symmetric. The level of optimal total quality is
the same for both firms, since there are no cost advantage of having high production
levels. The quality levels are then determined by the outcome of the quality game
between the two firms, an equilibrium which is symmetric and in which both firms
provide half of the optimal total quality each. If prices are subjected to price-cap
regulation, we observe that we may have investments in quality even though firms
face a binding price-cap. To see how quality affects a firm's marginal profitability,
observe that the marginal profit (with respect to quality) increases with the quantity
produced, since a~:;!i= -~ > o. Thus, for each extra unit produced by firm i,
marginal profit with respect to quality is increased by -åe;./ åSi. Thus, cost com-
plementarity implies that for a given level of quality, firm i enjoys higher marginal
profit (at this level of quality) than firm j if firm i has a higher market share than
firm j; that is, if qi > q;. Firm i will produce a higher output in equilibrium (i.e.,
qi > qj) if, for instance, firm i is more efficient than firm j (f3i < f3j).
What about the effect on optimal (total) quality of changes in the efficiency
parameter, f3? If firms' efficiency parameters are different, this also affects the
optimal level of quality in a similar way as both cost complementarity and quality
sensitive prices, since different values of f3i and f3j introduces asymmetry between
the firms. If ~ < O, more ~efficient firms has a lower optimal (total) quality.
This inequality holds in the absence of cost complementarity. When there is cost
complementarity, the inequality may be reversed, since higher level of quality reduces
the marginal cost of producing the product. A larger market share increases the
potential for having ~ > 0.32 Thus, for a large enough market share for the .
most inefficient firm, the effect may be that it is the provider of the highest level of
quality whereas the most efficient firm free-rides on the less efficient firm's investment
in quality. However, if firms are symmetric the equilibrium of the game will be
32The sign of the inequality is determined by the sign of the following expression: ~ -8{3;I:Js; -
29
symmetric in terms of quantities. Consequently, to justify the more inefficient firm
having a larger market share than the more efficient firm we need to make some ad
hoc assumptions about, e.g., one firm being an incumbent with an installed base.
It could also happen in the ease of observable quality that the less efficient firm
provides the highest level of quality if, for instance, the market share of the less
efficient firm is sufficiently large. In the observable case the socially optimal level of
quality is still higher than the outcome of the unregulated game. Furthermore, it is
generally the case that both firms provide positive levels of quality when the regu-
lator can design a contract contingent upon the quality levels, unless the marginal
(quality) investment cost is very large.
6.3.2 Qualities as substitutes
The case of verifiable quality in the substitute case is considered in detail in the
analysis of the basic model. We have seen that with ex ante symmetric firms (i.e.,
the efficiency parameters are drawn from identical distributions), the most efficient
firm provides a higher level of quality. The firms provide positive levels of quality
(or rather, is instructed to provide positivelevels of quality), if the marginal cost of
investing in quality and the shadow cost of public funds is not too large.
For the case of unverifiable quality, however, the solution may depend on whether
there is cost complementarity/" In the absence of cost complementarity, it may be
the case that both firms provide the same (positive) level of quality, or that both
firms decides on no quality investment. In any case, the absence of cost complemen-
tarity leads to symmetric Nash equilibria.P' Thus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 7
Assume unverifiable quality and equally efficient firms. When qualities are sub-
stitutes, and in the absence of cost complementarity, then there is no vertical dif-
33The price sensitivity to quality changes and differences in efficiency may also affect the solution.
However, in the absence of these two effects, the solution depends critically on whether there is
cost complementarity.
34This should be no surprise, since firms (at a given level of efficiency) are symmetric in the
absence of cost complementarity and if prices are insensitive to quality changes.
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ferentiation between the networks. Either both firms provide the same positive level
of quality, or both make no quality investments. There is therefore no problem of
free-riding on the other's investments.
The proof is provided in appendix 3.
When allowing for cost complementarity of the particular type considered here,
the optimal level of quality for any given firm is increasing in the market share. A
larger market share (corresponds to a large q ) implies a cost advantage in quality
provision, which again may lead the firm to increasing its level of quality whereas
the firm with the smaller market share reduces his. Thus, in the presence of cost
complementarity (and/or price sensitivity to quality changes) the effect is that the
degree of vertical differentiation is increased. This is similar to the effect of cost
complementarity in the case of observable quality.
Furthermore, the unregulated choice of quality is in general different from the
socially optimal quality level, but the bias of the distortion is difficult to ascertain
in general. The reason for this is that the unregulated firm cannot internalise all
the external effects from the investments. The investing firm is able to internalise is
the demand effect (on its own demand), but is not able to internalise the (negative)
external effect on the other firm nor the (positive) external effect on consumers'
surplus.
7 Summary
The situation considered in this paper is the situation where a benevolent regulatory
agency is able to affect (through the regulation mechanism) the access quality which
the two firms offer to end-users. Assuming that firms' efficiency levels are different,
we have seen that the regulator should induce firms to produce access of different
quality; i.e., that some degree of (vertical) differentiation is indeed socially optimal in
the setting of this model. The presence of asymmetric information necessitates even
more differentiation in order to sufficiently distort the market shares in favour of the
most efficient of the two firms, which implies that the more efficient firm produces
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more under asymmetric information. The primary reason for the optimal degree of
differentiation to depend on the information which is available to the regulator is
related to the cross-effects on information rents. Another reason is that both firms'
efficiency parameters are drawn from identical distributions. Allowing for different
distributions may modify the results. It is then not necessarily the case that the
term correcting for asymmetric information unambiguously distorts optimal quality
in favour of the most efficient of the two firms.
It is, of course, important for the regulator to know both the cost structure and
how the level of quality impacts on the demand side. In the extensions to the basic
model, I allow for variations in the model. The results there highlight the importance
of knowing the structure of both demand and costs for optimal regulatory policy.
8 Appendices
Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1
I follow the standard approach of, e.g., Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) when clari-
fying the requirements for implementation under asymmetric information. However,
there are some changes since expectations must be taken into account.
Firm i's profit function, when taking into account that firms have private infor-
mation, and for a more general cost function, is given by (taking expectations over.
the other firm's efficiency parameter)
Eø; [7ri(t3i,/1i,/1;)] - Eø; [(P-/1i)Qi(Si (A,/1;) ,s; (A,/1;))
+ti(t3i' /1;) - vi (Si(t3i,/1;))]
for i,j = 1,2, and i =I j.
Firm i chooses its report to maximise profits, and the report must satisfy the
following first- and second-order conditions:
(1) aEp;[1ri((~i,Øi,Ø;))] = O
aøi
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(2) c')2Epj [11", ((Ø",B",Bj))] < O
8,Bl -
Differentiating (1) with respect to the true efficiency parameter, !3i, and noting
that at the optimum. the reported type is equal to actual type (this is the property
of incentive compatibility), the second-order condition can be rewritten as:
82E,Bj [1l"i((!3i,!3;))] 8si 82E,Bj [1l"i ((!3i,!3;))] 8s; > O
8si8!3i 8!3i + 8s;8!3i 8!3i -
We can show that c')2Epj[11"i((,Bi,,Bj»] = =E«. [fJq,(,B",Bj)] which is assumed to be
8s,8,B, fJJ 8s, '
c')2Ep.[11"i((,Bi,,Bj»] E [8q.(,B. ,B.)] hich i be nosi .negative, and '8sj8,B, = -,Bj '8s~ J ,w IS assume to e positive.
Furthermore, by symmetry we have that ~ =~. Thus, the inequality (*) is
satisfied for the following conditions:
(i) illi < O8,B, -
(Ii) ~ > O11 8,Bj-
Thus, inequalities (i) and (ii) are sufficient conditions for implementation. These
inequalities will be utilised as (the equivalent of the) second order conditions of in-
(*)
centive compatibility in the section on optimal regulation under asymmetric infor-
mation. The standard procedure is to ignore these constraints ex ante, and checking
whether they are satisfied ex post to avoid unnecessary messy calculations. If the
monotonicity conditions are not satisfied, optimal policies may be characterised by
partial pooling contracts.
Appendix 2
(proof of Propositions 5 and 6. The proof is adapted from Auriol, 1998)
The firms chooses a level of quality which maximises profits. Optimal (to-
tal) quality for firm i, st , is given by the first-order condition: ~ = O , or
(Pi - C;) (8q,(På::+Sj) + ~p~) + (~ - ~) qi - 8'1j;/8si = O . Qualities are comple-
ments, and what matters is total quality, not which firm supplies the quality. si
defines the level of total quality which maximises firm i's profit, and can be sup-
plied by firm i alone, by firm j alone, or as a team effort by both firms. Firm i's
best response is given by: Si (Si) = si - Si , for si ::; si , and Si (Si) = O other-
wise. Implicit differentiation of the first-order condition with respect to qi yields:
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~ = - C'j~;!.)/ C::S?i) . The denominator (the second-order condition) is as-
sumed to be negative. The sign of ~ is determined by the sign of the numerator:
8~;!i= p~- ~ ~ o. In the absence of cost complementarity (CC) and if prices
are insensitive to quality changes (that is, if p~ = O), ~ = O, and for CC, or if
prices respond to quality changes, ~ > O. Thus, if there is CC, the optimal (total)
quality is increasing in the market share and otherwise not (assuming p~= O). For
CC or for quality sensitive prices, qi > qj implies si > sj . Thus, the unique Nash
equilibrium in the quality game corresponds to Auriol (1998): For qi > qj , Si = si
and Sj = O. Thus, free-riding in quality provision is present. In the absence of CC
(and for p~=O), optimal quality for both firms is independent of the market shares;
si = sj = s" . Best responses for firm i and j are given by: Si (sj) = s" - Sj and
Sj (Si) = s" - Si . Thus, the equilibrium strategy is to have Si = Sj , which amounts
to: Si (Sj) = ~s· for i, j.
Appendix 3
(proof of proposition 7)
Let st = arg max [(Pi (Si) - c, (f3i' Si)) qi - 'Ij; (Si)] define the profit maximising
quality choice for firm i. In the absence of cost complementarity and with unre-
sponsive prices, firms are symmetric if f3i = f3j. This implies that at the symmetric
Nash equilibrium st = sj = s+; that is, the optimal level of quality is identical for
both firms i = 1,2. Whether the firms provide additional" quality (in excess of the
minimum quality standard) depends on the sign of the first-order condition at §_:
Si = Sj = §_ if ~ ::;Oat Si = §_, and Si = Sj > §_ if ~ > Oat Si =:!. For a price
P sufficiently close to marginal cost f3i, or for sufficiently high marginal investment
cost, st is equal to zero for i = 1,2.
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Abstract
The paper considers the optimal regulation of access charges, and the
effect such regulation has on incentives to foreclose downstream rival firms.
I show that when a vertically integrated firm is able to discriminate against
rivals by means of non-price measures, optimal access charges must be set
higher than in the case when no discrimination is possible and will always
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1 Introduction
In vertically related markets, the production of final products makes use of (essen-
tial) inputs produced in a complementary market. The producers of these essential
inputs usually have opportunities to earn positive economic profits. The extent to
which this is possible depends, among other things, both on regulatory and competi-
tion policies. For instance, firms offering Internet access to end-users must purchase
access to consumers from local access providers.' The pricing of local access is more
often than not subject to regulation. It is reasonable to expect that the regulation
o~access charges in general results in prices which are different from the prices an
unregulated firm would choose. If the access charge is set below the monopoly level,
regulation effectively restricts the potential for monopoly rents in access provision.
The main reason for introducing regulation of access charges is to stimulate com-
petition, byensuring that rival firms can obtain access to end-users at reasonable
terms. This means setting a low access charge. However, as we shall see, restricting
the integrated firm's earning potential upstream results in an increased incentive to
foreclose its rivals. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. legislation, restrictions are to
some extent imposed on which firms are allowed into the long-distance markets. By
restricting local access providers' opportunity to serve long-distance markets (i.e.,
refusing vertical integration), competition authorities may restrict the potential for
earning monopoly rent upstream even without regulating access charges. This is a
result well known in the literature on vertical relations.f
Allowing vertical integration opens up the possibility for foreclosure activities
by the vertically integrated firm. A combined policy of allowing vertical integration
and regulation of monopoly rent upstream (through access charge regulation) may
seriously affect downstream competition. When we allow for the possibility for non-
price discrimination by the vertically integrated firm, an interesting question in this
setting is whether abandoning access charge regulation all together (or, equivalently,
set a non-binding access charge) results in a qualitatively different outcome than does
lThe local access providers are often the incumbent telecommunications companies.
2This result is a consequence of the upstream firm's inability to credibly commit to charging
monopoly prices (Rey and Tirole, 1997)
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the situation with binding access charge regulation.
The contribution of this model to the theory of regulation is to allow for the .
possibility that a vertically integrated firm (the network owner) may foreclose its
rivals (partially or complete). 3 The foreclosure may be thought of as either increasing
the cost of purchasing network inputs (in addition to the exogenously given access
price), or equivalently as degrading the quality of such inputs. The increased costs
of the rivals could, for instance, be due to legal expenses incurred when attempting
to obtain access on equal terms with the network owner's downstream subsidiary,
or more direct costs due to lower quality of access.
Throughout the paper I assume that the regulator cannot regulate the down-
stream sector due to reasons external to the model presented below.' A general
model of optimal regulation should be able to explain the deregulation of the down-
stream industry following as the optimal outcome of a complete. regulatory setup.
In the present model, following a partial approach, I assume that the downstream
industry is deregulated. This is the case, e.g., in the telecommunications industry.
Often, the regulation of access charges is easier to implement due to a vast array
of different products on the market. It also seems to be the case that industry
regulators focus more of their attention on the regulation of access terms.
The issue of optimal (regulated) access charges has been examined by many oth-
ers {e.g., Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996), Laffont and Tirole (1990, 1996)). In
contrast to their work, I focus on the relation between the regulated access charge
and the vertically integrated firm's incentive to foreclose its rival along other di-
mensions. This has some resemblance to the multi-task principal-agent literature
(see Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). The vertically integrated firm has in reality
two main methods of foreclosing rival firms. Either by means of setting high access
charges, or by non-price behaviour. In the model presented here, however, the access
charge is regulated and the only method of foreclosure that remains open is through
3Partia! foreclosure means that the vertically integrated firm supplies access to the downstream
competitor, but at less favourable conditions than its own downstream subsidiary. Complete
foreclosure is a situation where the competitors are in effect denied access.
4This is also the starting point of Vickers (1995).
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non-price behaviour. The incentives for non-price behaviour is then obviously af-
fected by the regulation of the access charge.
The access terms offered to rival firms consist of two main elements - the price
paid for access and the quality of access. I assume that the access charge is subject
to regulation. However, the network provider has ample opportunities to degrade
the quality of access offered to its competitors. The decision of the network provider
(the vertically integrated firm) on access quality is not regulated in the model, and
may seriously affect the competition downstream. This relates the model to the
literature on raising rivals' costs and foreclosure (see, for instance, Rey and Tirole,
1997, and Economides, 1998a, 1998b). The model presented in this paper can be seen
as a combination of Vickers (1995) and Economides (1998a, 1998b), with a primary
focus on the incentives to reduce the quality of the inputs offered to downstream
rivals, which is equivalent to raise rivals' costs. The issue of raising rivals' costs
is the focus of Economides (1998a, 1998b), but his model does not incorporate the
optimal regulation of access charges. Vickers (1995) presents a paper on regulation in
vertically related markets, but his primary concern is to investigate the importance
of the industry structure (vertically separation or integration) on optimally regulated
access prices. The primary focus in my paper is rather on how regulating the access
charge affects the incentive to foreclose rival firms, and how access charges in this
context should be set to achieve the social optimum.
The model fits into the essential facilities, or bottleneck doctrine: One dominant
firm owns the supply of a non-standard input, to which there are no, or few, substi-
tutes. A firm is then said to be foreclosed if the dominant firm denies proper access
to the essential facility, with the intent of maintaining its market power (Reyand
Tirole, 1997). If the upstream firm is not allowed to vertically integrate with one
of the downstream firms, the upstream firm may be in a situation similar to that
of a durable-good monopolist; it will be difficult to credibly commit to maintaining
monopoly pricing, since once the upstream monopolist has sold to one of the down-
stream firms at monopoly price it will have incentives to reduce the price to other
downstream firms to effectively exploit the residual demand. Thus, the upstream
monopolist may not be able to exploit its monopoly power. Vertical integration, on
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the other hand, eliminates the commitment problem. Thus, allowing vertical inte-
gration enables the upstream firm to earn monopoly profits. In the model presented
below, this negative effect (from a static efficiency point of view) is restricted since
access charges are regulated.
The remaining part of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 the basic
model is presented and analysed, in section 3 I investigate the optimal regulation of
access charges both when the vertically integrated firm can and cannot use non-price
discrimination. In section 4 the results are summarised and policy implications are
discussed.
2 A model of vertically related markets
There are two firms. Firm i is a producer of a final product. Firm v is a verti-
cally integrated firm, that supplies an essential input for the production of the final
product. In the final product market there is Cournot competition. The vertically
integrated firm can be perceived as a firm providing both long-distance services and
local calls, whereas the other firm provides only long-distance services. Alterna-
tively, the vertically integrated firm provides both content and network services,
whereas the other firm provides content only.
The regulator offers a menu of contracts contingent on the report made by the
regulated firm, specifying an access charge and awarding a transfer to the regulated
firm. The network provider makes a report of its own (upstream) efficiency level,
which is subject to private information. We allow for differences in the efficiency
levels upstream and downstream. When setting the access charge, the regulator
must take into account that the regulated firm may take some unverifiable actions
which affect the costs of its downstream rival (and that the incentive to do so may .
depend on the level of the access charge). The regulator can thus indirectly affect
both prices and consumers' surplus through the determination of the access charge.
For purposes of comparison, I consider both the cases where the vertically inte-
grated firm can and cannot take some unverifiable action (non-price discrimination).
The absence of non-price discrimination can be taken to mean that regulators are
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able to write complete contracts related to the access terms offered to other firms.
This can be considered as a benchmark case to investigate the effects of foreclosure
on the level of optimal access charges.
2.1 The demand side
In the downstream market firms are facing the inverse linear demand function,
p (Q) = a - Q, where Q = qV + qi is total production downstream.
Net consumers' surplus is in this case given by:
CS(Q) = ~Q2
2
(1)
2.2 Firms and costs
The vertically integrated firm earns profit in two different markets - the upstream
and downstream market. This implies that foreclosing rival firms downstream entails
an opportunity cost - the reduction in profits in the upstream activity resulting
from a lower overall production level downstream. In addition, foreclosure entails a
monetary cost. Activities designed to foreclose rival firms are normally not consistent
with competition laws. Consequently, firms that undertake such activities must
conceal their actions, and it is realistic to assume that this is costly. Foreclosure
is socially wasteful both since total downstream production is reduced and since it
involves a monetary cost of the unproductive activity,"
The profit function of the competing firm downstream is given by:
(2)
where f3i is the efficiency level, and qi is the production level of firm i. The profit
function of the vertically integrated firm is given by:
5An alternative justification for C (r) could be that a more pronounced level of foreclosure
makes it more likely that the competition authorities reveals the unwanted practice, which may
lead to a fine being imposed on the firm practicing foreclosure.
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Il" = (P (Q) - (J'- - w) qV + (w - (3v.) Q - e (r) + t - F (3)
where (J'- and (3v. are the downstream and upstream efficiency levels, respectively.
qV is the downstream production of the vertically integrated firm, Q is the total
production downstream, t is the transfer from the regulator, and F is a fixed cost
related to upstream production. There are no capacity constraints upstream, and
upstream inputs are available to any firm which is willing to pay the prevailing price."
Let r denote the degree of foreclosure in the access terms for the competitors. It
is chosen by the firm and is unverifiable by the regulator. A high level of r is
interpreted as a low level of access quality offered to the rival firm, which reduces
the willingness to pay for the product sold to end-users. 7 The cost of foreclosure,
e (r), is increasing and strictly convex (er> O, err> O), and is for the sake of
simplicity assumed to have the following quadratic form: e (r) = cpr2/2. In the case
where the integrated firm cannot foreclose its rival, the parameter r is exogenously
given and normalised to zero, with e (O)= O.
The regulated variable w is the price all downstream firms pay per unit of the
inputs purchased from the upstream firm. All downstream firms obtain access at
the same price, including the downstream subsidiary of the upstream firm. For the
vertically integrated firm the access charge is, however, simply an internal transfer.
6With no capacity constraints upstream, one may argue that price compatition is as likelyas
quantity competition. However, as an ad hoc justification of the use of quantity competition, it
is assumed that each of the downstream firms must decide on a level of capacity prior to entering
into the downstream market (e.g., firms must lease lines from the local access provider which have
a fixed capacity prior to producing the services sold to end-users). This implies that at the last
stage of the game, each firm has a limited level of capacity. In such a situation, and under certain
conditions about the capacity levels and the rationing rule, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) shows
that the unique outcome of a price competition game with capacity constraints is the Cournot
outcome.
7The effect of modelling foreclosure as a quality degradation rather than as a cost raising
strategy is that the price elasticity of demand is affected by the level of foreclosure. Increasing the
level of foreclosure makes the rivals' demand more elastic.
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2.3 Welfare and the regulator
The regulator is assumed to maximise a utilitarian welfare function, where transfers
awarded to the regulated firm are socially costly due to distortions imposed on other
sectors of the economy to raise the revenue. The welfare function is given by:
w = CS + Il" + ni - (1 +.\) t (4)
where (1+ .\)is the social cost of transfers to the regulated firm, with .\ > O. The
welfare function is assumed to be concave in w. The regulatory agency has imperfect
knowledge of the costs upstream, and it only knows the distribution, G ([3U) with
the strictly positive density function 9 ([3U) > O,and the support of upstream costs,
pu. E [Q,Ø], with [3 ~ O. The upstream and downstream costs of the vertically
integrated firm are assumed to be independently distributed, which implies that
observation of the downstream costs yields no information about upstream efficiency
to the regulator.
2.4 Timing of the game
The stages of the regulatory game are as follows:
• Stage 1: The regulator offers a contract of the form M = {w (øU) ,t (øU) }
to the regulated firm. '
......U
• Stage 2: The regulated firm reports a type [3 to the regulator, and the
contract is executed. The regulator assigns the firm a transfer, t, and an
access charge, w.
• Stage 3: The regulated firm decides on the (unregulated) quality of access
terms to downstream rivals (the level of foreclosure), r.
• Stage 4: Firms compete a la Cournot in the downstream market.
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2.5 Solving the model
In order to solve this model, we start at the last stage of the game, and solve
by backward induction. The regulator must take into account the effects that the
regulatory mechanism he proposes has on all subsequent stages. We first solve for
the outcome of the post-regulation stages. Using his knowledge of the outcome in the
last two stages, the regulator designs a second-best optimal regulatory mechanism.
For now, I will assume that there is a fixed number of firms in the downstream
industry.
2.5.1 Cournot competition
There is quantity competition between the firms downstream. Firm v chooses the
level of quantity q*v which maximises ITv, where ITv is defined by eqn. (3). Firm i
solve a similar maximisation problem, maximising (2) with respect to qi.
The vertically integrated firm's optimal quantity choice is determined by:
(5)
For firm i, the optimal quantity is determined by:
(6)
Solving for equilibrium quantities, we obtain the following:
*v a - 2 ({3d + (3U) +~ + w + r
q = 3 (7)
and
*' a - 2 ({3i +W + r) +~ + øu
q , = ----------'------
3
(8)
Total downstream quantity is
Q* *v *i 2a - {3i - {3d - {3u - W - r=q +q =---------3
Using the equilibrium quantities, we can express the stage 4 equilibrium profit
for firm v as:
(9)
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and for firm i as:
(10)
2.5.2 Choosing the level of foreclosure
The regulated firm can in some circumstances foreclose rival firms, by degrading the
quality of inputs sold to its rivals. When firm v can undertake some unverifiable
action, it chooses a level of r to maximise ITv. The maximisation is subject to
qV = q*v and qi = s", where q*v and q*i are the equilibrium quantities in the
quantity competition stage. Consequently, r" = r (li', øu, w, ~) .
The profit maximising level of quality degradation r" , is governed by the following
relationship:
which can be rewritten as:
(11)
Observing eq. (11) we note that if [(w - f3U) + PQq*V] > O, or equivalently, if
net marginal profit of an increase in the rival's quantity is positive, then firm v
chooses the level of foreclosure as lowas possible; r" = r.8 In line with the rea-
soning of Economides (1998b), we observe that [(w - ØU') + PQq*V] > O can only be
positive and consistent with the existence of profit-maximising downstream rivals if
the downstream subsidiary of the vertically integrated firm is sufficiently inefficient.?
8Thus, if we allowe for negative levels of r, it is possible that a vertically integrated firm may
find it in its own interest to upgrade, rather than downgrade, the quality of inputs sold to its rival,
implying that downstream market shares are shifted in favour of the rival firm. However, in this
paper we maintain the assumption that r ~ O.
9Assume [(w - {311.)+ PQq*vJ > O. The first-order condition for the profit-maximising quantity
choice for the vertically integrated firm is given by: (*) [PQq*v + (w - {311.)J + P - {3d - W = o.
Then, the condition [PQq*v + (w - {311.)J > Oimplies P - w « B", The first-order condition for the
rival firm is given by: (**) PQq*i +P - {3i - W - r =O.We observe that if {3i =~, condition (**)
cannot be satisfied if r ~ O. However, condition (**) can be satisfied if {3d > P - w > {3i + r; i.e.,
if ~ is sufficiently greater than ~ .
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Consequently, the vertically integrated firm may wish to shift downstream market
shares in favour of its own rival if its own downstream subsidiary is sufficiently in-
efficient. This is achieved by providing higher quality access to the rival firm than
is available to its own subsidiary. The intuition behind this result is that when the
rival firm produces the final product much more efficiently, it is better for the verti-
cally integrated firm to concentrate on the provision of access and leave as much as
possible of the production of the final product to the rival. An interpretation of this
could be that the vertically integrated firm in effect outsources the production of the
final product to its rival. In Economides (1998b), in contrast, (w - /311.) +PQq·v > O
can never be positive and consistent with the existence of profit-maximising rival
firms, as all downstream firms have the same marginal costs.
Eqn. (11) can, by using the linear demand function and quadratic cost function,
be rewritten as:lO
(12)
The profit maximising level of foreclosure thus has the following properties.'!
dr" /d/3d - -4/ (9cp - 2) < O
dr·/døu - 2/ (9cp - 2) > O
dr" /d/3i - 2/ (9cp - 2) > O
dr·/dw - -4/ (9cp - 2) < O
The degree of foreclosure is reduced when the downstream inefficiency of the
vertically integrated firm increases; dr" / d/3d < O. The intuition is that higher down- .
stream costs makes it relatively more profitable to offer access downstream (which
lOThe second-order condition for r* to be a maximum is cp > 2/9, which is assumed to be
satisfied. H, on the other hand, the second-order condition is not satisfied, the vertically integrated
firm will choose a level of r which completely forecloses its rival.
11These properties are also valid for more general specifications of the inverse demand function.
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corresponds to a lower r), rather than to compete in services downstream. Conse-
quently, the vertically integrated firm sets a low level of foreclosure to increase the
profit earned in the downstream segment. The intuition behind dr / df3V. > Ois as
follows: Higher upstream costs makes it less profitable to offer access, and the verti-
cally integrated firm chooses to compete downstream (i.e., the vertically integrated
firm wants to set a higher r) rather than to offer access. The fact that dr" / dw < O
seems quite reasonable, as r and w are basically substitute foreclosing activities. A
firm selling inputs that are essential to competing downstream firms, can improve
its own downstream subsidiary's position by either increasing the access charge, or
by reducing the quality of access.
Foreclosure benefits the regulated firm through two effects: first, foreclosing
the downstream rival reduces its equilibrium output, and thus increases the verti-
cally integrated firm's equilibrium output (since quantities are strategic substitutes;
dq" /dqi < O). Secondly, foreclosure increases the price on the inframarginal units of
firm v's output downstream. These benefits are traded off against the opportunity
cost of foreclosure, which is due to the contractive effect on upstream profit resulting
from lower quantity sold to its rivals.
2.5.3 Report to the regulator
The upstream firm makes its report, and the game is played according to the terms
of the contract (if accepted). Given the level of efficiency øv., firm v chooses the
report
-v.
f3 - arg maxll"ØV (13)
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3 Optimal regulation
The regulator maximises the expected value of the welfare function, with expecta-
tions taken over the upstream type of the regulated firm, pu, subject to participation
and incentive constraints. As for the participation constraint, it is required that the
regulated firm earns non-negative profits in aggregate (that is, the sum of upstream
and downstream profits), Il" ~ O. This implies that we need not be concerned with
conditions to ensure that the downstream subsidiary of the vertically integrated
firm earns positive profits. It should, however, be noted that when the participation
constraint is applied to aggregate profits this opens up the possibility for cross-
subsidisation from the regulated activity (upstream production) to the competitive
segment (the downstream industry). A participation constraint applied to aggregate
profit also simplifies somewhat the analysis, as the incentive constraint is related to
aggregate profits (see below).
3.1 Unregulated access charge
In an unregulated environment, the vertically integrated firm can choose to foreclose
rival firms using either the access price or through non-price discrimination. Since
non-price discrimination is costly for the integrated firm, it is reasonable to assume
that a preferable (i.e., less costly) method offoreclosure is to set a high access charge.
The unregulated firm solves the, following maximisation problem:
subject to q*v ~ Oand q*i ~ O
The solution to the problem, ur"; is to set:
or, if ri = ~ = c, we have ui" = (a - c+ PU) /2. This implies that q*i = O;
the vertically integrated firm is a monopolist in both markets. If firms are not
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symmetric, the rival firm will be active in the downstream market provided that it
is more efficient than the downstream subsidiary of the vertically integrated firm.12
3.2 First-order incentive constraint
The regulator realises that if the network owner is also present downstream, truthful
revelation must be based on the joint profit function for the vertically integrated firm,
i.e., equation (3). The reason is that the report of efficiency made to the regulator
internalises any effects that the report (and resulting infrastructure quality) has on
the downstream profits.
Lemma 3 Local incentive compatibility requires that:
dI1V Q* [( {3U) Po "l dq"-=- + w- + Qq -døu d{3u
Proof: Apply the envelope theorem to (3), given that (qV, qi), and r are chosen
optimally (in stages 4 and 3, respectively). More generally, we can write the first-
der incenti .. dII" all" all" ~ all" dr" all" ~or er incentive constraint as. d{3" = af3U + aq' df3U + ar df3U + aq" df3U. However,
using the first-order conditions determining r" and s", this simplifies to ~~: =
~~+ ~~;~~. The expression dq" / d{3u will be different in the two subcases we
discuss (i.e., foreclosure or no foreclosure). QED.
From lemma 3 we observe that the regulated firm may face countervailing in-
centives.P which come from the process of internalising the effects on downstream
profit. A necessary, but not sufficient condition for countervailing incentives to be
present is that the expression in the squared brackets is positive, or equivalently if
~ > P-w > ~+r (see lemma 1). The first component of the incentive constraint,
-Q*, is also found in, e.g., the Baron and Myerson (1982) model of regulation of a
monopolist with unknown costs. Reducing the quantity produced for less efficient
types makes it less desirable for efficient types to imitate less efficient types. In the
12Inserting for the (unregulated) access charge in the rival's equilibrium quantity yields Q*i =
2 (ff' - ri) /5.
3See Lewis and Sappington (1989).
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model presented here, there is in addition an effect on the downstream equilibrium
of changing (3'U. By the envelope theorem, the change of firm v's downstream quan-
tity from changing øv. does not affect the incentive constraint. However, the change
in equilibrium quantity for the competitor(s) affectsthe price of the final product,
and consequently, the incentives change. This must be taken into account when
formulating the incentive constraint.
If the sign of the incentive constraint is unambiguously negative for all values of
øv. in the support, the firm has only incentives to overstate its upstream costs. The
positive element implies that the firm has incentives to understate its costs upstream
for some realisations of the efficiency parameter. The countervailing incentive stems
from the fact that a lower level of efficiency (i.e., a higher (3'U) effectively increases the
equilibrium quantity of firm i. This has two effects, working in opposite directions:
1) For a given quantity for firm v, the price on inframarginal units falls. To retain
incentive compatibility, the information rent must increase. 2) Higher upstream
(marginal) costs implies higher quantity for firm i, which has a positive impact on
profits since it increases the revenue that the vertically integrated firm earns on its
upstream operations as the rival requires more access capacity." This effect tends
towards a lower level of information rents.
Thus, regulators may want to impose countervailing incentives in order to reduce
information rents. In certain cases (e.g., if lump-sum transfers can be used, or if
there is no break-even constraint on upstream profit), we would expect that optimal
access charges should be set below marginal cost of providing access. The reason for
this is that there is unregulated Cournot competition downstream, and lowering the
marginal costs (of the rival firm) corrects for the inefficiency downstream by rais-
ing equilibrium quantities. Higher quantities result in increased consumer surplus.
However, there is a social cost associated with using lump-sum transfers. Whether '
the optimal access charge is higher or lower than the marginal cost of providing
access depends on which distortion is the more costly at the margin - the cost of
14Note that the negative effect on upstream profits from the negative impact that increasing ø'U
has on q"v disappears by use of the envelope theorem. The only effect to consider is the one related
to the change in the rival's quantity.
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public funds, or the deadweight-loss downstream.
3.2.1 No foreclosure
If the vertically integrated firm cannot discriminate against the rival using non-price
behaviour, the incentive constraint in lemma 3 can be rewritten as (using the linear
demand function):
(14)
We observe that the information rent will be decreasing in w, as d2rrv / d{3V.dw =
5/9. This implies that by increasing the access charge, the information rent is
reduced. By increasing the access charge w the first-order incentive compatibility
constraint becomes less negative, and consequently, the gain from imitating less
efficient types becomes smaller. Note that since aq*i / ap > 0, a necessary condition
for creating countervailing incentives is w > {3V..
·3.2.2 Foreclosure
Assume that the vertically integrated firm can discriminate the rival using non-
price behaviour. In this case there are two effects of changing {3V. on q*i. The direct
effect, aq*i / ap, which is positive, is the effect when the level of foreclosure is fixed.
Upstream (marginal) costs are part of the total marginal costs, and increasing either
. upstream or downstream marginal costs adversely affects the downstream quantity
produced by the vertically integrated firm. The indirect effect, which is negative,
takes into consideration that the level of foreclosure is also affected when {3V. changes.
Increasing upstream inefficiency increases the incentive to foreclose the rival firm,
and increasing foreclosure leads to a lower level of equilibrium quantity for the
rival as its perceived costs are increased. Which effect dominates depends on the
characteristics of the cost function C (T). If the cost function is sufficiently convex
in T, or cp > 2/3, the direct effect dominates and dq*i/d{3V.> O.
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Using the fact that dq·i/d{3u = aq·i/a{3'" + (aq·i/ar) (dr·/d{3"'), the incentive
constraint in lemma 3 can be rewritten as (using the linear demand and quadratic
cost functions):
drrv __ [.i 12rp- 4 .v] ( _ (3U) 3rp- 2
d{3u - q + 9rp- 2 q + w 9rp- 2
The asynunetry of information may cause the optimally regulated access charge
(15)
to switch from being less than marginal cost to being higher than marginal cost, since
setting w > {3u may reduce the informational costs of access provision. Provided
that w > {3u (which turns out to be the case in equilibrium), the condition rp> 2/3
also ensures that there is a countervailing incentive present.
As it turns out, the parameter rpalso determines the sign of the marginal infor-
mation cost. The single-crossing condition is given by:
d2rrv (3rp- 2) (15rp- 2)
-d{3"'dw (9rp- 2)2
(16)
From eqn. (16) we observe that the marginal information cost, d2rrv /d{3udw
is positive if rp > 2/3, equal to O if rp = 2/3, and negative if 2/15 < rp < 2/3.
If d2rrv / d{3udw > Oit implies that the information rent awarded to the regulated
firm decreases in w. Note that if the cost function is not convex enough (that is,
rp < 2/3), then the information rent is in fact increasing in w. For rp= 2/3, the
asynunetry of information does not affect the optimal solution - the full information
solution coincides with the solution under asynunetric information.
3.3 Second order incentive constraints
The necessary condition for the mechanism to be implementable, with the control
variable w, is given in the following lemma (adapted from Fudenberg and Tirole, .
1991):
Lemma 5 The mechanism M = {w (;BU) ,t (;BU)} is implementable if and only
if:
a (arr.V) dw
a{3u aw d{3u ~ o
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The proof of lemma 5 is in an appendix.
It can be shown that :,;g;u is indeed positive in the absence of foreclosure. When
foreclosure is possible :,;g;u is positive provided that cp > 2/3.15 Then, the more
efficient the upstream firm is, the lower is the access charge. This is summarised in
a proposition:
Proposition 1 When :,;g;.. > O, the following condition is sufficient for imple-
mentation of the mechanism M: dw/d(3'U ~ O.
A higher level of (31.£results in a higher level of foreclosure, r, which implicitly
increases the costs of the rivals. As for the access price, w, we observe that an
increase in the access price reduces the incentive to foreclose rival firms. Foreclosure
and pricing of access are substitute activities to improve the competitive situation
downstream for the vertically integrated firm. A sufficient condition on w for im-
plementation of the mechanism M is that w increases as the inefficiency level of
the regulated firm increases. If this is not satisfied, the regulated firm will use its
possibilities to improve its own situation through the unregulated activity; i.e., by
foreclosing the rivals. The profit-maximising level of r is increasing in (31.£,and w
is increasing in øu. (second-order sufficient condition for implementation). The in-
struments r and w are substitutes for the vertically integrated firm when it comes
to imposing higher costs on its competitors, through which it can improve its own
situation in the competitive downstream market. This can also be related to the
multi-task literature." If the regulated firm is not given enough margin along the
regulated dimension, w - øu., this may have a negative effect on the unregulated
(unobservable) dimension, r. A small margin in the regulated dimension effectively
means that the regulated firm is given strong incentives to foreclose.
When foreclosure is possible and the cost function is not sufficiently convex (Le.,
cp < 2/3), we obtain a qualitatively different requirement for implementation:
Proposition 2 When :,;g;.. < O, the following condition is sufficient for imple-
mentation of the mechanism M: dw / d(3'Us O.
15 ::J1J,. ?: O is also known as the single-crossing condition.
16See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
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As is mentioned above, the information rent is increasing in the access charge
when cp < 2/3; i.e., when the convexity of the foreclosure costs is less pronounced.
In addition, there are no countervailing incentives present.
3.4 Full information benchmark
The absence of asymmetric information is used as a benchmark case to investi-
gate the consequences that the regulator's imperfect information has on optimal
regulatory policy. This is not the first-best solution, as the number of firms in
the unregulated downstream market is exogenously given (i.e., no free entry). The
regulator maximises the following problem (substituting for transfer):
m;x:W - ~Q2 + (1+ >') [(qV)2 + (w _ .BU) qi _ ~ r2]
+ (qi)2 _ (1+ >') F _ >.ITv
(17)
subject to
(PC)
r" = arg maxll" (q*v, q*i)
r
(S.3)
(S.4)
That is, r" is the profit-maximising choice of foreclosure from stage 3 (constraint
S.3), and constraint S.4 represents the Nash-equilibrium in stage 4 of the game.
This is to say that when deciding on the optimal policy, the regulator must take
into account the effects that a change in the quality of the infrastructure has on
both firm v's decision on the level of foreclosure activity (r), and the effect in the
quantity competition game. Since rents to the regulated firm are costly, the regulator
will determine transfers such that ITv (.BU) = O. The solution to the maximisation
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problem of the regulator is determined by:
Q*dQ* + (1 + A) (2q*Vdq*v + q*i + (w _ /3"') dq*idw dw dw
* dr" ) 2 *i dq"
-cpr dw + q dw
O =
When foreclosure is not an option, we assume that r = o. Consequently, we only
need to consider the direct effect of changes in w on q'", q*i and Q*.
3.4.1 Access charge regulation (no foreclosure)
The full information optimal level of access charges when the vertically integrated
firm cannot use non-price discrimination is denoted w~r' and can be written as:
f _ a (5A - 1) - .ad(4 + A) +ø (5 - 4A) + .au(2 + 5A)
wnr - 1+ IDA
Optimal access charge when there is no foreclosure has the following properties
(the magnitude of the social cost of public funds, A, plays an important part in
determining the Signs):17
8w!rl8a - (5A - 1) 1 (1 + lOA) > O if A> 1/5
åW!rI8.ad - - (4 + A) 1 (1 + lOA) < O
åW!rlå.ai - (5 - 4A) 1(1 + IDA) > O if A <: 5/4
8w!rI8.au - (2 + 5A) 1 (1 + lOA) > O
We see that the optimal access charge is used to ensure that market shares are
distorted in favour of the more efficient firm (in the end-user production), with the
access charge being (unambiguously) decreasing in ~ and increasing in ø. A similar
result is obtained by Lewis and Sappington (1999). However, the latter property is
171f both firms have identical downstream marginal costs (~ = f3i = c), then w!r is decreasing
in c provided that A> 1/5. For a high enough A, the optimal access charge is determined to yield
a positive access margin. Furthermore, the regulated firm earns positive profits in the downstream
market. This implies that the transfer is a negative number. In this case, the primary concern
of the regulator is to ensure that the profit of the regulated firm is high, which it is when total
quantity is high, as this yields a large transfer to the regulator.
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only valid when the social cost of public funds is not too large. When A > 5/4, we
observe that the optimal access charge is smaller the higher is the marginal cost of
the rival firm. In such a situation, efficiency in production becomes less important
whereas the cost of transfers is the dominating concern.P
Proposition 3 'When the vertically integrated firm cannot discriminate. against its
rival (neither by setting a high access charge nor by non-price means), the access
charge is (normally) distorted away from the marginal cost of providing access in
order to favour the more efficient downstream firm.
In general, we cannot determine the magnitude of w~r relative to the upstream
marginal cost, /3u. What we see in the present model is that the optimal access charge
is in fact increasing in the upstream marginal cost.l? Using numerical examples, it
is possible to show the followingr"
Proposition 4 If A = O and the rival firm (if any) has a cost advantage, then
w!r < /3u. The higher the downstream marginal cost of the integrated firm is relative
to the rival firm the further below upstream marginal cost is the access charge. If
the integrated firm enjoys a cost advantage downstream (If > O,~ = O), w!r > /3U
for some parameter values.
With no social cost of public funds (A = O), the optimal access charge policy
requires that access is subsidised to correct the distortion caused by imperfect com-
petition in the downstream market. This causes an access deficit for the vertically
integrated firm, but the regulatory agency can use costless lump-sum transfers to
finance this deficit.
18When the shadow cost is large, we know that the vertically integrated firm has a positive
access margin. In the downstream industry there is at least a non-zero profit. Since there is full
information, transfers are set such that the regulated firm's profit is exactly 0, and, consequently,
transfers are negative if we assume F = O-Le., the regulated firm pays the regulator. So when
>. > 5/4, the gain to the regulator from receiving money from the regulated firm outweighs the
cost of the distorted production downstream.
19If the optimal access charge is not increasing in the upstream marginal cost, this implies that
market shares are distorted in favour of the downstream rival.
2°In the calculations, I assume that tr,ri,{3" E [0,1].
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If the social cost of public funds is large, it becomes very costly to use lump-
sum transfers to subsidise the access deficit. Consequently, optimal policy calls for
an access surplus, except for the case where the downstream subsidiary is highly
inefficient. When the downstream subsidiary is highly inefficient it is better to
subsidise the rival to distort market shares to the integrated firm's disadvantage.
Proposition 5 For {3d = {3i = O,w~r > {3u when ,X ~ 0.2. For shadow cost of
public funds below this level, the optimal access charge is always less than {3u.
It is reasonable that the degree to which there is an access deficit (w~r < (3U) is
smaller the higher is the social cost of public funds. When Xbecomes large, the cost
of transferring a lump-sum payment to the regulated firm becomes a heavier burden.
Consequently, optimal policy on access charges shifts from subsidising the rival firm
and using compensating lump-sum transfers, to allowing the regulated firm to earn
a positive margin on access provision.
We assume that the number of firms competing downstream is exogenously given
(and equal to 2), which implies that there is an inefficiency in this market. Subsidis-
ing the rival's cost (by subsidising access) is one way to correct for this inefficiency.
However, there is also a second distortion from the fact that transfers to the regulated
firm must be financed through taxing other sectors of the economy. Which of these
distortions is the more pronounced will determine the appropriate policy on access
pricing. When the latter effect is more important, access cannot be subsidised ..
3.4.2 Access charge regulation (foreclosure)
Under full information, and allowing for non-price discrimination, the constrained
optimal access charge, w!, is given by:
wI =r
1
N [a (,X (45ep2 - 28ep + 4) - 9ep2 + 38ep - 16)
+{3d (16 + 8ep - 36ep2 + ,X(20ep - 9ep2 - 4)) + {3i (45ep2 - 46ep + ,X(8ep - 36ep2))
+{3u (,X (45ep2 - 28ep + 4) + 18ep2 + 14ep - 12)]
where N = (9ep2 + 52ep - 28+ 2,X(45ep2 - 28ep + 4». In this case, the optimal
access charge will depend not only on relative efficienciesand the social cost of public
22
funds, but also on the convexity of the cost function C (r) (or, equivalently, the
magnitude of the parameter cp). When we open up for the possibility of foreclosure
activities by the vertically integrated firm, a more general statement can be given
with regard to the access charge relative to the upstream marginal cost.
Proposition 6 Men the integrated firm can use non-price discrimination, we find
that w! > {31J. for all realisations of parameter values. Furthermore, the optimal
access charge is higher when the cost function is less convex in the foreclosure variable
r (i. e., the smaller is cp).
We have seen above that the degree to which the vertically integrated firm
chooses to foreclose its rival depends (in part) on the level of the access charge.
The higher is the access charge, the lower is the level of foreclosure. From a social
point of view, foreclosure is costly and should be kept as lowas possible. Conse-
quently, the optimal access charge accounts for the opportunity to foreclose rival
firms by setting the access charge higher than is the case when foreclosure is not
an option. The fact that the optimal access charge is higher when the cost related
to foreclosure is less convex in r reflects. the fact that a less convex cost function
implies that it is less costly to foreclose rival firms. Thus, when foreclosure is costly
the level of foreclosure is less responsive to changes in the access charge (i.e., år· / åw
is less negative when cp is large) and, consequently, the optimal access charge is lower
compared to the case when foreclosure is less costly (i.e., a lower cp).
I
Proposition 7 Men non-price discrimination is an option for the vertically inte-
grated firm, the access charge is used to distort downstream market shares in favour
of the more efficient firm only when the costs of foreclosure is sufficiently high. For
2/3 < cp < 1 and A ;S 5/4, the access charge is set in order to attempt to cancelout
any differences in the marginal costs of the downstream firms.
This can be seen from the comparative static results for the optimal access charge
when foreclosure is possible, since we observe that åw! / åøu > 0, åw! / å{3d ~ 0,
åw!/å{3i ~ 0, and åw!/åa > 0.21
21When the downstream firms have identical marginal costs (i.e., f3d = f3i = c), the optimal
access charge is unambiguously decreasing in c.
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ff 2/3 < cp < 59/75, then awl / a{3"-> 0.22 Weknow from above that the incentive
to foreclosure is negatively related to the downstream cost {3"- (and more so the less
costly foreclosure is), and that increasing the access charge reduces the incentives to
foreclose rivals. Furthermore, we know that when the cost of foreclosure is relatively
low, the vertically integrated firm will choose a high level for r, which is detrimental
to welfare. An increase in f3d will subsequently lower the level of foreclosure both
directlyas determined byeqn. (12), and also indirectly through raising the access
charge.
When cp is large, the level of foreclosure is less responsive to changes in f3d (or any
other of the exogenous parameters), so when {3"- (or the access charge w) increases
the level of foreclosure is reduced less than when foreclosure entails a lower cost.
Consequently, with a high cost of foreclosure the cost of raising the access charge
to counter the foreclosure (measured by the detrimental effect on welfare through
reduced total quantity) exceeds the benefits of a level playing field.
Furthermore, awl / a(i is negative for alllevels of the shadow cost of public funds
provided that cp ::; 1. ff cp> 1, aw!/af3i > Owhen the shadow cost of public funds
is sufficiently low.23 Thus, contrary to the case where non-price discrimination is
not possible, the regulator does not (necessarily) use the access charge to distort the
market share in favour of the more efficient firm.
3.5 Asymmetric information
In order to maximise the welfare function W (w), the regulator offers the incentive
compatible contract
221£we restrict our attention to the case where <p > 2/3 (to avoid problems of discontinuities)
and assume that A E (0,5), I find that for low enough <p (that is, <p < 59/75), aw!/a{3d > 0, for
all levels of the shadow cost of public funds. The higher is <p above this level, the higher must the
shadow cost of public fund be for awl / a~ to be positive. When <p > 13/10, awl / a{3d< ° for all
permissible values of A.
23The more convex the cost offoreclosure is, the higher can Abe. However, even when <p becomes
very large, the optimal access charge is decreasing in {3i if A~ 5/4.
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to the upstream firm, using his knowledge of the distribution and support of the
unknown parameter, and of the way the game is played in the subsequent stages.
The contract specifies the access charge (w), and transfer to the regulated firm (t).
If the efficiency level of the network provider is not known to the regulator, he
must offer a regulatory contract which induces the regulated firm to reveal its true
efficiency level. The regulator will then maximise welfare, subject to incentive and
participation constraints.
The regulator's optimisation problem is given by:
~ 1;[CS (w, Ø") + (1+ A) [(qV)' + (w - Ø") q' - ~ r'J + (qi)' (18)
- (1+ >.) F - >.rrV] dG (øu)
subject to
(IC)
(PC)
dw / df3u > O if d2rrv / dwdf3u > O
dsu] døu < O if d2rrv / dwdøu < O
(SIC)
r" = arg maxll" (q*v, q*i)
r
(S.3)
(SA)
The constraint S.3 is the profit-maximising level of foreclosure, and SA is the
Cournot-equilibrium. The constraint SIC, is the second-order incentive constraint,
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which we will ignore for now but check ex post. The participation constraints must
be satisfied to induce voluntary participation. Since there are countervailing incen-
tives, the standard procedure of assuming that (PC) binds for the least efficient
type is no longer valid in the general case. Instead, the participation constraint
is introduced explicitly into the optimisation problem.P' However, I will assume
that the sign of the incentive constraint does not change over the relevant interval
for ~, and use the standard methodology to solve this problem. This means that
the participation constraint will be binding only for the least efficient firm (i.e., for
~ = (3).25 Integrating the incentive constraint by parts, using the fact that [PC]
binds for the least efficient firm {3, we get an expression for the regulator's virtual
surplus (i.e., welfare adjusted to take account of the informational costs of inducing
truthful revelation):26
vs - l {CS (w,,8") + (1+ Å) [(q')2 + (w -,8") q; - ~ r2] + (d (19)
- (1+ >') F + >.~ ~:j[((W -~) - q*V) ~~ - Q*]} dG ((3U)
Maximising expression (19) pointwise with respect to iv, defines the optimal
access charge under asymmetric information, w:r:
where W refers to the welfare function under full information. We see that the
optimal access charge under asymmetric information, W:r, is equal to the optimal
24See Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) for a general treatment of the problem of countervailing
incentives.
25For the case without forclosure, a sufficient condition for ensuring that dII.V /df3u < O, and
consequently that the condition IT'll (if) ~ O is sufficient to guarantee participation from all types,
is a > w.
26See appendix 1.
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access charge under full information plus an incentive correction term. The magni-
tude and sign of the incentive correction term will depend on whether the regulated
firm can or cannot foreclose its rival. We will consider these two subcases below.
3.5.1 Access charge regulation (no foreclosure)
When the regulated firm cannot discriminate against the rival firm using non-price
means, the incentive correction form is given by:
(20)
Assuming>. > O, eqn. (20) is zero only when (3u = (J.: Thus, we have the
standard "no distortion at the top" - i.e., the allocation for a regulated firm of the
most efficient type is not distorted relative to the full information benchmark. 27
FIGURE 1 HERE
Figure 1: No foreclosure - optimal access charges
under full information (dashed line) and
asymmetric information (solid line). Uniform distribution
with pammeter values: (ri' = (1'- = O,a = 2, >.= 0.25)
Proposition 8 For all types of the regulatedfirm except f3u = (3, the optimal access
charge is higher under asymmetric information relative to the full information case.
The intuition is clear. By setting a high access charge the regulator effectively
restricts total output downstream since BQ* / In» < O,which reduces the information
rent necessary to induce truthful revelation. Furthermore, for a given (3u we see that
(w~r - (3U) > (w!r - øu), such that the countervailing incentive is more pronounced.
As is discussed above, creating countervailing incentives can be beneficial from a
social welfare point of view as this reduces the information rents. The comparative
static results for w~r are the same as in the full information case, w!r'
27A sufficient condition for the second-order incentive constraint to be satisfied is if the inverse
hasard rate is increasing in {3; i.e., d$u ~tS:? 2: O. This assumption is satisfied for a number of
distributions.
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·3.5.2 Access charge regulation (foreclosure)
If the regulated firm can discriminate against rival firms, the incentive correction
term is given by the followingexpression:
AG ({f") (3CP - 2) (6 - 33CP)
g ({f") 9cp- 2 9cp- 2
which sign and magnitude depends on both the convexity of the cost function
and the efficiencyof the regulated firm. Observe that the solution is not affected by
the asymmetry of information provided that {3'IJ.= {3, and/or cp= 2/3.
Proposition 9 Provided that A > 0, optimal access charge is higher under asym-
metric information relative to the full information solution for {f" > f!. and ip > 2/3;
i.e., wt < w~. For cp= 2/3 and/or {3'IJ. = {3, there is no distortion relative to the full
information solution. For cp< 2/3, wt > w~.
The intuition is similar to the no-foreclosure case. By increasing the access
charge, total downstream output is ·reduced and the countervailing incentives be-
comes more pronounced. Part of the reason that the incentive correction term
disappears when cp = 2/3 is that dq*i/d{f" = O; i.e., the (positive) direct effect
is exactly offset by the (negative) indirect effect. This leaves us with a first-
order incentive constraint equal to dTIv / d{f" = -Q*. For cp= 2/3, we observe
from eqn. (12) that dr" / dw = -1. Thus, any increases in the access charge
is matched exactly by a reduction in the level of foreclosure. This implies that
dQ*/dw = aQ*law + (aQ*lar) ar*law = 0, since aQ*law = aQ*lar. Conse-
quently, any changes in the access charge has no effect on the incentive constraint
at the margin for cp= 2/3.
FIGURE 2 HERE
Figure 2: Foreclosure - optimal access charge under
asymmetric information (solid line) and full information
(dashed line). Uniform distribution with parameter
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values: (~= f3d= O,a = 2, A= 0.25, IP= 1)
When IP< 2/3, we know from above that the second-order incentive constraint
requires that dw / df3'U~ O. When solving the regulator's maximisation problem
without taking the second-order constraint into account, the solution candidate for
optimal access charge is increasing in øv.. This cannot be the optimal solution.
This will imply that the optimal solution is characterised by "bunching" j i.e., that
different types are given the same contract.F'
The comparative static results for w~ are as follows: aw~/af3'U > O,aw~/aa > O,
aw~/a~ ~ O,and aw~/af3i ~ O. To avoid problems of discontinuities I will assume
that IP> 2/3. When IP> 4/3, the optimal access charge is decreasing in the marginal
cost of the downstream subsidiary (i.e., aw~/af3d < 0).29 The optimal access charge
is decreasing in f3i whenever IP< 1, and may be increasing in f3i if IP> 1 provided
that A is not too large. This is essentially the same as is the case for optimal access
charge under full information with foreclosure, w!, and the intuition is explained in
section 3.4.2.
3.6 Welfare comparisons
In this model, the welfare considerations are quite straightforward. As it turns
out, the level of welfare is always higher whenever non-price discrimination is not
possible, both under full and asymmetric information. The level of welfare is highest
under full information and no foreclosure, and is lowest when there is asymmetric
information and foreclosure. The reason for this is simply that foreclosure entails
two types of costs (and virtually no benefits in this model) j the monetary cost C (r),
but also the cost in terms of reduced consumer surplus of a reduction in the total
downstream production.
When there is no access charge regulation, the rival firm is foreclosed completely
if both firms' downstream costs are identical (that is, if f3d= ~).30 In this situation,
the vertically integrated firm acts as a monopolist both upstream and downstream.
28The optimal policy in this case will not be expressed formally.
29For lower cp, aw~/arr < O if the shadow cost of public funds is low enough.
30See fig. 3 for an illustration of the welfare levels under full information. The parameter values
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Under full information, welfare is always highest under regulation when foreclosure
is not possible. However, welfare may be higher in the unregulated case than in
the regulated case if foreclosure is possible, provided that the cost of foreclosure is
sufficiently high (with cp > 1). Consequently, the regulator cannot do better than
the unregulated outcome when it cannot control the quality of access provided by
the vertically integrated firm, provided that the cost of foreclosure is sufficiently
high.31 The reason for this is that when the integrated firm is unregulated, it
can choose to either foreclose its rival using non-price means or by setting a high
access charge. Since non-price foreclosure is costly, the firm will set a high access
charge and eliminate competition downstream. This will lead to an elimination of
the monetary costs associated with foreclosure. When the firm is regulated, it will
attempt to foreclose its rival by (costly) non-price means. Consequently, when the
costs of such behaviour is sufficiently high, these costs outweigh the negative effect
on welfare of the lower monopoly quantity in the unregulated case.
Contrary to the full information case, the unregulated welfare may be higher
than what is the case under regulation and no foreclosure when there is asymmetric
information (assuming that f3d = f3i). See fig. 4 and 5 for illustrations (fig. 4 with
cp = 1, and fig. 5 with cp = 2).32 ff the marginal cost of upstream production
becomes sufficiently high, welfare is highest in the unregulated case. The reason is
a combination of several things. First of all, the regulator does not need to award
information rents to the vertically integrated firm in the unregulated case. Further-
more, in the unregulated case where the rival is completely foreclosed, the problem
of double marginalisation is avoided which obviously has a positive impact on wel-
fare. An finally, the total downstream quantity falls faster when upstream marginal
cost increases in the regulated case than in the unregulated case (as a consequence of
are as follows: a = 5,{3d = {3i = O,F = 0,>. = 1/4 and lp = 2. The solid line represents welfare
with no foreclosure, the short dashed line represents unregulated welfare, and the long dashed line
represents welfare with foreclosure.
31The regulator will actually never do worse if it does not interfere even if lp is smaller than 1.
32The parameter values are as follows: a = 5, ~ = {3i = 0,F = 0, >.= 1/4. The solid line
represents welfare with no foreclosure, the short dashed line represents unregulated welfare, and
the long dashed line represents welfare with foreclosure.
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the way the optimal access charge is set). When upstream marginal cost increases,
the access margin (i.e., w - J3U) increases if there is asymmetric information. This
is contrary to the case with full information. Since total downstream quantity falls
when øu increases, the distortion in the downstream market becomes larger. To
mitigate this distortion, the regulator decides to increase the access charge by less
than the increase in J3u which leads the access margin to fall. However, in the pres-
ence of asymmetric information, we know that the magnitude of the access margin
is important for the level of the information rent necessary for truthful revelation.
More specifically, we know that the higher the access margin is, the lower is the
information rent. Consequently, the regulator may choose to accept a larger dis-
tortion in the downstream market when J3u increases in order to reduce the costly
information rents payable to the regulated firm.
4 Summary
Regulatory authorities in a number of countries, including the US and EU, recom-
mend using a cost based policy with respect to the pricing of access to an essential fa-
cility - the localloop ("the last ten miles" of the telecommunications network). In the
US 1996Telecommunications Act, prices are recommended to be non-discriminatory
and cost based, and may include a reasonable profit to cover non-traffic sensitive
costs. The main reason for pursuing such a policy seems to be that regulators feel
that this is the best method of ensuring rival firms access to the essential facility
at reasonable terms. If the vertically integrated firm - the owner of the network -
is allowed to determine access charges without regulatory intervention, it will do
so to foreclose rival firms completely. Consequently, there is obviously some scope
for the regulation of access charges. However, by focusing too heavily on the costs .
of providing access in the determination of optimal access charges, the regulators
may run the risk of ignoring the possibility that the network owner may be able
to discriminate against potential rivals by means of non-price behaviour (such as
degrading the quality of access offered to rival firms, which then translates into a
lower quality of the rival's final product).
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The analysis above suggests that if regulators cannot write complete contracts
with respect to the access terms offered.to rivals (i.e., the regulators can only control
the price a network owner charges, but not the quality of the access), the optimal ac-
cess charge should be distorted away from marginal costs of providing access to yield
a positive profit margin on access. Even if we assume that the regulator can control
all aspects of the access terms offered to rival firms (i.e., a complete contract situa-
tion), the optimal access charge will in general be different from the marginal cost
of providing access in situations where there is imperfect competition downstream.
In the absence of any foreclosure activities, the socially optimal access charge may
yield either a positive profit margin on access or an access deficit, depending on how
socially costly transfers to the regulated firm are. When the integrated firm can
practice foreclosure, the regulated firm will always earn a positive access margin,
which is not necessarily the case when foreclosure is not an option. Furthermore,
the access margin under asymmetric information is always higher than under full in-
formation. Consequently, opting for a cost-based regulation of access charge, where
cost-based usually is interpreted as the cost of providing access, is not necessarily
socially optimal.
Furthermore, as seems quite intuitive; I find that optimal access Charges should
be determined not only by looking at the costs of providing access, but also examine
the costs of providing end user services (for both the vertically integrated firm and
its downstream rival) - the relative efficiencies of the service providers. The optimal
access charge should not only attempt to price access solely based. on the cost of
providing access, but it should also pay attention to the distribution of the pro-
duction downstream between the two firms. Furthermore, my results suggest that
the regulation of the access charge is not always used to award the more efficient
downstream firm a larger market share.
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6 Appendicies
Appendix 1
Integrating the local incentive constraint by parts
Our problem is to get the objective function of the regulator to a form which
allows us to maximise the integrand pointwise. Inserting for the information rent
into the objective function results (in part) in the following expression:
(il nu ({3U)9 ({3U)d{3U= _ (il [ (il dllU d{3U] 9 ({3U)døu
l e l e l pu døu
where ~: = -Q* + [(w - øu) + PQq*U) '!!ø~is the local incentive constraint. We
will integrate this expression by parts to eliminate the integral over the interval
[{3u,Ø] . Define [fffu ~: d{3U] . u (øu), and v (øu) = G (øu), which imply that
v' ({3U) = dv (øu) /døu = 9 (øu), and u' (øu) = du (øu) /døu == ~:. The formula for
integrating by parts is given by: ff u'vdx = uv If - ff uv'dx. Using this formula,
and the definitions above, we obtain:
-J; [l ::dØ"] 9 (Ø")dØ" = [1:::dØ"G(Ø")] I~
_ iii dllU G (øu) døu
lf!. døu
Using the fact that G (ff) = 0, G (Jf) = 1, and fl ~d{3U = 0, we can rewrite
the above as:
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Substituting the right-hand side of this expression for IIV into the objective func-
tion, we obtain the "virtual surplus" function.
Appendix 2
The second-order incentive constraint
In the first stage the regulator proposes an incentive compatible mechanism,
M = {w (It) ,t (It)}. As described in the model chapter, the firm makes a
report on its level of efficiency to the regulator (stage 2). When the firm makes
....... '1£
this report, it maximises its profits with respect to {3 (the reported parameter).
This solves the first-order condition: :Jl~= O. In order for this to be a maximum,
the second-order condition a~~)2 ~ O must also be satisfied. At this optimum,
changing the value of its report has a marginal net benefit of zero, so taking the
al derivati .......{3'U val ed {3.......'U {3'U' Ids lJ2II" il:.. a2II" Otot erivative wrt. to e uat at = Yle: a('ØU)2døu + allaøu = .
The first element is non-positive (from the second-order condition), and the second
l lJ2II" a2II" dw b . f h ali h Id (le ement aø"aøu = 8waøu døu must e non-negative or t e equ ty to o emma
5).
This is the (standard) implementation requirement that the product of the single-
crossing condition and the monotonicity condition is non-negative. If for instance
the inverse demand is linear in Q and costs, C (r), are quadratic in r, then the
information rent is decreasing in w (equivalent to ~-g;u > O). Sufficient conditions
for the information rent being decreasing in w are 1) concave inverse demand with
respect to quantity (PQQ ~ O),, 2) the regulated firm having a sufficiently large
market share of the total downstream market relative to the rival firm, and 3) costs
being sufficiently convex in the foreclosure variable, r. We shall investigate this in
more detail below. Sufficient conditions for second-order incentive compatibility is
then: t; ~O. Thus, the second-order incentive condition requires that the access
price increases in the upstream inefficiency. QED.
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Abstract
This paper considers regulation of market structure and access charges in
vertically related markets. The main trade-off in determining the appropriate
access charge is static efficiency versus fixed cost duplication. The subgame
perfect regulation is characterised, and I find that regulating access charges
combined with no structure regulation is always the (weakly) best option. For
an interval of the downstream fixed cost, no regulation of the access charge
yields the same level of welfa.:e as the regulated case. Furthermore, I find that
the excess entry result of Ma.clciwand Whinston (1986) does not generally
carry over to vertically related markets.
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1 Introduction
Allocative efficiencyand entry conditions are two important issues that occupy many
regulators, as ensuring that scarce resources are used efficiently is one on the main
goals of regulation. Thus, regulators aim at determining the correct (regulated)
prices from a static allocative efficiency point of view and prices that ensure that
the degree of entry into the industry is socially optimal. This involves, among other
things, removing inefficient entry barriers so that the correct number of firms may
enter an industry. In the absence of fixed costs, we know that more competition
yields a better result. However, if there are fixed costs the welfare loss due to fixed
cost duplication must be measured against the benefits of increased competition.
The main intentions of this paper are twofold: First, to determine the socially
optimal policy (or combination of policies) in terms of access charge determination
and choice of market structure, where the access charge is determined either by the
upstream monopolist, or by a regulator. Second, to examine how the number of
entrants under free entry compares. to the socially optimal level. With imperfect
competition and free entry there will, under certain conditions, be a tendency to-
wards excessive entry (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). The main trade-off in the
determination of the access charge is then whether it should be set to create a level
playing field or to limit the potentially excessive entry. The literature on excessive
entry with imperfect competition typically only examines one market. One of the
goals of this paper is to examine whether the excessive entry result carry over to
a setting with vertically related markets, where the input market may be subject
to price regulation due to monopolisation and where the input monopolist may not
be allowed to enter the downstream market. Mankiw and Whinston (1986) show,
under the assumptions made in the present model (specifically ignoring the integer
constraint), that more firms will enter in equilibrium than is socially optimal. In
their model, however, there is only one market to consider. In the present model,
firms operate in vertically related markets and the firm supplying the essential input
may also serve the final product market. Furthermore, the price of the essential in-
put mayor may not, be subject to regulation. I show that the excessive entry result
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obtained by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) arises as a special case in the present
model.
It is assumed that there is free entry into the downstream market for all inde-
pendent firms, whereas the upstream monopolist may face restrictions on his entry
opportunities. Any obstacles to entry is only posed by the fixed cost incurred when
entering and the level of the access charge chosen by either the network monopolist
or the regulator. With imperfect competition, it may be necessary to subsidised
entry to foster competition, but, on the other hand, subsidies must normally be
financed by distortionary taxation which creates efficiency losses elsewhere in the
economy. Realistically, such subsidies will be difficult to advocate to politicians and
bureaucrats in most situations. In particular, it will be difficult in global markets
where international trade agreements and cross-border competition policy agree-
ments restrict the opportunity for subsidising production.
The role of the access charge from a social point of view is twofold, and in
setting the appropriate access charge there are some potentially opposing effects.
First, it can be used to correct for the potential allocative loss downstream as a
result of imperfect competition. Second, the access charge can be used to limit
socially costly duplication of fixed costs. As long as thereis imperfect competition
downstream, there will be an allocative loss. If we examine the upstream market
in isolation, static allocative efficiency calls for pricing the input at marginal cost.'
However, from the theory of second-best we know that when there are distortions
in the economy, first-best pricing is generally not welfare maximising.I When there
is Cournot-competition in a vertically related market (the downstream market), the
optimal access price implies setting price below marginal cost in a regime where
the regulator has full information about all relevant aspects." Such a policy results
1If there are fixed costs upstream, the access charge must be in excess of the marginal cost of
providing access. Furthermore, dynamic efficiency aspects may call for access charges in excess of
marginal costs in order to provide the appropriate investment incentives for the network owner.
Such dynamic aspects are not considered in the current paper.
2The classical reference on second-best theory is Lipsey and Lancaster (1956).
3Access charges below marginal costs require transfers to the regulated firm to compensate for
the access deficit. Access subsidies are only optimal if the cost of transfers to the regulated firm is
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in increased downstream quantity, which consequently leads to consumers' welfare
increasing. On the other hand, setting too low an access charge may encourage
excess entry and too much duplication of fixed costs. These two elements suggest
that marginal cost pricing of access, as proposed by e.g. the EU, is in general not
the best policy," li the regulator can subsidise access deficits and provided that the
shadow cost of public funds is sufficiently low, the optimal access charge is set below
the marginal cost of providing access (see Sand, 2000, 2001).5 The main assumption
in this paper is, however, that the access charge must be sufficient to cover costs,
so the details of first- and second-best regulation will not be discussed (see Sand,
2001).
The broader question we may ask is whether firms enjoying a monopoly position
in one market should be allowed to enter vertically related markets. This is an issue
that has been debated in great detail in relation to many network industries. In the
early 1980's, the conclusion for the telecommunications industry in the US was that
local and long-distance telephony should be provided by separate entities, and lead
to the break-up of AT&T. Regulators and competition policy authorities are again
becoming less reluctant to allowing integration between firms providing local and
long-distance telephony.
When there is only one firm producing an essential input for downstream pro-
duction, there is a danger that the monopolist may exploit his monopoly powers.
However, contrary to the majority of the literature on vertical relations (see Rey
and Tirole, 1997, for a summary of this literature), the regulator may choose to
restrict the upstream firm's potential for earning monopoly rents by regulating the
price charged for the intermediate product (the intermediate product is access to
end-users). A completely unregulated vertically integrated firm will, if firms are
symmetric, have incentives to foreclose rivals in the competitive segment and there- .
sufficiently low (see Sand, 2000, for more details).
4If the network provider has a dominant position, EU suggests that access charges should be
based on actual cost plus a reasonable rate of return on investments. See, e.g., Article 7 of Directive
97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997.
5When the shadow cost of public funds is too large, the social cost of the distortion in the
downstream industry must be weighed against the welfare loss of transfers.
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fore directly affect the degree of entry. In my model, the regulator may implicitly
determine whether firms find it profitable to enter the downstream industry through
the determination of the access charges. Consequently, the actions of the regulator
(i.e., determining access charges) have similar effects to foreclosure activities under-
taken by vertically integrated firms, or raising rivals' costs (see Salop and Scheffman,
1983). Foreclosure is frequently defined as "any dominant firm's practice that denies
proper access to an essential input it produces to some users of this input, with the
intent of extending monopoly power from one segment of the market (the bottleneck
segment) to the other (the potentially competitive segment)" (Rey and Tirole, 1997;
p.I). If the upstream firm is restricted to charge only a linear price for access, the
only way to extract the surplus in the downstream segment in an efficient way is to
vertically integrate into this segment. However, since there is imperfect competition
downstream, the vertically integrated firm can only extract the entire surplus down-
stream if it completely forecloses all rivals. Alternatively, the upstream monopolist
could use an appropriately designed two-part tariff (franchise fees) to extract the
total industry surplus without having to vertically integrate. Another alternative
method of preserving the monopoly profit for the upstream firm is the use of resale
price maintenance (RPM). 6
In the present paper, I will be concerned with the analysis of vertically related
markets. The vertical structure of the type of model considered here is compati-
ble with a great number of industries. All network industries typically consist of
vertically related markets. The market for Internet access is one example. An es-
sential input for the Internet access providers (lAPs) is access to the local loop and
end-users, a service which usually is provided by telecommunications firms. Many
of these firms have substantial market powers in the local access market, and the
pricing of local access is usually subject to regulation by national regulators. The'
final product market can be thought of as a potentially new market, e.g., a market
for broadband communication services, where firms mayor may not enter. I have
in mind a situation where the upstream firm provides transportation network ser-
6See Rey and Tirole (1997) and Tirole (1988) for more detailed discussions about both RPM
and franchise fees.
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vices that may be used as an essential input to produce services to consumers, but
the analysis applies more generally than this. The model presented below is very
stylised, but it is still general enough to be appropriate for the analysis of other cases
where there is a distribution network (essential facility) and imperfect competition
in a downstream market (electricity transmission and production, railroad, airline
market and landing slots, etc.).
In the present model it is assumed that the regulator has two main regulatory
instruments at his disposal. First, the regulator may impose entry restrictions on the
upstream monopolist. Entry into downstream markets by the upstream monopolist
may be restricted jf the regulator fears that a firm producing an essential input
(an upstream monopolist) may foreclose rival firms in the downstream industry,"
Second, the regulator may decide on the appropriate access charge, which still is a
disputed matter for instance in the widely deregulated telecommunications industry.
It is assumed throughout the paper that the regulator cannot subsidise access by
setting an access charge lower than the upstream monopolist's marginal cost of
providing the access.
The primary reason for regulating at all should be that such a regulation yields
a higher level of welfare than no regulation does, and it therefore seems appropriate
to use the unregulated scenario as the benchmark case. ABit turns out, regulating
access charges is not generally the best policy. In this paper, I examine how well
regulation (both structure regulation and access charge regulation) does compared
to the unregulated case. InVickers (1995), the focus is on how the vertical structure
affects the choice of the level of the (regulated) access charge, and consequently, the
unregulated access charge case is not considered. Furthermore, contrary to Vickers
(1995) the regulator cannot give lump-sum transfers to the regulated firm and it
is assumed that the regulator has full information about all relevant factors. This
implies that the financial loss access subsidies impose on the upstream firm cannot
be financed by transfers from the regulator.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the model, and
7An alternative to control the number of downstream firms is to restrict entry by the use of
licenses. This is, however, not considered in the present paper.
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section 3 provides the reader with some basic intuition as well as the formal analysis.
Section 4 provides the analysis of welfare under various policy combinations and
evaluates how free entry compares to the social optimal degree of entry. In section
5, some concluding remarks are made.
2 The framework
In the model considered here, I assume that there is only one firm upstream. The
number of downstream firms is determined endogenously, and potential downstream
firms enter if they find it profitable to do so and if they are allowed to do so by the
regulator.
The analysis is conducted in the setting of a multi-stage game. In the first stage
either the upstream firm or the regulator decides on an access charge. In the second
stage, firms choose simultaneously to enter or not. In the final stage, firms compete
simultaneously in quantities. The final stage of the game is unregulated. The choice
of whether the upstream monopolist should be subject to entry restrictions is taken
by the regulator prior to the access charge is being determined.
The downstream firms are assumed to compete in quantities. The justification of
Cournot competition in the final product market is that firms, prior to the final stage
competition, need to choose the capacity of the transport network. This capacity
choice amounts to building up a transport network, or leasing transport capacity
from another firm (see Hansen, 1999). Thus, the quantity choices these firms make
in the final stage of the game is in reality a choice of capacity,"
ITthe upstream monopolist is allowed to enter the downstream market, its profits
consist of both the profit it earns from selling access and the profit from selling the
BIt is often argued that a more realistic assumption is that firms compete in prices, not quan-
tity. However, the Cournot outcome can, provided that certain assumptions are met, be seen as
the outcome of a two-stage game where capacity choice precedes price competition (Kreps and
Scheinkman, 1983).
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final product to consumers. Firm v's upstream profit only is given by:
n
'TrU = (w - f3)L qi
i=O
(1)
where qo ~ Ois the output of the downstream subsidiary of the upstream mo-
nopolist and qi ~ O,i = L.n, are the downstream output levels of the independent
firms. The parameters w and f3 are the access charge and upstream marginal cost,
respectively. I will assume that the upstream firm must be financially viable as a
separate entity, and that the regulator cannot (or will not) use transfers to compen-
sate the upstream monopolist for any operating loss it may incur if the regulator
chooses to use access subsidies (i.e., determining an access charge below marginal
cost)," I will therefore make the following assumptionr'?
Assumption 1
The regulated access charge must ensure coverage of costs; i.e., w ~ f3.
Fixed costs upstream is an important characteristic of most local access tech-
nologies, and is a major reason for the lack of competition in the localloop ("the
last mile" of telecommunication networks). In many networks the investments in
infrastructure are already sunk, and play no role in the determination of the access
charge. Thus, an ad hoc justification of leaving fixed costs in network provision out
of the analysis is that the game which is played in the current paper takes place
after investments are sunk. Furthermore, the level of these fixed costs is assumed
to be high enough to deter entry into the upstream segment. Il
9The upstream firm will, of course, never want to determine an access charge below marginal
costs of providing access.
lONote that assumptions 1-3 all put restrictions on the magnitude of the endogenous variable
w. However, it turns out that both the unregulated and regulated access charges all satisfy the
restrictions imposed by assumptions 1-3 if the level of the fixed costs is sufficiently low; i.e., if
a - c - {3 - 2.fF ;:::o.
Il A consequence of ignoring fixed costs upstream is that the assumption which requires the access
charge to cover the marginal cost of providing access is sufficient for ensuring that the uptream
firm earns non-negative profits. If there are fixed costs present, then the access charge must be
strictly above marginal cost for Ramsey reasons.
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The profit obtained downstream for firms i = 0,1, ...,n, is given by:
'!ri = (P - w - c) qi - F (2)
where P = a - E:=o qi, is the inverse demand function. Let us define Q as the
total quantity produced downstream, which is given by: Q = E:=o qi. Downstream
marginal cost is the same for all firms, and is denoted c. It is assumed that all
downstream firms pay the same access charge w, but for a vertically integrated firm
the access charge is simply a transfer price. We assume that all firms must pay the
same fixed costs, F, for establishing downstream operations. This could be costs
associated with setting up a distribution and sales network, marketing expenses,
and it is reasonable that both firms face the same fixed costs. These fixed costs
could also be attributed to a USO-fee (USO - Universal Service Obligation), which
all firms operating downstream must pay.12 The presence of the fixed cost' implies
that firms may not want to enter into the industry even if equilibrium quantities
are positive. A sufficient condition for the upstream firm to enter the downstream
industry is that the downstream operation, in isolation, earns positive profits.P
The regulator's welfare' is given by:
w = { Cs-: - (c+ (3) E~o qi - (n + 1) F
Cssr - (c + (3) E:=l qi - nF
(3)
where CSk = aQk - (Qk)2 /2, for k = nsr, sr, is the gross consumers' surplus under
the cases of no structure regulation (nsr) and structure regulation (sr), respectively.
In the latter case, the upstream monopolist is not allowed to enter the downstream
market.
12An extension to the present model could be to say that the regulator determines the level of
the fixed costs associated with entry into the downstream market. This could, for instance, be the
case where firms who enter are required to contribute towards the costs of maintaining networks
in unprofitable geographical areas (e.g., part of the entry costs contribute towards the costs of
Universal Service Obligations, USO).
13In general, we would expect that the upstream firm evaluates the profit earned as a monopolist
access provider with no downstream operation against the profit earned as a vertically integrated
firm (i.e., compare (P - c - w) qo - F + (w - (3) 'E~=o qi against (w - (3) 'E~=1 qi.
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2.1 The game
We are looking for the subgame perfect equilibrium in the game, and start at the
last stage to reveal the equilibrium path. We first solve for the Cournot-equilibrium.
Then we solve for the optimal access charge; i.e., the price paid for access which
maximises either the upstream firm's profit (the unregulated case) or the regulator's
welfare function (the regulated case).
The access charge can also be used as an instrument to limit the degree of
costly duplication of fixed costs. The regulator may choose to set the access charge
high enough to foreclose the rival firms if the fixed costs are sufficiently high.l'' An
alternative policy to the regulation of access charge to avoid duplication of fixed costs
is either to restrict the upstream monopolist's opportunity to enter into vertically
related markets, or to limit entry by independent firms.
One might argue that regulating the final product prices is another alternative.
However, as is argued by, e.g., Laffont and Tirole (2000), the more severe monopoly
problem is in the upstream market with (potentially) significant economies of scale.
The downstream market is more competitive. This leads us to the conclusion that
the more appropriate regulatory policy would be to direct the attention to the
bottleneck segment (network services) which is the real problem, and regulate access
charges rather than regulating the prices of the final products.
3 The regulated and unregulated cases
In this section I will determine both the unregulated firm's choice of access charge
and the socially optimal access policy, when the number of firms downstream is
determined endogenously.
Let us assume that firm v is active in both markets. We now allow for potential
rival firms to enter freely in the downstream market. In this case, the inverse demand
function is given by: P = a - E~=oqi, where firms i = 1,..n are the independent
14If we allow for differences in marginal cost downstream, the regulator may decide to foreclose
(some of) the rival firm(s) if the rival firm is very inefficient relative to the downstream subsidiary
of the access provider.
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rival firms and firm O is the downstream subsidiary of the upstream monopolist.
When there is free entry, the total number of rivals will be determined by the zero
profit condition for all independent firms i:
(4)
Ignoring problems of indivisibilities, we can assume that the inequality is satisfied
as an equality in equilibrium.P Since we assume that all potential entrants have
identical marginal costs, all active downstream rivals produce the same quantity;
qi = q, 'Vi = 1, ..n. I also assume that the downstream subsidiary of the upstream
monopolist face the same downstream marginal cost as the independent firms. Any
cost differences between the downstream competitors will therefore be due to the fact
that the access charge is different from the marginal cost of providing access. Thus,
the vertically integrated firm may therefore have a different level of production.
Consequently, the total downstream quantity is given by Q = nq + qo.
Cournot equilibrium In the final stage of the game firms compete in quan-
tities, taking the access charge as given.' It can be shown that when there are n
entrants and the upstream monopolist is allowed to enter the competitive segment,
the (unique) equilibrium quantities for a given level of the access charge will be:
* a - c- 2w + /3
q = n+2 (5)
* a-c-(n+l)/3+nw
qo= n+ 2 (6)
where q* and qo represent the equilibrium quantities for each rival and the vertically
integrated firm, respectively. Note that in some of the cases considered below, the
vertically integrated firm may enjoy a monopoly situation downstream, with the
resulting monopoly output Qo = (a - c - /3) /2.
15In reality, there are of course indivisibility and the zero profit condition is satisfied as an
equality only by coincidence. The true number of firms which will enter is the largest positive
integer which satisfies the zero profit condition, and this will in general imply that firms earn
positive profits downstream. However, to simplify the analysis I abstract from this problem.
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The total downstream quantity is in equilibrium given as:
Q* * * (n+l)(a-c)-nw-,8= qo+ nq = ~-"":"""":'-n-+___;_2--___;- (7)
Observe that in the competitive limit when n -+ 00, lim qå = w - ,8, which
n ......oo
is (strictly) positive if firm v earns a (strictly) positive profit margin upstream.
FUrthermore, lim q* = ° and lim Q* = (a - c - w) > 0, where the latter limit is
n ......oo n ......oo
equal to the competitive output Qcomp = (a - c - ,8) if w = ,8.
To ensure that the competitive output is positive, I assume the following:
Assumption 2
w < a- c.
Assumption 2 ensures both that the competitive limit is positive when there are
no vertical restrictions, and, as we will see below, that the output of the independent
downstream firms is positive when the upstream monopolist is not allowed to enter
into the competitive segment. If assumption 2 is not satisfied it indicates that the
market size is small relative to the marginal costs of the independent firms, and this
implies that there will never be any entry by independent firms in the competitive
segment (not even in the absence of fixed costs).
If the network monopolist is not allowed to enter the downstream market, then it
can be shown that the symmetric (and unique) equilibrium quantity in the Cournot
game is given by:
'if = (a - c - w)/(n + 1) (8)
In this case, we see that assumption 2 ensures that there will be production in
equilibrium (provided that the fixed costs are sufficiently low). If, on the other hand,
w > a - c, then we are in the uninteresting case of a market with no activity.
Entry decisions The entry decision by each independent firm is taken at the
intermediate stage of the game, in which the equilibrium quantities from the final
stage of the game are used to determine the profitability of entry. The zero-profit
condition, eqn. (4), dictates the total number of rivals the industry can support for
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a given set of parameter values. By inserting for eqn. (5) into (4), we obtain the
following expression which determines the number of firms, n ~ O, that enters the
downstream industry:
...... a - c - 2w + (3 - 2#n<n= r;:;,- vF (9)
where 11, is the value of n which ensures that (4) is satisfied as an equality. The
actual number of firms, n, that enters will be the largest positive integer satisfying
(9). We observe that the number of firms which enter is a decreasing function of
the level of fixed costs and the access charge. After we have calculated the optimal
access charge, we can then work out how many firms that actually enter using (9).
When the upstream monopolist cannot enter the downstream market, the num-
ber of firms entering is determined by:
_ a-c-w-..jF
n<n= r;:;,- vF (10)
If there are no fixed costs associated with entry into the downstream market
and if the access charge is set equal to marginal cost of providing access (w = (3),
then q* = ff = (a - c - w) / (n + 2), and q* is non-negative since a > c + w by
assumption 2.16 In this case, the number of firms entering the industry tends to
infinity (IIi ---t Oas n ---t 00). This is the same result as in Mankiw and Whinston
(1986), who find that if the fixed cost of entry approaches zero the bias towards
excessive entry tends to infinity. However, they prove that the welfare loss caused
by having too many firms approaches zero in this case.
The entry dynamics implies that the regulator can determine the degree of entry
into the industry if the access charge is regulated. We know from Mankiw and
Whinston (1986) that there is a tendency for excess entry in markets with imperfect
competition when the business stealing effect is significant. In this case, the profit
of new firms entering the industry comes at the expense of incumbent firms' profits.
This implies that the gain to society of a new firm entering is less than the gain to
16If assumption 2 is not satisfied, there will be no production in the downstream industry (and
consequently, no production upstream), as firms are symmetric and q* = qo under the assumptions
in the current paragraph.
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the entering firm. Consequently, the regulator can by means of the access charge
restrict entry such that only the socially optimal number of firms enters into the
industry, if he so desires.
I will assume that the following condition is satisfied, unless stated otherwise:
Assumption 3
To ensure that doumstream output for the independent firms is positive, we must
have the following: w :::;(a - c+ (3) 12.
A necessary, but not sufficient, requirement for entry by independent firms is that
the equilibrium output is positive, which is ensured by assumption 3. It also ensures
that the price-cost margin of the downstream firms is non-negative. Assumption
3 also ensures that the total equilibrium downstream output, Q*, increases when
more firms enter; i.e., aQ* I an ~ O. Thus, under assumption 3 we know 'that the
introduction of another firm in the downstream market implies that there is a market
expansion effect.
Furthermore, assumption 3 ensures that each downstream firm's equilibrium
quantity decreases in the number of firms: i.e., aq*Ian:::; O and aqålan :::;O. This
implication of assumption 3 captures the business stealing effect of newentry. For
each newentrant in the market, that particular firm brings an added social gain
due to the market expansion effect. However, part of the profit of the potential new
entrant comes from stealing som~ of the existing firms' market shares and profits.
Thus, from a social point of view the profit of a given newentrant, which is the
basis for the entry decision of that firm, is higher than the value to society of that
new entrant.l"
Consequently, there are opposing effects on welfare due to entry. First, consumers
are better off due to the fact that quantity increases in the number of firms entering'
downstream. On the other hand, there are real economic costs due to entry, due
to higher output and more duplication of fixed costs. The optimal entry implies
balancing these costs and benefits.
17Assumption 3 satisfies all the conditions laid down by assumption 1-3 in Mankiw and Whinston
(1986), in which case free entry in imperfectly competitive markets tends towards excessive entry.
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3.1 The basic trade-off: Outsourcing of production
Before I analyse the various cases in detail, it will be beneficial to give a short
overview of the main trade-offs the firm and the regulator, respectively, face when
the level of the access charge is to be determined. An understanding of the basic
economic forces at work will help understand the results presented below.
Both in the unregulated case (the upstream firm determines the level of the ac-
cess charge) and in the regulated case (a regulator determines the access charge),
the process of determining the level of the access charge may be seen as a problem of
outsourcing a production activity. In the unregulated case, the determining factor
in choosing whether to price access to allow independent downstream firms com-
pete is whether such a policy increases the network monopolist's profit. The idea is
to price the access to achieve a production mix which maximises profits. By pric-
ing access low enough to make entry by independent firms profitable, the network
monopolist effectively outsources part of (or the total) production downstream to
these independent firms. Whether this is in the network monopolist's own interest
depends on several factors. The most commonly used explanation of why a firm
chooses to outsource (part of) its production relates to cost aspects. Certain pro-
duction activities, either final products or inputs to the production process, may be
better undertaken by independent firms if these firms are more cost efficient than
the in-house supplier. With a sufficiently low access charge, independent firms will
enter and earn a positive level of profits. However, the network monopolist will be
able to capture at least some of the profit from the downstream market by choosing
the access charge appropriately. In the present model, this effect is not present since
all downstream firms are equally efficient.
Part of the profit earned by outsourcing production to independent firms may,
as mentioned, be captured by the network monopolist through setting an access
charge in excess of marginal cost, but some profit will have to be retained by the
independent firms in order to induce their entry. Consequently, there will be a profit-
shifting effect from the network monopolist to the independent suppliers. This effect
reducesthe network monopolist's incentives to outsource its (final good) production,
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and this effect will push for determining a higher access charge to limit the degree
of outsourcing (or potentially eliminate outsourcing altogether). Furthermore, by
setting the access charge low enough to induce entry this implies that the total
production downstream increases due to lowermarket price of the final product. This
leads to more profit from selling access, but less profit in the final product market
(due to lower output by the network monopolist's own downstream subsidiary and
lower price on all units sold). However, this expansion in output cannot improve
profits since a vertically integrated monopolist (with monopoly in both segments)
will follow a price strategy to maximise its overall level of profit. The vertically
integrated monopolist can expand the total production level by increasing its own
production level, in which case it will be able to capture the entire profit from
the increase (a complete internalisation). However, if the increased production is
undertaken by an independent firm, the network monopolist cannot capture the
entire gain from increasing production through the linear access price. This will
also tend towards foreclosure, or a higher level of the access charge.
From society's point of view, the problem of determining the level of the access
charge is also a problem of outsourcing. Equivalently, the regulator faces the problem
of setting the access charge to ensure that the resources are utilised to maximise some
measurement of welfare (in the present model, the sum of profit and consumers'
surplus). The trade-offs facing the regulator are to some extent identical to the
unregulated firm's problem. Production should take place with the most efficient
firm, and the determination of the socially optimal access charge reflects this (see,
e.g., Sand, 2000 and 2001, or Lewis and Sappington, 1999).18 The more efficient an
independent firm is relative to the network monopolist's own subsidiary, the lower
is the access charge set to distort market shares in favour of the more efficient firm.
However, in the present model all firms are equally efficient, so a distortion in market·
shares due to differences in efficiency is not an issue. Furthermore, contrary to the
181nthe regulatory debate, a more pronounced view is that the access charges should be set to
level the playing field, which is often interpreted to imply that the access charge should be set close
to marginal cost. However, this does not necessarily imply that the total production is undertaken
most efficiently.
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unregulated case, the profit-shifting from the network monopolist to independent
rival firms is of no importance since it is simply a transfer (all firms' profits have
equal weight in the welfare function).
In addition, and most importantly in the present model, the regulator faces
a trade-off between increasing the downstream production through entry and the
socially costly duplication of fixed costs. There are fixed costs associated with
production in the downstream market, and since entry implies that more firms
produce a lower output each, there is less utilisation of the economies of scale.
However, entry implies a higher level of total production which results in an increase
in consumers' surplus. Thus, the main trade-off facing a benevolent regulator is to
balance the increase in consumers' surplus as a result of entry (which tends towards
a lower access charge) against the social cost of utilising the economies of scale to
a lesser extent (which tends towards a higher access charge). Essentially, the access
charge has from society's point of view two main roles to play in the case with free
entry. It is an instrument for correcting the allocative inefficiency in the downstream
market, which (under certain conditions) calls for an access charge below marginal
cost of providing access. The access charge can also used to ensure that there is no
inefficient entry, which often calls for an access charge in excess of marginal cost to
mitigate the excess entry problem. Thus, the optimal access charge is determined by
the optimal trade-off between the regulator's concern to achieve allocative efficiency
(to which the process of free entry yields insufficient entry) and the business stealing
effect (which tends towards excess entry).
3.2 Unregulated access charge
In this section I investigate how an unregulated, profit maximising firm will set the
access charge in the first stage of the game. I will focus on two cases: 1) The up-
stream firm is allowed to enter the downstream market, and 2) there are restrictions
on the upstream monopolist entry into vertically related markets (i.e., the upstream
firm cannot enter the downstream market). Rival firms in the downstream market
enter as long as their profit is non-negative. I will look for subgame perfect equilibria
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in the access charge.
3.2.1 No structure regulation
When there is free entry, the equilibrium profit of the vertically integrated firm is
modified as follows:
ITv (n, w) = (q~(n, w))2 + (w - (3) nq' (n, w) - F (11)
where q* is defined byeqn. (5) and qå defined by eqn. (6).
If the upstream monopolist is allowed to enter into the downstream market and
is free to determine an access charge to maximise its own profit, then the upstream
firm will set w to maximise eqn. (11). Since the access charge is determined prior
to the entry decision by potential entrants, the number of firms that actually enters
is a function of the access charge. Consequently, the unregulated firm must take the
interaction between the degree of entry and the access charge into account in his
maximisatioIi problem. We will assume that, as an approximation, eqn. (9) holds
as an equality, and therefore determines the exact number of firms that enters.
The profit maximising access charge will either be given by the first-order condition
when maximising ITv with respect to w, which we denote wur. However, this does
not necessarily yield the global maximum for firm v's profit. Thus, alternatively,
firm v will determine an access charge w, such that 'Tri < O, for all i = 1, ..,n, in
equilibrium. Such a policy will imply complete foreclosure of all rival firms.
The result is summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The vertically integrated firm will never accommodate rival firms'
entry when all downstream firms are symmetric (including the subsidiary of the
upstream firm). The subgame perfect equilibrium implies setting an access charge ,
high enough to deter all entry.
Proof. The upstream firm will choose the access charge, w or ur"; which yields
a global maximum for profits. If ITV (w = w) ;:::ITV (w = wur), the subgame perfect
equilibrium implies deterring entry of all rival firms. First, it can be shown that, after
inserting for the equilibrium in quantities, aIT~/an < O. Thus, if there is entry, firm
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v will decide an access charge to limit entry as much as possible, which means n = 1.
Then, let us compare firm v's profit when n = 1 to the monopoly profit when n = O,
for any given level of the access charge. This entails comparing eqn. (11), given that
n = 1, against firm v's monopoly profit: ITv 1n=1-IT~ = -3~ (a - c - 2w + (3)2,
which is negative per assumption. Consequently, the upstream firm has no interest
in accommodating entry. •
The intuition can be related to the discussion above where the fundamental
trade-offs facing the firm (and regulator) are explained. When access charge is
unregulated and all downstream firms are equally efficient in producing the final
product, there are two effects and both give incentives to foreclose rival firms. By
allowing independent firms to enter through setting a low access charge, there is
a profit-shifting effect from the network monopolist's own downstream subsidiary
to the independent firms which has a negative impact on the network monopolist's
total profit. Furthermore, the increase in profit from the access segment due to
entry will not increase overall profit for the network monopolist (see discussion
above). Consequently, the vertically integrated firm has no incentives to outsource
the production of the final product to its rivals.
3.2.2 Structure regulation
When the upstream monopolist is not allowed to enter the downstream industry, we
need to maximise eqn. (1) with respect to the access charge, taking into account
that the number of firms entering is endogenously determined by eqn. (4). Again,
we will ignore the integer constraint with respect to entry to simplify the exposition.
The solution to the upstream monopolist's maximisation problem is given by:
.......~ ( (3) On~ ( (3) .......8(j*nq + w - ._q + w - n- = O
8w 8w (12)
where (j* is defined by eqn. (8), and is the equilibrium quantity of each of the
downstream firms, and Ti is defined by eqn. (10). The closed-form solution, w~r, to
this problem is given by:
(13)
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The comparative static results for the unregulated. access charge shows that the
unregulated access charge is: 1) Increasing in upstream marginal cost, 2) decreas-
ing in downstream marginal cost, 3) decreasing in the level of fixed costs, and 4)
increasing in the market size.
The first effect is straightforward. The second effect can be explained as follows:
We observe that total downstream quantity is decreasing in c, which implies a lower
level of sales of local access for the upstream monopolist. Thus, to compensate
for this red.uction in the profit from the upstream operation, the upstream monop-
olist lowers the access charge the independent firms must pay. The third effect,
aw~r/ aF < O, is due to a straightforward trade-off between red.ucing the access
charge to maintain high level of sales of access to downstream firms and lower level
of sales at a larger profit margin. The effect on the access charge of changes in the
market size is straightforward.
In the case where firm v can enter the downstream market, we find that in equi-
librium no firms enter as a result of the non-accommodating access pricing strategy
that firm v chooses. Because of this, the regulator may choose not to allow firm v to
enter the downstream market. When entry by the upstream monopolist is restricted,
we find that the degree of entry is negatively correlated. to both the upstream and
downstream marginal costs (i.e., an/a/3 < Oand an/ac < O,respectively), provided
that the access charge is determined. by eqn. (13).19
In contrast to the case with no structure regulation, the firm that determines the
access charge is now not active in the downstream market. This implies that changes
in the upstream marginal cost only enter through the effect on the access charge,
and we know that aw~r/a/3 > o. Thus, increasing the marginal cost upstream raises
the access charge which red.uces the profitability of each of the downstream firms.
Thus, there will be fewer firms entering when /3 goes up. We also know that an'
increase in c (downstream marginal cost) leads to a reduction in the access charge,
the indirect effect, which by itself would tend towards a higher entry. However, the
direct effect of increasing c is to reduce the profitability downstream, and it is this
19We see this by examining the comparative statics of eqn. (10), when we have inserted for
w = w~r. This yields a level of entry given by: nur = (a - c - /3 - v'F) /2v'F.
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latter (direct) effect which is dominant. The upstream monopolist must balance the
loss of profitability from reducing the access charge against the loss of profitability
from a lower level of traffic.
The direct effect of increased fixed costs is to reduce entry. However, an indirect
effect due to an increased level of fixed costs is that the unregulated access charge
is reduced in this case, which, ceteris paribus, increases the degree of entry into the
market, but this effect is dominated by the direct effect. When the size of the market
increases, we have seen that firm v raises the access charge which in isolation tends
towards lower equilibrium profit downstream and less entry. However, an increase
in the size of the market works in the opposite direction and more than cancels out
the negative effect on entry of the increase in the access charge.
3.3 Optimal access charge
In this section, it is assumed that the regulator determines the socially optimallevel
of the access charge, and the number of rival firms that actually enter is determined
by the zero-profit condition, eqn. (4).20
3.3.1 No structure regulation
Simplifying the expressions, social welfare is given as (when inserting for the final
stage equilibrium quantities):
w = CS (n,w) - (c + (3) Q* (n,w) - (n + l)F (14)
where CS = aQ* (n, w) - [Q* (n, w)]2 /2 is the gross consumers' surplus.F' Let
Q* (n, w) = qo (n, w) + nq" (n, w) be the total equilibrium downstream quantity
when the upstream monopolist is allowed to enter into the downstream market,
20The results with respect to the regulated access charge (in both the following subsections)
are the same as in Vickers (1995) if we ignore the asymmetry of information about costs, or,
alternatively, if consumers' surplus and firms' profits are weighted equally in the welfare function.
21The gross consumers' surplus is in general given by:JoQP(s) ds. We can rewrite this as net
consumers' surplus + total expenditure, which in equilibrium turns out to be (with linear inverse
demand):' CS = aQ* _ ~ (Q*)2.
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and P* (Q*) be the resulting price. The social cost of production is given by
(c + (3) Q* (n, w) + (n + l)F.
In this section, the upstream monopolist is allowed to enter the downstream
market. The number of firms that enters the industry is n, and is determined by
eqn. (9). Thus, the regulator's problem is then to maximise (14) with respect
to w, subject to the constraint that entry is endogenous and determined by eqn.
(9) and zero-profit restrictions. The solution to this maximisation problem, ur , is
determined by:22
dW (n (w) ,w) = dCS (n (w) ,w) _ (c + (3) dQ* (n (w) ,w) _ OnF = O (15)
dw dw dw åw
For all permissible parameter values we find that dQ*/ dw < O,which implies that
dC S / dw < o. Thus, increasing the access charge reduces the equilibrium quantity
and the gross consumers' surplus.
A socially optimal access charge when the upstream monopolist is allowed to
enter into the downstream market is determined byeqn. (15) (Vickers, 1995):
Proposition 2 lVhen the upstream monopolist is allowed to enter the downstream
market, the regulated access charge is determined by: w* = (3 + ff.
In the absence of fixed costs, we know that the number of firms entering the
downstream market approaches infinity. Furthermore, when n -+ 00, we know
that Q* -+ (a - c - w) which equals the competitive output if w = (3. Thus,
when F = O and n -+ 00, it can be shown that åW/åw < o. Consequently,
the regulator will choose to determine an access charge as low as possible without
violating the constraint w ~ (3, which implies that w* = (3. When there are no
fixed costs, there is obviously no costly duplication of fixed costs. Then, the only
concern for the regulator is to implement a level playing field for all firms operating
22I assume that the second-order condition with respect to w is satisfied: ~:;r= d;~'lS -
(c + {3) d;S· < O. For all permissible parameter values, the second-order condition is indeed sat-
isfied. The total derivatives of GS and Q are given by dGS/dw = 8GS/8w + (8GS/an) (8n/8w)
and dQ*/dw = 8Q* /8w + (8Q* /8n) (8n/8w).
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in the downstream market. However, if there are fixed costs associated with entry
downstream, the regulator must incorporate the social cost of duplicating these when
determining the socially optimal access charge. Thus, the optimal access charge may
be in excess of the upstream marginal cost to avoid too much costly duplication.
A benevolent regulator will want to determine an access charge to obtain the so-
cially optimal mix between maximising consumers' surplus and utilising the economies
of scale that are present in the downstream industry. Ifmaximising consumers' sur-
plus is the regulator's only concern, then this is an argument for marginal cost
pricing of access which implies a higher total quantity in the downstream market.
However, the regulator will also be concerned with the duplication of fixed costs as-
sociated with entry, which results in utilising the economies of scale for the network
monopolist's own less. This latter concern implies that the regulator will want to
set an access charge in excess of marginal cost to limit the degree of entry.
In a social optimum, the price of access should then reflect the true social cost
of expanding output, which will consist of two elements: the marginal cost of access
and the social cost of utilising the economies of scale of the network monopolist's
own subsidiary less.
3.3.2 Structure regulation
When no vertical integration is allowed by regulatory authorities, all downstream
firms are on equal terms. Consequently, the total equilibrium quantity produced.
and sold downstream is then Q* (n,w) = n(j* (n,w), where (j* is given by eqn. (8).
The welfare is in this case given by:
w = Cs (n, w) - (c + {3)Q* (n, w) - nF (16)
-where CS is the gross consumers' surplus when firm v is not allowed to enter.
In this section, the firm providing the essential input, firm v, is not allowed to
enter the downstream market. The number of firms that enter the downstream
market is n, which is determined byeqn. (10). The regulator's problem is then
to maximise (16) with respect to w, subject to endogenous entry and zero-profit
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conditions. The solution, w;, is then determined by:23
dW(n(w),w) = dCS(n(w),w) _(c+{3)dQ*(n(w),w) _ 8nF=0 (17)
dw dw dw 8w
When there axe fixed costs and the upstream monopolist is not allowed to enter
into the downstream market, we find, when inserting for the inverse demand function
and eqn. (10), that the socially optimal access charge is given by w; = {3. In this
case, the welfare function is decreasing in the access charge for all values ofw. When
there axe no vertical restrictions (see the previous subsection), the welfare function
is strictly decreasing in the access charge only when there axe no fixed costs. When
there axe vertical restrictions imposed on the upstream monopolist, this is the case
even if fixed costs axe positive. Thus, we have the following result (Vickers, 1995):
Proposition 3 VVhenthe upstream monopolist cannot enter the downstream mar-
ket, the socially optimal access charge implies marginal cost pricing of access: i. e.,
*-{3Wr - .
The main difference to the case with no vertical restrictions is that the socially
optimal access charge under vertical restrictions is simply marginal cost pricing of
access, without any mark-up to counter the duplication of fixed costs. Transferring
production between firms entails reducing the production of one independent firm
and increasing it for another, and there axe no losses in the economies of scale of
the network monopolist's own downstream activities (ofwhich there axe none in this
scenario).
4 Welfare comparisons and entry
In this section I will compare the level of welfare under various combinations of
policies, and the main objective is to find the subgame perfect regulation. There
23The total derivatives of consumers' surplus and quantity are given by: dCSldw = aCSlaw +
(acs Ian) (Onlaw) and dQ*Idw = aQ*law +jaQ* Ian) (Onl8w). Observe that dQ*Idw < O if
assumption 2 is satisfied, which implies that dCSldw < O.
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are four different cases (i.e., policy combinations) to consider: 1) No structure reg-
ulation and access charge regulation, 2) no structure regulation and unregulated
access charge, 3) structure regulation and access charge regulation, and 4) structure
regulation and unregulated access charge. The outcomes in terms of access charge
and the number of firms downstream, are summarised in the following table (AR
denotes the case of access charge regulation, whereas UR denotes the unregulated
access charge case):
No structure regulation Structure regulation
AR (1)
w· = (3+ v'F
(3)
w; =(3
........+ 1= a-c-j3-3VF -. a-c-j3-VFn ,JF n= .JF
UR (2)
wur ---t complete foreclosure
(4)
w~r= ~ (a - c + (3 - v'F)
n;ur + 1= 1 -ur _ a-c-j3-VFn - .~
It should be noted that the welfare levels reported in this section are, of course,
only valid provided that at least one downstream firm is active. If the level of fixed
costs is sufficiently high, there may not be any firms that find it profitable to enter,
in which case the welfare level is zero. The welfare levels for the four cases are,
respectively:
1) W~Br - (a - c - (3) ( a - c - (3 - 2v'F) /2 + F
2) W: - !(3 (a - c - (3)2 - BF)B
3) W:r - (a - c - (3) ( a - c - (3 - 2v'F) /2 + F /2
4) w:r - ~ (a - c - (3 - v'Fr
4.1 Noregulation versus structure regulation
When there are no restrictions put on firm v, it enters the downstream market and
chooses an access charge to deter all other firms from entering. Consequently, firm v
enjoys a monopoly situation both upstream and downstream, and the welfare level
is given by W;n which is determined by eqn. (3) when inserting for the monopoly
output: The total downstream quantity is Qo = (a - c - (3) /2, and fixed costs are
only incurred once.
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H, on the other hand, firm v cannot enter the downstream market (the case
of structure regulation), the chosen access charge is w~r which is determined by
eqn. (13). Provided that w = w~r, the total downstream quantity is in equi-
librium Q~r = (a - c - (3 - JF) /2, and the level of entry is given by Tiur =
(a - c - (3 - JF) /2n. Note that at least one firm enters the downstream market
in the current case (i.e., Tiur;::::1) only if F :::;[(a - c - (3) /3]2.
Comparing the welfare levels in the two cases with unregulated access charge,
with or without structure regulation, yields the following result:
Proposition 4 When the access charge is unregulated, the level of welfare is always
at least as large without structure regulation compared to the case with structure
regulation.
Proof. Define .D1I = w: - W:r. By inserting for w = w~r defined by eqn.
(13) in w;,r, it can be shown that .D.l =~n(a - c - (3 - ~1JF). H at least one
independent firm enters (with structure regulation), then a - c - {3 ;::::3JF, which
implies that .D.1 > O. If a - c - {3 < 3n, then w;,r = Oand .D.l =W:> o. •
Proposition 4 tells us that a vertically integrated monopoly is preferred in terms
of the welfare level compared to a situation with vertical separation with indepen-
dent firms downstream in an unregulated access market. By applying structure
regulation, the network monopolist can only recoup his monopoly profit in the ac-
cess market and since the access charge is not subject to regulation he will be able
to earn a positive level of profit. To obtain a strictly positive level of profit, the
network monopolist must set the access charge strictly in excess of marginal cost of
providing access, which will imply that the independent firms will face higher costs
of production than a subsidiary of the network monopolist. Thus, to a vertically in- .
tegrated firm's ability to avoid the problem of double marginalisation, the output in
the final product market is lower with structure regulation than without. Without
structure regulation, the vertically integrated firm will foreclose all rival firms and
produce the monopoly quantity downstream.
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4.2 Access charge regulation
As already noted, the regulator may also subject access charges to regulation. In
this section I will compare the welfare levels in the access charge regulation scenario,
with and without structure regulation.
Proposition 5 When the access charge is subject to regulation, a policy of no struc-
ture regulation is preferred by the regulator (i.e., W~sr > Ws*r)'
Proof. If there is no structure regulation, we know that the regulated access charge
is given by w· = {3+.JF. Inserting for w* into Ti, where Ti is determined by eqn.
(9), yields actual entry given by Ti· = (a - c - (3 - 4.JF) I.JF. Welfare is given by
eqn. (14), which is denoted by W~r after we have inserted for w = ui" and n = Ti·.
Note that Ti· > 1, i.e., that at least one rival firm enters, only if a - c - {3 2:: 5.JF.
If there is structure regulation, the regulated access charge is given by w; = {3, and
actual entry is given by Ti·= (a - c - (3 - .JF) I.JF. In this case, welfare is given
byeqn. (16), and denoted W;.after we have inserted for w = w; and n = Ti·. Define
Å2 = W~r - Ws*,.· Inserting for access charge and entry in the two policy regimes,
we find that Å2 = FI2 > Ofor F > O.•
In the present model with endogenous entry, actual entry is larger under structure
regulation, since Ti· < Ti·. The reason being that with structure regulation, the
regulated access charge rule is to simply use marginal cost pricing of access, whereas
without structure regulation the regulator determines an access charge strictly in
excess of marginal costs to limit the degree of costly duplication of fixed costs. The
number of firms entering when there is no structure regulation does not include
the network monopolist's own subsidiary. Thus, the total number of firms is then
Ti· + 1. However, it is easily shown that Ti* > Ti· + 1, and consequently, there is .
more competition with structure regulation. With more competition, the (gross)
consumers' surplus is higher (under assumption 3). However, since Ti· < Ti· we
also know that the duplication costs are larger, and Proposition 5 tells us that the
increase in consumers' surplus due to more competition and higher total output in
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the final product market is not enough to offset the cost of allowing more firms to
enter (i.e., the increase in fixed costs).
4.3 Access regulation, structure regulation or no regula-
tion?
As we have seen above, the welfare levels in both the regulated and unregulated
scenarios are higher if the regulator does not impose structure regulation. In this
section I will examine which policy or combination of policies, that yields the best
outcome in terms of welfare for different levels of the fixed costs. The first question
we may ask is whether there are conditions under which regulation of access charges
is always better in terms of welfare than not regulating access charges. If we can
prove that the level of welfare in the scenario with a regulated access charge and
with structure regulation is larger than the welfare without structure regulation and
without access charge regulation; i.e., Ws~ > W;n, then regulation of access charges
will always prove welfare optimal in the present model. However, this turns out to
be the case only when the size of the market is large relative to the level of fixed
costs. Thus, it may in certain situations be better in terms of welfare not to regulate
the access charge.
For us to be able to make the welfare comparisons we need to know when there
is entry by independent firms. This information is summarised in Lemma 1:
Lemma 1 We k:now the following about independent firms' entry:
1):;;,ur = O,
2) 71:* ~ 1 if a - c - (3 - 5# ~ O,
3) 1iur ~ 1 if a - c - (3 - 3R ~O, and
4) 1i* ~ 1 if a - c - {3 - 2# ~O.
We know from Propositions 4 and 5 that W;n > w~r and W~sr > W;r' Provided
that at least one independent firm enters under structure regulation (with and with-
out access charge regulation), it can easily be proven that W~r > W;r > w~r (with
the first inequality being provided by Proposition 5). Thus, welfare when regulating
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access charges (with or without structure regulation) is always strictly higher com-
pared to not regulating access charges and subjecting the upstream monopolist to
structure regulation.
Furthermore, it can be shown that W';"r always yields the highest level of welfare
in the free entry case, and strictly higher welfare than the (best) alternative if at
least one rival firm enters the downstream industry. The requirement for entry by
rival firms is that n* ~ 1, or equivalently, a - c - f3 - 5VF ~ O. This implies that
rival firms enter only if the size of the market is sufficiently large relative to, among
other things, the level of fixed costs. If n* ~ 1, we can show that W:sr > W~ and
if, in the regulated access charge scenario, no firms enter this implies that firm v
will maintain a monopoly position both upstream and downstream and the welfare
level is the same as in the unregulated access charge scenario W~.
We now know that of the four different policy combinations the case with unreg-
ulated access charge and with structure regulation yields the lowest level of welfare.
Furthermore, we know that welfare with access charge regulation and without struc-
ture regulation can never do worse than the best alternative policy combination.
What can also be shown is that W;' ~ W~ only if a - c - f3 - 6VF ~ O, with
W;r > W~ if a - c - f3 - 6VF > O.
The results of the welfare comparisons are gathered in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Welfare comparisons:
1. If a - c - f3 ~ 6VF, in 'which case at least one independent firm enters
(independent of regulatory structure), then W:sr > W;r ~ W~ > w,!'r.
2. If 6VF > a - c - f3 ~ 5VF in which case at least one independent firm enters
(independent of regulatory structure), then W';"r > W~ > Ws*r> w,!'r.
9. If 5VF > a - c - f3 ~ 4VF in which case no independent firms enter without
structure regulation, then W:sr = W~ > W;r > w:r.
Consequently, we find that when the level of fixed costs is relatively low com-
pared to the size of the market, regulating access charges will always yield at least
the same level of welfare as the next best policy combination. For sufficiently low
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fixed costs, regulation of the access charge is always strictly better than the best al-
ternative. If, however, fixed costs are sufficiently high, not regulating access charges
in combination' with the absence of structure regulation may yield higher welfare
than regulating access charges and imposing structure regulations. FUrthermore,
for an interval of fixed costs, leaving access charges unregulated may be as good as
regulating access charges (assuming that there is no structure regulation). This is
due to the fact that no independent firms find it profitable to enter if fixed costs are
sufficiently high when w* = f3 +n.
Thus, we see that the lower the level of fixed costs associated with entry into the
downstream market, the better does the regulation of access charges do. Intuitively,
it may be reasonable to assume that low levels of fixed costs, or equivalently low
barriers to entry, necessitates less regulatory intervention. This is, however, not
the case. Low fixed costs implies a higher degree of entry, ceteris paribus, provided
that the access charge is regulated. If there is no regulation of the access charge
we have seen that the subgame perfect equilibrium entails a complete foreclosure
of all rival firms (cf. Proposition 4). This suggests that at least some form of
regulatory intervention may be desirable. Regulating the access charge only will,
provided that the fixed costs are low enough, result in entry which is beneficial for
consumers, and will never be worse than a double monopoly. For sufficiently low
fixed costs, the expansion in output due to entry - entry aided by access charge
regulation - outweighs the social cost of duplication. Another alternative is to only
impose structure regulation, which may be superior in terms of welfare compared
to the complete foreclosure case, as it entails at least some degree of entry and
output expansion. If the fixed costs are not too high, the gain to consumers' surplus
outweighs the cost of duplication.
4.4 Excessive entry?
If there is free entry into a market and imperfect competition, we know from Mankiw
and Whinston (1986) that free entry under certain conditions results in a socially
excessive number of firms in the industry. The socially optimal number of firms is,
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of course, not necessarily equal to the number of firms that ensures zero profit. In
this section we will look at how entry varies (under the zero profit assumption) with
different policy combinations. I will focus on how the established result that free
entry together with the business stealing effect leads to excessive entry when there
is imperfect competition may change if (1) an upstream firm may serve a vertically
related market, and (2) when the access charge may be subject to regulation.i" The
Mankiw and Whinston (1986) model is essentially extended to cover further cases
which are of particular interest in vertically related markets, with their excessive
entry result as a special case. In all of the analysis below the inverse demand is
assumed to be linear.
The socially optimal level of entry will normally be defined by the first-order con-
dition with respect to n on the appropriate welfare function (depending on whether
there are restrictions on the network monopolist's opportunity for entry into the
final product market). The socially optimal level of entry will then be compared
to the level of entry that takes place in the four cases of policy combinations, The
socially optimal level of entry will also be compared to the sub-game perfect policy
combination.
When the regulator allows the network monopolist to enter the downstream
market, the number offirms entering is determined byeqn. (9), whereas when he
is not allowed to enter the number of firms is determined byeqn. (10). When the
regulator chooses to determine the access charge, he implicitly affects the degree of
entry. Similarly, if the regulator chooses not to regulate the access charge, he also
makes an implicit choice about the level of entry. In this section, the analysis is
not an attempt to shed light on subgame perfect policies, but rather to examine
whether the excess entry result of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) carries over to each
of the four scenarios analysed in the present paper. This implies that I only examine '
whether free entry results in excessive, socially optimal, or insufficient entry for each
of the cases (i.e., for the given level of access charge in each case).
24The regulator could (in addition to, or instead of access charge regulation) potentially use
direct entry restrictions as another regulatory instrument.
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4.4.1 Structure regulation
Let us first consider the case where the network monopolist only serves the ac-
cess market (i.e., the situation with structure regulation). In this case, the only
major difference to Mankiw and Whinston (1986) is that the marginal cost of the
downstream firms is endogenously determined. If the access charge is regulated we
observe that entry is twice as large as in the unregulated case (Ti* = 2Tiur), which
implies that a benevolent regulator will choose a level of access charges such that
more firms find it profitable to enter. We know that an unregulated network mo-
nopolist can only capture his monopoly profit through the access charge, and will,
since he is restricted to a linear tariff scheme, choose an access charge in excess of
marginal cost to capture some of this profit (cf. eqn. 13), which results in a lower
level of entry. A welfare maximising regulator, however, chooses to use marginal cost
pricing of access (cf. eqn. 17). This result is summarised in the following remark:
Remark If the market for the intermediate good (access) is unregulated and the
monopolist provider of access cannot opemte in the final product market, then free
entry and imperfect competition results in a lower level of entry than if the access
charge is regulated.
When the regulator restricts entry into the vertically related market, the socially
optimal number of firms is in this case found by maximising eqn. (16) with respect
to n, which is denoted n;*, and is implicitly given by:
Bes (n, w) _ (c + {3) BO* _ F = O
Bn Bn
(18)
In this case, assumption 2 is sufficient to ensure that total equilibrium output
increases in the number of firms downstream, and that the output of each individual
firm is decreasing in the number of firms (the latter effect is the business stealing
effect). Without loss of generality, I will assume that the marginal cost of providing
the final product is normalised to zero; i.e., c = o.
We can rewrite eqn. (18) as:
( ** )3 _ (a - w)2 (a - w) (w - {3)(n;* + 1)nr +1 - F + F (19)
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where n;* is the socially optimal level of entry when the network monopolist
cannot enter the downstream market. Rewriting the free entry condition when the
network monopolist is not allowed to enter the downstream market yields (n~denotes
the level of entry under free entry with structure regulation):
(20)
The comparison between the actual entry and the socially optimal level of entry
is summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 If the network monopolist is not allowed to enter the downstream
market, then regulation of the access charge implies that the excess entry result
of Mankiw and 'Whinston (1986) is retained. However, if the network monopolist
determines the access charge, then there is neither excess nor insufficient entry.
Proof. By comparing eqns. (19) and (20) we observe that if w = f3 (i.e., in
the regulated access charge scenario), the outcome is identical to the linear demand
example in Mankiw and Whinston (1986): ff the socially optimal number of firms
is equal to 3 (i.e., n;* = 3), then free entry implies that 7 independent firms enter.
ff n;* = 5, then n~ = 13, and if n;* = 8, then n~ = 26.25 When w > f3 (i.e., the
unregulated case), the comparison between n* and n~ can be done by writing n~ as
a function of n;*. Without loss of generality, we can normalise f3 to O. Then we have
the following:
(n~+ 1)2 = (n;* + 2)3 - (a - w) (n;*+ 1) w/ F (21)
When the upstream monopolist determines an unregulated level of access charge
in excess of the marginal cost of providing access (i.e., w~r = (a - JF) /2 > O), ,
the latter element of eqn. (21) implies that the actuallevel of entry is lower than
25As is pointed out by Mankiw and Whinston (1986), the difference between the socially optimal
number of firms and the actual entry is not the correct measure of welfare loss. They show that the
welfare loss due to excess entry decreases as n* increases. Obviously, as the free entry number of
firms get larger, the equilibrium quantity becomes closer to the competitive limit which is beneficial
to welfare, which partly offsets the cost of duplicating fixed costs.
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when w = O,and the degree of excess entry is lower. For w = w~r, then n;* = n~ if
n;* = (a - vP) /2vP. By inserting for n;* = (a - vP) /2vP in eqn. (19), the
equality is satisfied and it is verified that n~= n;* = (a - vP) /2vP. Note that
for a given market size a, an increase in the socially optimal degree of entry must
be accompanied by a reduction in the fixed costs (e.g., Let a = 10; if n* = 3, then
F ~ 2.04 to satisfy eqn. (19), if n* = 5, then F ~ 0.83, etc.) .•
Consequently, when the network monopolist is not allowed to enter the down-
stream market, the degree of excess entry is lower without access charge regulation.
Furthermore, as the result immediately above suggests, the unregulated monopolist
will determine an access charge which induces the socially optimal number of firms
to enter. This result is contrary to what is obtained by Mankiw and Whinston
(1986). Thus, a welfare maximising regulator will choose an access charge which in-
duces more entry than what is socially optimal. Levelling the playing field by using
marginal cost pricing of access does not incorporate the effect of business stealing
byentering firms, but takes only into account the direct cost of entry (the cost of
production). The unregulated network monopolist is, contrary to the regulated firm,
interested in capturing some of the (total) downstream profit by determining an ac-
cess charge in excess of marginal cost, and he realises that the some of the profit a
newentrant earns is a result of business stealing. Consequently, the network mo-
nopolist finds it less profitable to let a new finn enter and internalises the external
effect posed by business stealing and prices access to induce optimal entry. When
determining the socially optimal access charge, the welfare maximising regulator is
not interested in the distribution of profits between the downstream firms and the
upstream monopolist, but is simply concerned with ensuring the highest possible
level of welfare which implies excessive entry.26
26However, when undertaking welfare comparisons between the various policy combinations, we
find that welfare in the (structure regulation, no access charge regulation)-case yields the lowest
level of welfare of the four combinations we consider.
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4.4.2 No structure regulation
If we examine the situation where there is no structure regulation where the network
monopolist can serve the final product market, then a similar result is obtained.
When the access charge is determined by the network monopolist, the access charge
is set high enough to deter all entry by independent firms (cf. Proposition 1), which
implies that there is only one active firm in the downstream market. H, however,
the regulator determines the level of the access charge he cannot do worse in terms
of entry than in the unregulated case. Provided that the level of fixed costs is not
too high, regulating access charges will lead to a higher degree of entry than in the
unregulated case (specifically, if a - c - f3 ?: 4#, then n* ?: nur). This can be
summarised as follows:
Remark Assume there is free entry and imperfect competition downstream. Set-
ting socially optimal access charges when the network provider is allowed to serve
the downstream market will always result in at least the degree oj entry that prevails
iJ the access charge is set by the network provider.
For any given level of the access charge, the socially optimal degree of entry is
the solution to maximising eqn. (14) with respect to n is defined as n**, and is
implicitly given by the following expression."
acs9 (n,w) _ (c+ f3)aQ* _ F = O
an an (22)
We know from assumption 3 that entry increases the total downstream output.
We can rewrite eqn. (22) in the following manner:
( ** 2)3- (a-2w+f3)2 (a-2w+f3)(w-f3) (n**+2)n+ - F + F (23)
Rewriting the free entry condition when the network monopolist is allowed to
enter, eqn. (4), we find that:
(24)
27A closed-form solution for the number of firms entering is difficult to obtain.
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where ne is the number of firms entering under free entry (without structure regu-
lation).
Proposition 8 Assume that the network monopolist is allowed to enter the down-
stream market. Then there will be no entry if the monopolist determines the access
charge. If the access charge is subject to regulation, then the degree of excess en-
try is less pronounced without structure regulation than in the case with structure
regulation.
Proof. In Proposition 1, the first part this result is proven. The comparison
between the socially optimal level of entry and the actual entry is then determined
by:
(ne+ 2f = (n*· + 2)3 - (a - 2w +Ø) (n** + 2)(w - Ø) / F (25)
If w = ø, then the latter element of (25) vanishes, and ne = (n* + 2)2 - 2. This
implies that the degree of excess entry will be substantial, e.g., with ne = 23 if
n*· = 3; ne = 47 if n** = 5; ne = 98 if n·* = 8. By setting w > ø, which is
always the case when there is no structure regulation, the tendency for excess entry
is partially mitigated. Without loss of generality, we can normalise ø to O. For w =
w* = ø+ ff, we know that if a = 10, then the following combinations of optimal
entry and fixed costs satisfy eqn. (23): (n** = 3, F ~ 0.8~), (n** = 5,F ~ 0.17),
(n·* = 8,F ~ 0.07). Assuming a -;- 10 and c = ø = O, then if n** = 3, then ne = 6;
if n** = 5, then ne = 11, if n** = 8, then ne = 23.•
Consequently, leaving the pricing of access services unregulated results in a de-
gree of entry which is lower than the level induced by a welfare maximising regulator,
due to complete foreclosure (cf. Proposition 1). Again, contrary to the result oh- '
tained by Mankiw and Whinston (1986), there is no excessive entry in the present
model of vertically related markets provided that the price of the intermediate prod-
uct is unregulated (even if there is both imperfect competition and a business steal-
ing effect of new entry). In this particular case, there may be socially insufficient
entry. However, if the access charge is subject to regulation then there is excess
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entry, but to a lesser extent than in the case with both access charge regulation
and structure regulation. Note that with marginal cost pricing of access, there is a
substantial degree of excess entry when the network monopolist is allowed to enter
the downstream market.
5 Concluding remarks
This article has studied socially optimal regulatory policies in vertically related
markets, where the regulatory instruments available are access charge and structure
regulation. Furthermore, it is examined whether the excess entry result obtained
by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) carries over to a situation with vertically related
markets. It is shown that free entry mayor may not induce excessive entry in
an imperfectly competitive downstream market depending on the regulatory policy
chosen.
The analysis above is undertaken in a very stylised model, which does not cap-
ture all aspects of vertically related industries, and network industries in particular.
First of all, the model assumes that there are no economies of scope between net-
work provision and service provision. This may be a simplification in, for instance,
the telecommunicationsindustry where network providers often argue that there are
substantial synergy effects between these two production elements. This implies that
there are additional benefits to society from vertical integration that are not taken
into account in the present analysis. The presence of economies of scope will only
strengthen the result that the subgame perfect regulatory policy involves regulation
of access charges and vertical integration. Allowing for economies of scope may,
however, change the ranking of some of the socially suboptimal regulatory policies.
In other related settings, it is not so obvious that there are economies of scope - for
instance between content provision and network services in the Internet industry.
The data flow from content provision provided over the Internet is often transported
through the traditional telecommunications network, and it is not necessarily the
case that the traditional telecom firms are better at providing content than inde-
pendent firms. In some cases, for instance news and certain types of information,
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it seems reasonable that some independent firms are better equipped for producing
content.
The present paper does not either examine network externalities, which is es-
sential in the industries I have had in mind. How the introduction of such effects
will influence the outcome depends on the way the network externalities work. Let
us, for instance, assume that the level of the network effect is determined, in part,
by the total quantity (of, e.g., network subscriptions) in the downstream market. If
all networks are perfectly interconnected, all firms enjoy the same level of network
effects for all configurations of the industry. This will increase the size of the total
market, but not the distribution of market shares. If the network externalities are
increasing in the downstream output, then the regulatory policy that results in the
highest level of output will also generate the highest level of externalities. This will
be an additional social benefit not taken into account in the present analysis. In
the present model, the output is largest with structure regulation combined with
regulation of the access charge.
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1 Introduction
In industries which are characterised by vertically related markets, the issue of pric-
ing the access to essential facilities becomes important from a social point of view. In
many industries, the providers of essential inputs needed to produce a product that
*1am grateful for valuable comments from Kåre P. Hagen and Nils-Henrik von der Fehr.
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can be sold to end-users possess market power and may have incentives to choose a
price which is higher than the socially optimal price. An additional problem is that
the providers of the essential input may be active in the end-user market, competing
with rival firms, which implies that there may be incentives to foreclose rival firms.
This is frequently the case in the telecommunications industry (the providers of local
access also supplies long-distance services), and can also be observed in the mar-
ket for computer software (the operating system provider also produces application
software).
In the present paper, I examine under which circumstances a monopolist provider
of an essential input will choose not to completely foreclose rivals firms producing
products for end-users. The pricing of access can be seen as a problem of outsourcing
all or part of the production of end-user products. When the access charge is not
subject to regulation, the provider of the essential input will determine a level of
the access charge such that the rival firm producing for end-users is only allowed to
produce if it is sufficiently more efficient than the monopolist's own subsidiary. The
regulator's problem when choosing the access charge is also related to choosing which
firm to produce the end-user product, but the focus is then on the socially optimal
mix of production between the two fimis. FUrthermore, the first- and second-best
access charges are examined. The first-best access charge is obtained if the regulator
can use compensating transfers at no social cost, whereas no transfers can be used
in the case of the second-best access charge.
In light of the potential for foreclosure of rival firms in the end-user market, the
question of whether a monopolist provider of an essential input should be allowed
to enter a vertically related market is also examined in a stylised setting. Foreclo-
sure in the setting presented below takes the form of setting a high access charge.
Alternatively, foreclosure can be exercised by the use of non-price means, e.g., by .
degrading the quality of the input supplied to rivals (see e.g., Economides, 1998 and
Sand,2000).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In section 2, the model is
described and the solution to the final stage of the game is presented. In section 3,
both the unregulated and socially optimal access charges are analysed. In section 4,
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I compare various combinations of regulatory policies to find the subgame perfect
regulatory regime. In section 5, Some concluding remarks are presented.
2 The framework
I assume that there is one firm upstream (firm v) and only two potential firms
downstream (firm s and firm v). The two downstream firms must decide whether
they wish to be active in the final product market (or a regulator decides whether
they are allowed to enter this market), where one of the potential downstream firms is
a subsidiary of the upstream monopolist. The final product market can be thought
of as a new market, e.g., a market for broadband communication services, where
firms mayor may not enter. The upstream firm provides transportation network
services which is an essential input for broadband services.
The analysis is conducted in the setting of a multi-stage game. In the first stage
either the upstream firm or the regulator decides on an access charge. In the second
stage, firms choose simultaneously to enter or not. In the final stage, there is either
a monopoly or a duopoly (depending on the strategies chosen by the regulator and
firms v and s in the preceeding stages). The final stage of the game is unregulated
and firms compete in quantities.
The entry game can be thought of as follows, where firms v and s choose either
to enter (E) or not enter (NE):
Firm 8
Firmv
E NE
E Duopoly Monopoly to firm v
NE Monopoly to firm s No activity downstream
There are potentially four different cases to be considered in the current model,
but I assume that the case where no firms enter is not an option. The access charge
and level of fixed costs will play an important role in respect to which firm(s) enters,
and will be discussed in detail below.
Firm v's profit earned in the upstream market only is given by (if firm v is
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vertically integrated, it will in addition earn profit downstream):
(1)
where qi :::::0, for i = v, s, are the downstream output levels. Fixed costs up-
stream is an important characteristic of most local access technologies, and is a major
reason for the lack of competition in the localloop ("the last mile" of telecommu-
nication networks). Inmany networks the investments in infrastructure are already
sunk, and plays no role in the determination of the access charge. Thus, an ad hoc
justification of leaving fixed costs out of the analysis is that the game which is played
in the current paper takes place after investments are sunk. Furthermore, the level
of these fixed costs is assumed to be high enough to deter entry into the upstream
segment. l The parameters w and f3 are the access charge and upstream marginal
cost, respectively.
Firm i's downstream profit, for i = v, s, is given by:
7r i = (P - w - Ci) qi - F (2)
where P = a - qi - qj, for i =/: j, and i,j = v, s, is the inverse demand function.
Downstream marginal cost for firm i is denoted Ci. We assume that both firms must
pay the same fixed costs, F, for establishing downstream operations. This could
be costs associated with setting up a distribution and sales network, marketing ex-
penses, and it is reasonable that both firms face the same fixed costs. These fixed
costs could also be attributed to a USa-fee (USO - Universal Service Obligation),
which all firms operating downstream must pay. The presence of the fixed cost im-
plies that firms may not want to enter into the industry even if equilibrium quantities
are positive. A sufficient condition for the upstream firm to enter the downstream
industry is that the downstream operation, in isolation, earns positive profits.P
lA consequence of ignoring fixed costs upstream is that the assumption which requires the access
charge to cover the marginal cost of providing access is sufficient for ensuring that the uptream
firm earns non-negative profits. If there are fixed costs present, then the access charge must be
strictly above marginal cost for Ramsey reasons.
2In general, we would expect that the upstream firm evaluates the profit earned as a monopolist
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The regulator's welfare is given by:
{
GS': + (p::, - c, - (3) q,:/, - F (a)
W = GSd + (pd - Cv - (3) q~+ (pd - Cs - (3) q: - 2F (b)
GS': + (P'; - c, - (3) q': - F (c)
(3)
m d
where GSi = Joq, p (s) ds-Pf'qf", fori = v, s, and GSd= Joq p (s) dS-pd (q~+ q:)
are the net consumers' surplus under monopoly and duopoly, respectively," The wel-
fare if only firm v is active downstream is given by (a), if both firms are active (b),
and if only firm s is active by (c). Observe that a duopoly outcome implies a
duplication of the fixed costs, which is detrimental to welfare.
2.1 Solving the game
We are looking for the subgame perfect equilibrium in the game, and starts at the
last stage to reveal the equilibrium path. We first solve for the Cournot-equilibrium.
Then we solve for the optimal access charge; i.e., the price paid for access which
maximises either the upstream firm's profit (the unregulated case) or the regulator's
welfare function (the regulated case).
2.1.1 Final stage
The Duopoly case The vertically integrated firm v maximises the sum of its
upstream and downstream profit (i.e., the sum of equations 1 and 2). Firm v's and
firm s's equilibrium profit is given by, respectively:
n~= (Q~)2 + (w - (3)Q~- F (4)
(5)
access provider with no downstream operation against the profit earned as a vertically integrated
firm (i.e., compare (P - Cv - w) q~ - F + (w - {3) (q~ + q:) against (w - {3) q";', where superscript
m and d represent monopoly and duopoly, respectively).
3Superscript m and d represent monopoly and duopoly, respectively, and subscript v and s
represent the two firms.
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where Qv and Q s are the Cournot-equilibrium quantities, where
Qv = (a - 2 (c, +,8) + Cs + w) /3 and Qs = (a - 2 (cs + w) + c, +,8) /3. In or-
der to have a set of non-negative profit levels we must have: Q~> JF - (w - ,8)Q~,
and Q~ 2:n.
Monopoly case If firm v enjoys a monopoly position downstream,' the access
charge will simply be an internal transfer and, consequently, we are in the standard
case of a profit-maximising monopolist. It is obvious that the role of the access
charge disappears when firm v has monopoly both upstream and downstream, as it
is simply an internal transfer. In this case, there is no need for an examination of
the optimal access charge.
Total industry profit is given by:
(6)
If firm s is the monopolist downstream, total industry profit includes firm v's
profit from upstream operations:
(7)
(8)
The monopoly profit maximising quantities are Qr:: = (a - Cv - ,8) /2 and Qr: =
(a - c, - w) /2 in the two different cases. To ensure that either firm v or s is active
downstream when there is a monopoly, I assume the following:
Assumption 1
i) a - (c, + ,8) >2n
ii) w < a - Cs - 2n
Part (i) of assumption 1 ensures that the total industry profit in equilibrium is
positive when firm v is the only active firm (upstream and downstream), whereas
part (~i)ensures that firm s earns a non-negative level of profit in equilibrium as
a monopolist. Thus, assumption 1 tells us that a firm which enjoys a monopoly
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situation will have a positive level of production, and, furthermore, that a firm's
monopoly profit downstream is non-negative (i.e., Qr ~H for i = v, s). To ensure
this, there must be a ceiling on the access charge (assumption 1, part ii). If it is
the downstream subsidiary of the upstream monopolist who is the sole downstream
provider, then the level of the access charge obviously plays no role.
To ensure that the upstream firm earns a non-negative level of profit, we assume
the following:
Assumption 2
The regulated access charye must ensure covemge of costs; w ~ {3.
If it is the rival downstream firm that enjoys a monopoly situation downstream,
then the upstream monopolist will always prefer to provide access to firm s at a
price which implies that firm s makes a positive level of profit (provided, of course,
that w ~ {3). An access charge such that w > {3, and such that II~ ~ O, yields a
strictly positive profit level for firm v. If the upstream monopolist sets an access high
enough to deter entry by firm s, and provided that firm v cannot enter downstream
itself, yields zero profit for firm v. Assumption 2 ensures that production upstream
earns at least zero profit.
2.1.2 Entry decisions
Firms v and s will choose to enter into the downstream industry if they find it
profitable. FUrthermore, for firm v to enter, such entry must in addition be allowed
by the regulator.
Provided that firm venters the downstream industry, firm s chooses to remain
in the industry if II~ > O. If firm v does not enter and firm s enters, firm s gets a
profit of II~ > O and O otherwise (i.e., no entry). Consequently, firm s will always
choose to enter into the industry if firm v chooses not to enter, or if firm v is not
allowed to enter. Obviously, the profit obtained in either situation will depend on
the access charge set by the government in the regulated case, and firm v in the
unregulated case.
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One of the roles that the access charge play from a social point of view is to
correct for the distortion that exists in the downstream market." Since there are
only two firms and these firms compete in quantities, there will be an allocative loss
downstream. If we examine the upstream market in isolation, the price of access
should be set equal to marginal cost." However, from the theory of second-best we
know that when there is a distortion in one market, it may be socially desirable to
introduce distortions in other markets to correct for the existing distortion." If the
regulator can subsidise access deficits and provided that the shadow cost of public
funds is sufficiently low, the optimal access charge is set below the marginal cost of
providing access (see Sand, 2000).7 However, the main assumption in this paper is
that the access charge must be sufficient to cover costs, and transfers will only be
introduced to show the characteristics of the first-best solution.
The access charge can also be used as an instrument to limit the degree of costly
duplication of fixed costs. Provided that firm v finds it in its interest to enter, the
regulator may choose to set the access charge high enough to foreclose the rival
firm if the fixed costs are sufficiently high, or if the rival firm is very inefficient
relative to the downstream subsidiary of the access provider. An alternative policy
to the regulation of access charge to avoid duplication of fixed costs is to restrict the
upstream monopolist's opportunity to enter into vertically related markets.
The main reason that regulation of final product prices is not considered here is
that the (potentially) most competitive market is the downstream market, and it
is more likely that this market is in less need of regulatory corrections. Arguments
along this line is found in, e.g., Laffont and Tirole (2000), who argues that the more
severe monopoly problem is in the upstream market with (potentially) significant
4If we consider the case of free entry into the downstream market, the role of the access charge
from a social point of view is twofold (see Sand, 2001). First, it can be used to correct for the .
potential allocative loss downstream as a result of imperfect competition. Second, the access charge
can be used to limit socially costly duplication of fixed costs.
5If there are fixed costs upstream, the access charge must be in excess of the marginal cost of
providing access.
6The classical reference on second-best theory is Lipsey and Lancaster (1956).
7When the shadow cost of public funds is too large, the social cost of the distortion in the
downstream industry must be weighed against the welfare loss of transfers.
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economies of scale. Consequently, provided that a complete deregulation is the
ultimate goal of the emerging telecommuncations legislations the more appropriate
regulatory policy seems to be to direct the attention to the bottleneck segment (i.e.,
network services), and regulate access charges rather than regulating the prices of
the final products.
3 First- and second-best access charges in a duopoly
With an exogenous number of potential firms downstream (two potential firms), the
main question is to investigate in which situations it is socially optimal to have a
monopoly or duopoly downstream. The regulator determines the access charge prior
to entry decisions and Cournot competition. We will assume that the regulator has
complete information about all relevant aspects to the game.
The regulator calculates the level of welfare in equilibrium for all possible out-
comes, and determines a policy with respect to the access charge and entry to
maximise welfare. ff the access charge is unregulated, the local access provider is
free to determine the level of the access charge that maximises his profits.
3.1 Unregulated access charge
Let us assume that firm venters the downstream industry. It will then choose
an access charge which maximises its profits, given by eqn. (4), subject to non-
negativity constraints on equilibrium quantities. By setting a high access charge
it ensures that its own downstream subsidiary obtains a dominant position in the
final product market, which is positive for firm v's profit. However, by setting a
high access charge, firm v sells less to its rival of access services, which implies
has a negative impact on firm v's profit. This trade-off results in the following
proposition,"
Proposition 1
8This is similar to the result in Lewis and Sappington (1999).
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The vertically integrated firm will only foreclose its downstream rival completely
using the access charge if its own subsidiary is equally, or more efficient that the
rival firm.
The proof of this result is explained here. The solution to the vertically integrated
firm's maximisation problem, wur, is given by:
ur 5a - 4cs - Cv + 5{3
w = 10 (9)
We observe that if firms have identical downstream marginal costs, l.e., c,= Cv,
then wur = (a - c+ (3) /2 and Q~ = O, which yields a negative profit for firm s;
II~ = -F < O, and firm s does not enter. However, if the rival firm has a cost
advantage over firm v's own downstream subsidiary, then Q~ > o. We then need
to examine whether this output level is sufficiently large to cover the fixed costs. If
the rival firm enjoys a cost advantage over firm v, then the vertically integrated firm
faces a problem which is essentially equivalent to the problem of choosing whether
to outsource part of its own production to an independent firm. A firm seeking to
maximise its own profit will choose to outsource (all, or part of) its production if
the cost advantage of the rival firm is sufficiently large.
When firm s has a cost advantage, the equilibrium quantity for firm s when
inserting for the profit maximising choice for the access charge is given by: Q~ =
2 (c, - cs) /5. We know that in order for firm s to enter ,wemust have (c, - c,') 2:
(5JF) /2, which implies that the rival firm will enter only if the vertically integrated
firm's cost disadvantage is sufficiently large. The higher the entry costs, the larger
must firm v's cost disadvantage be for the vertically integrated firm to not force
firm s out of the market. The reason for not exercising full foreclosure in this
case is that firm v finds it more profitable to outsource some of the downstream
production to firm s. It is better for the vertically integrated firm to concentrate on
providing the monopoly service (i.e., local access), rather than to compete head to
head downstream where it has a disadvantage. Furthermore, eqn. (9) is the subgame
perfect equilibrium access charge only if firm v's profit when determining the access
charge according to this formula is at least as large as firm v's monopoly profit.
It can be shown that firm v's profit when choosing an accommodating strategy is
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indeed larger than firm v's entry deterring profit. The reason for this is that firm s's
entry is only accommodated provided that it is sufficiently more efficient than firm
v, in which case firm v finds it relatively more profitable to outsource some of the
downstream production rather than to be an inefficient sole producer of the final
product.
When firm v does not enter the downstream market (e.g., if the regulator restricts
entry directly), there is a monopoly both upstream and downstream. Firm v then
maximises its profit given by eqn. (1), subject to firm s choosing its monopoly
quantity Q";'. The access charge, w', that solves this maximisation problem is then
given by:
I a - Cs + f3w =----
2
(10)
which yields a positive quantity for firm s downstream. Note that we will make
the assumption that w' 2:: f3 to ensure that the upstream monopolist earns a non-
negative level of profit. This is summarised in assumption 3:
Assumption 3
The following is necessary for the unregulated upstream monopolist to earn pos-
itive profits when the rival firm is a monopolist downstream: a - Cs - f3 2:: O.
Thus, assumption 3 ensures that an upstream monopolist selling access to a
downstream monopolist will make non-negative profits when it cannot enter into
the downstream market, since 1) w' 2:: f3 is ensured and 2) Q";' > O.
3.2 Optimal access charge with an exogenous number of
firms
The regulator maximises a utilitarian welfare function, which is the sum of con-
sumers' surplus and the firms' profits, defined by (3), subject to non-negativity
constraints on equilibrium quantities and profits. We will for now restrict our atten-
tion to the case where the regulated access charge is at least as large as the marginal
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cost of providing access (assumption 2).9
This implies that in the presence of imperfections in the downstream market, the
access charge which maximises welfare in our case is not necessarily the unrestricted
optimal access charge. ABdiscussed above (and in more detail in Sand, 2000), a
feature of optimal access charges when there is a Cournot duopoly downstream is
that the regulator finds it optimal to induce an access deficit when transfers are
allowed (and if the shadow cost of the transfers is sufficiently low). Contrary to
Sand (2000), it is assumed that transfers are not allowed, unless stated otherwise.
This implies that the regulated access charge must cover the costs of providing access
(assumption 2).10
We can rewrite the welfare function as follows:
w;n -
Wd -
tv: -
CS;ross - (c, + (3) Q': - F
CS:ros8 - (c,+ (3) QV - (cs + (3) QS - 2F
CS;"OS8 - (c, + (3) Qr;: - F
(11)
where we have inserted for final stage equilibrium quantities. CS;ross' represents
the gross consumers' surplus, which is equal to: CS;ross = (aQi - (Qi)2 /2), where
i = d, s, v denotes duopoly, monopoly to firm s and monopoly to firm v, respectively.
Qi is the total equilibrium downstream quantity in the three cases.
Ignoring first the constraint that the access charge must be at least as large as
the marginal cost of providing access, and let the regulator have access to transfers
at zero social cost. We then obtain the unrestricted optimality conditions (i.e., the
first-best regulation) for the two cases of downstream monopoly to firm s and the
9Transferring public funds to the firm is socially costly, and this will limit the extent to which
the regulator whishes to subsidise the rival's cost of purchasing access. In this paper, I assume
that the regulator cannot use lum-sum transfers. However, the case of costless transfers is used as
a first-best benchmark.
lOIn the full information scenario with transfers, the regulated firm's profit is set equal to the
value of the outside options for the regulated firm (usually normalised to zero). Profits to the firm
are socially costly if there are efficiency losses associated with public funds, and are therefore taxed
away. In the present model, any positive profit may be retained by the regulated firm.
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case of duopoly:
W: = 2(3+ Cs - a
Wd = 2(3+ 5cs - 4c" - a
The optimal access charge when firm v is the sole provider both upstream and
downstream is indeterminate, as it is simply an internal transfer within the firm
and plays no allocative role. It is furthermore worth noting that when firm s is
a monopolist downstream, the unrestricted access charge is below marginal cost of
providing access, since w: - (3= - (a - c, - (3) which must be negative if firm s
is active downstream. Since the welfare function is concave in the access charge,
any access charge in excess of the optimal access charge will reduce welfare.'! Con-
sequently, if the regulator cannot use transfers he will determine an access charge
as lowas possible without violating the constraint W ~ (3. This implies setting an
access charge equal to marginal cost of providing access; w:r = (3.
However, let us for a moment contiune to examine what would happen if the
regulator could costlessly subsidise an access deficit and sets an access charge equal
to w: = 2(3+Cs - a. Inserting the optimal access charge into the monopoly quantity
of firm s yields an equilibrium output Q: = a - c, - (3> 0, which corresponds to the
competitive output level when the (social) marginal cost of producing is c, + (3_l2
Consequently, by setting the access charge below marginal cost of providing access,
the regulator is able to design a perfect correction for the distortion in the down-
stream market through the regulation of the upstream market. When we restrict our
attention to the no transfer case, the distortion in the downstream market cannot
fully be corrected for, and the total downstream quantity is 1/2 of the competitive
output level, provided that w: = (3.
11Since 82W:' /8w2 < 0, then for any w > w;, where w; solves the regulator's unconstrained
maximisation problem, welfare is reduced.
12To see this, simply equate the inverse demand function P = a - Q with the marginal cost
of producing as perceived by society which is Cs + /3 (the sum of firm s's marginal cost and the
marginal cost of providing access). This yields QComp = a - Cs - /3.
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The optimal unrestricted access charge when there is a duopoly, wd' is above
marginal cost of providing access only if firm s's marginal downstream cost is suffi-
ciently higher than firm v's marginal cost, in which case firm s actually chooses not
to enter. Inserting for wd = 2(3+ 5cs - 4Cv - a into firm v and s's equilibrium quan-
tities in the final product market yields the following quantities: Q~ = 2 (c, - Cv),
and Q~ = (a - (3)+ 3Cv - 4cs• Thus, firm v is only active downstream if its own
downstream subsidiary is more efficient than the rival. Rearranging the expressions,
we see that for the access charge wd to be larger than marginal cost of access and
firm s being active in the downstream market, we need parameter values such that
(c, - Cv) ~ Q~ ~ n. The first inequality implies that for the access charge wd
to be larger than (3, the efficiency parameters of firms s and v must be such that
the equilibrium quantity of firm v is at least twice as large as firm s. The latter
inequality simply ensures that firm s finds it profitable to enter ..
We observe that if firms have identical downstream marginal costs, i.e., Cv =
c, = c, the optimal unrestricted access charge of the form wd is not consistent with
both firms producing positive quantities in equilibrium. When firms have identical
downstream costs and when the access charge is determined by wd' firm v does not
produce in equilibrium. In this case, the access margin wd - (3 = - (a - c - (3) must
be negative if any production is to take place in equilibrium. Consequently, since
wd < (3,firm s's perceived marginal cost (c+ wd) of producing is lower than firm v's
perceived cost of producing (c+ (3). Another observation that we can make, is that
in the identical cost case the unrestricted regulation results again in a total quantity
downstream which corresponds to the competitive level of output. Ifwe reintroduce
differences in downstream marginal costs, we find that Q~nrestr = a - (3+ c, - 2cs.
Let us consider the case where the upstream firm is allowed to enter the down-
stream market. In many situations, the unrestricted access charge given by wd will .
not satisfy the constraint W ~ (3. Since the welfare function Wd is concave on w,
the regulator will set an access charge as low as possible, while satisfying the con-
straints. This implies that the restricted optimal access charge (when the conditions
above are not met) is given by: wr = (3. In this case, both firms produce positive
quantities in equilibrium, and the only reason for producing different level of output.
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is that c, =1= c,.13
When inserting for the restricted access charge, we find that total downstream
quantity in equilibrium is given by: Q;estr = (2a - Cv- c, - 2(3)/3 > O. The differ-
ence in the output levels in the unrestricted and restricted case can be written as:
D.Q* = Q~nrestr - Q;estr = ((a - /3 - cs) + 4 (c, - cs)) /3 or (a - /3+ 4Cv - 5cs) /3,
which is positive only if w;t - /3< O. Thus, the equilibrium output is larger in the
first-best regulation case only if the regulator uses access subsidies. In this case the
entrant is effectively subsidised by the choice of regulatory policy, and the playing
field is tilted in favour of the rival firm to correct for the distortion in the downstream
market.
The results on the optimal access charge is summarised in proposition 2:14
Proposition 2
1. If the upstream monopolist does not enter the downstream market, the regu-
lated access charge is w; = 2/3+c, - a if the resulting access deficit can be costlessly
subsidised, and w;r = /3 otherwise.
2. When both firms are active in the downstream industry, the regulated access
charge is equal to w;t = 2/3+ 5cs - 4Cv - a if - (a - c, - /3+ 4 (c, - cs)) 2:: O or if
the access deficit can be costlessly subsidised, and w;tr= /3 otherwise.
If we simplify the analysis by only considering firms .with identical marginal
costs (c, = c, = c) and retain assumption 2, then the regulated access charge will
always be set equal to the marginal cost of providing access. Thus, in this simplified
environment we have that w;r = w;tr = /3 which is assumed to be lower than the
unregulated access charge. This implies that both firms will be active in the market
as a consequence of the regulation and will be producing the. same quantity. If
an access deficit can be costlessly subsidised, then the first-best optimal regulation
results in only firm s being active downstream. In the unregulated case, we know
that firm s is completely foreclosed and does not produce in equilibrium.
13Assumption 1 ensures that both firms produce a positive level of output.
l4The requirement in part 2 of Proposition 2 that - (a - Cs - /3 + 4 (c, - cs)) > Ois equivalent
to requiring that wd ~ /3.
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The regulator can leave it to the market (read, the vertically integrated firm) to
determine the access charge, the regulator (or competition authority) can restrict
firm v's opportunity to enter into vertically related markets, and/or the regulator
can determine the access charge.P When the regulator decides which policy should
be chosen (i.e., the subgame perfect policy), he must take into account the welfare
loss in the duopoly case due to duplication of fixed costs. This is the topic for next
section.
4 Welfare comparisons
In this section, we will examine the level of welfare under different sets of policies
with respect to the access charge and entry. We will consider only the restricted case,
where no transfers can be used and where there cannot be an access deficit. In addi-
tion to regulation of the access charge, the regulator may also restrict the upstream
firm's opportunity to enter in the downstream industry (structure regulation). To
simplify the analysis, I will only consider the case of symmetric downstream firms
where c, = c, = c.
4.1 No regulation versus structure regulation
We have learnt from the analysis above that when firms face the same downstream
marginal costs, the unregulated situation without any structure regulation implies
that the only active firm is the vertically integrated firm (which enjoys a monopoly
situation both upstream and downstream); i.e., the vertically integrated firm will
ISH there are fixed costs, K > 0, in the upstream market, then a zero-profit condition on access
provision implies the following: (w - f3) ?: K/Q, where Q is the downstream quantity (which is
either a duopoly or a monopoly). Thus, the access charge must be set strictly in excess of the
marginal cost of providing access. Let us assume that Cv = Cs = C, which implies that firm v always
will produce a higher quantity than firm s (Qv> Qs in the duopoly case, and Q~ > Q';' in the two
monopoly cases). The consequence of introducing fixed costs upstream is that w; > w~ > w;t > f3
(i.e., the access charge is highest when firm s is a monopolist and lowest under a duopoly, but
always strictly in excess of the marginal cost of providing access).
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foreclose its rival completely. Consequently, there is no duplication of fixed costs
and no problems of double marginalisation.l" This situation yields the welfare level
w~ as defined in expression (11), with the access charge wur given byeqn. (9).
If the regulator chooses to only restrict firm v's opportunity to enter into the
downstream market (structure regulation), firm v is only active upstream and firms
is the only firm producing downstream. The welfare will be given by W;n also
defined in expression (11), with the access charge w' defined by eqn. (10). In both
these two cases, the upstream monopolist decides on the level of the access charge.
Proposition 3
Assume that firms are symmetric (i.e., c, = cs). If the access charge is unregu-
lated, then the overall welfare level is higher without structure regulation.
Proof. Define fl.Wm = W;n - W~ and fl.Qm = Q": - Q~, where Q": (w = w') =
(a - c - /3) /4 and Q~ = (a - c - /3) /2. The access charge w' is defined by eqn.
(10). Simplifying the expressions, fl.Qm = - (a - c - /3) /4, which is negative pro-
vided that assumption 1 is satisfied.
Then fl.Wm = (a - c - /3) fl.Qm - [(Q,,:)2/2 - (Q~)2 /2]. Under assumption
1 we observe that (a - c - /3) fl.Qm < O. The expression [(Q,,:)2/2 - (Q~)2 /2]
can, after simplifications, be written as -3 (a - c - /3)2 /32, which is negative under
assumption 1. Consequently, we can write fl.Wm as: fl.Wm = -5 (a - c - /3)2 /32 <
O.•
If only firm v produces the final product, it will avoid the problem of double
marginalisation and will consequently choose a higher level of output than is the case
when the upstream monopolist sells access to the monopolist firm s. Byobserving
the form of the welfare function, we can see that welfare is increasing and concave .
in quantity since it is assumed that a monopolist downstream has a positive profit
margin (which requires a - c - /3 > O). Thus, a welfare maximising regulator, when
choosing between no regulation and structure regulation, will do better by allowing
16Double marginalisation is a problem if firm s produces downstream and the access charge is
larger than the marginal cost of providing access. The classical reference is Spengler (1950).
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firm v to enter the downstream industry and effectively foreclose the rival firm
(which then chooses not to enter the industry) as the total output level increases.
Duplication of fixed costs, however, is not an issue as the downstream industry will
be monopolised in both cases.
ff firms have different marginal costs upstream (i.e., c, =1= c.) and if Cv < cs, the
result will be the same as in Proposition 3. In this case, firm v has an even greater
cost advantage in downstream production. However, if c, > c, the analysis becomes
more complicated. Then, if access is still unregulated, the absence of structure
regulation is only welfare optimal if the downstream subsidiary of firm v is not too
inefficient relative to firm s.
4.2 Access charge regulation
The regulator may in addition to, or instead of the structure regulation, choose to
regulate access charges. If there is regulation of access charges, the regulator faces
two options. He may regulate only access charges, or he may use a combination of
access charge regulation and structure policy. We then need to consider two different
cases. One case in which access charge regulation is used in combination with
structure regulation, which effectively awards firm s a monopoly in the downstream
industry. The other case consists of access charge regulation only. In both these
cases, it is assumed that the regulator cannot use transfers to subsidise any access
deficits, if this were to occur in a fully optimal regulatory policy.
If the regulator restricts the entry of firm v into the downstream industry, it will
choose as the optimal access charge w;r = {3_I7 The corresponding output by the
downstream monopolist is then: Q": = (a - c - {3) /2, which is the same output level
as firm v would choose if it is allowed monopoly power downstream since marginal
cost pricing of access and identical downstream marginal costs imply that the two
firms face the same total costs. The welfare in this case is denoted Wsr, which can
be rewritten as Wsr = (a - c - {3) Qr; - (Qr;)2 /2 - F.IB
17Weknow from above that the first-best regulation would result in an access charge, w;, below
the marginal cost of providing access.
18Subscript sr denotes structure regulation.
18
ff the regulator abstains from using structure regulation in this case we know
from above that both firms will be active in the downstream industry, and we also
know that the regulator will determine a policy of marginal cost access pricing; i.e.,
w";/ = {3. The equilibrium levels of output for the two firms are, since firms are
symmetric: Q: = Q~= (a - c - (3) /3. The level of welfare in this situation is given
by: Wd = (a - c - (3) (Q~+Q:) - (Q~+Q:) 2 /2 - 2F.
We now want to compare wd to Wsr to examine which of these two policies yield
the highest level of welfare. Note that when there is no structure regulation, there
is duplication of fixed costs.
Proposition 4
Assume that firms are symmetric (i.e., Cv = c.). If access charge is subject to.
requlaiion and in the absence oj transfers, a welfare maximising regulator will do.
better by not subjecting firms to. structure requlation. when fixed costs are not tDD
large.
Proof. When using transfers is not an option, we have seen that the regulator
will determine access charges w";{ = w;r = {3. Define ~Wd = Wd - Wsr and
~Qd = Qd _ Q';, where Qd ~ Q~+ Q: and Q~ = (a - c - (3) /3 = Q: when we
have inserted for the regulated access charge. We can rewrite ~ Wd as follows:
~ Wd = (a - c - (3) ~Qd - [( Qd)2 /2 - (Q,;)2 /2] - F. Since the regulator chooses
a plicy of marginal cost pricing of access, the two firms face identical marginal
costs of producing the final product. We then know that ~Qd = (a - c - (3) /6 >
o. Furthermore, [(Qd)2 /2 - (Q~;:l /2] = 7 (a - c - (3)2 /72, which implies that
~Wd = (a - c - (3)2 /6 - 7 (a - c - (3)2 /72 - F, or ~Wd = 5 (a - c - (3)2 /72 - F.
Consequently, ~ Wd > Oif (a - c - (3) > J72F /5. •
The intuition behind this result is, of course, that a duopoly produces a higher
level of output than does a monopoly. Inour case, both the downstream subsidiary of
firm v and firm s have identical costs, so there is no issue related to choosing the more
efficient producer of the two. The only aspects related to the welfare considerations
of the different policies are whether the total output differs in the two cases, and the
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importance of the duplication of the fixed costs. When the detrimental welfare effect
of fixed costs duplication does not dominate the positive welfare effect of increased
production, then the regulator should choose to only regulate access charge and
allow the upstream monopolist into the downstream industry.
4.3 Access regulation, structure regulation or no regula-
tion?
What then remains to be examined is which of these policies, or combination of
policies, that yields the highest level of overall welfare. We know from Proposition
3 that if the regulator chooses not to regulate access charges, the level of welfare
is highest if firm v is free to enter the downstream industry (i.e., when there is
no structure regulation). Consequently, we need to compare the welfare level W:
(which corresponds to the highest possible welfare level when the access charge is
unregulated) to Wd and Wsr (which is the welfare level without and with structure
regulation, respectively, when access charge is regulated). We know that the level of
the fixed cost of entry plays an important role in determining which policy is best
when the access charge is regulated. We will need to consider both the case of F
large and F small.l?
Large fixed costs In this case, we know from Proposition 4 that Wd < Wsr.
This implies that if the regulator regulates the access charge, then the best the
regulator can do in terms of overall welfare is to combine this regulation with struc-
ture regulation. Thus, we need to compare Wsr to W: to determine which policy
combination that yields the highest level of welfare.
Proposition 5
Assume that firms are symmetric (i.e., c, = cs). When fixed costs are suffi-
ciently large, a welfare maximising regulator is indifferent between structure regula-
tion combined with marginal cost pricing of access, and no regulation. In addition,
I9Le...we must consider the case where J75F/5 > a - c - /3 (F large), and the case when the
inequality is reversed (F small).
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these mixes of policies are strictly preferred to only regulating access charyes (i. e.,
W~ = War > Wd). Furthermore, among the regulatory mechanisms we consider,
only the first-best regulation will yield a higher level of welfare.
The proof of the proposition is straightforward and is omitted. The result rests
on the fact that marginal cost pricing of access together with c, = c, result in
the same monopoly output downstream independent of whether the production is
undertaken by firm v or s. Since the total output is identical and fixed costs are
only paid once in the two situations, the level of welfare will remain unchanged.
Consequently, we can conclude that when fixed costs are sufficiently large and the
regulator cannot use transfers, the regulator can do no better than to leave the
market unregulated.
H, however, the regulator may use subsidies with a shadow cost of public funds
equal to zero, then the regulator can achieve the first-best outcome. The first-
best situation amounts to producing the competitive output level, and this will be
achieved with only firm s producing downstream. This is discussed in detail in a
previous section.
Small fixed costs When fixedcosts are sufficientlysmallweknowfrom Propo-
sition 4 that Wd > Wsr. Thus, if the regulator chooses to regulate access charges,
the best he can do is not to impose structure regulation. Consequently, we need
to compare Wd to W~. The question here is whether access regulation will result
in higher welfare compared to the completely unregulated case (where the latter
situation will lead to firm v being a monopolist in both markets).
Proposition 6
Assume that firms are symmetric (i.e., c, = cs). When fixed costs are suffi-
ciently small, a welfare maximising regulator is indifferent between structure regula-
tion combined with maryinal cost pricing of access, and no regulation. In addition,
these mixes of policies do strictly worse than only regulating access charges (i.e.,
W~ = War < Wd). Furthermore, among the regulatory mechanisms we consider,
only the first-best regulation will yield a higher level of welfare.
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Since firms are identical and access is priced at marginal cost, the trade-off in
welfare is the same as when comparing access charge regulation to a combined access
charge regulation and structure regulation. Thus, in the current situation with low
levels of the fixed costs, regulation performs better than no regulation. Furthermore,
the regulator should not use policies directed at the structure of the markets.
5 Concludingremarks
The main aim of this note has been to find the socially optimal regulatory policy
when the regulator has two main regulatory instruments at its disposal, structure
regulation and access charge regulation, in a stylised model.
The analysis suggests that the level of the fixed costs is of great importance in
choosing the combination of policies to achieve the highest possible level of welfare,
given the imperfections that are assumed to be present (imperfect competition down-
stream, and in feasibility of giving lump-sum transfers). In this particular model we
observe that access charges should be subject to regulation only when fixed costs
of establishing firms in the competitive market downstream are sufficiently low; i.e.,
when entry barriers are (sufficiently) low. It may seem counter-intuitive that the
regulator should regulate access charge to ensure a level playing field only when it is
easy to enter an industry, whereas when entry is difficult it should make entry even
more difficult by not subjecting access charges to regulation. However, the expla-.
nation is quite straightforward. Regulation of access charges imply that there will
duplication of fixed costs, provided that there are no structure regulation. However,
having two firms downstream implies that the total quantity produced is higher,
which implies that consumers' surplus is higher. For sufficiently low fixed costs, the
social cost of duplication is less than the gain to consumers' surplus. No regulation '
at all, on the other hand, implies in the case of symmetric firms, complete foreclosure
of the rival firm and no duplication of fixed costs. When fixed costs are sufficiently
large, the cost of duplication is dominating the gain to consumers' surplus of having
more firms in the downstream market.
An issue that may be of some importance when analysing different vertical mar-
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ket structures, but which is not considered in the model presented above, is the issue
of economies of scope. I~ may In certain markets and situations be reasonable to
assume that a vertically integrated firm may enjoy an additional cost advantage over
a vertically separated firm which is not due to the elimination of double marginali-
sation. ff economies of scope between the upstream and downstream operations are
present, it is no longer the case that a regulator is indifferent between not regulating
the market at all (in which case the vertically integrated firm will monopolise the
downstream market) and a policy which combines marginal cost pricing of access
with structure regulation. In such a case, choosing not to regulate the market at all
(i.e., neither access charge regulation nor structure regulation) will be preferred by
the regulator. In the case of large fixed costs, economies of scope may also modify the
ranking between welfare levels with only access charge regulation, and welfare with
both access charge regulation and structure regulation. The reason for this is that
the cost advantage of the vertically integrated firm may, if sufficiently pronounced,
outweigh the cost of duplicating fixed costs. However, it is likely that the overall
conclusion that no regulation is best is still valid, since the no regulation scenario
(in which the network provider, firm v, will be a vertically integrated monopoly)
also will benefit from the cost advantage due to economies of scope. In the case if
small fixed costs, economies of scope seems only to strengthen the conclusion that
regulating access charges is the welfare optimal solution.
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Investment incentives
and regulation
ESSAY6
1Demand-side Spillovers and Semi-collusion in
the Mobile Communications Market#
Øystein Foros·, Bjørn Hansen" and Jan Yngve Sand'"
Abstract: We analyze roaming policy in the market for mobile
telecommunications. Firms undertake investments in network infrastructure to
increase geographical coverage, capacity in a given area, or functionality. Prior to
investments, roaming policy is determined. We show that under collusion at the
investment stage, firms' and a benevolent welfare maximizing regulator's interests
coincide, and no regulatory intervention is needed. When investments are undertaken
non-cooperatively, firms' and the regulator's interests do not coincide. Contrary to
what seems to be the regulator' s concern, firms would decide on a higher roaming
quality than the regulator. The effects of allowing a virtual operator to enter are also
examined. Furthermore, we discuss some implications for competition policy with
regard to network infrastructure investment.
Keywords: Mobile communications, roaming, competition, virtual operators
JEL classification: L13, L5I, L96
# This work has been carried out as part of a research project at Telenor R&D - DN 0401. The authors
are grateful to the editor and an anonymous referee for comments. Furthermore we thank Kåre P.
Hagen, Lars Sørgard, Lars Mathiesen and Derek Clark, participants at the 19th Annual Conference on
the "Competitive challenge in network industries", May 2000, Lake George, New York, EUNIP 2000,
December 2000, Tilburg, Netherlands, Helsinki Conference on Anti-trust Issues in Network Industries
2001, and EARlE 2001, Dublin, Ireland, for comments and discussions .
• Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration and Telenor R&D, Norway.
Corresponding address: Norwegian School ofEconomics and Business Administration, Department of
Economics, Hellev. 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway. E-mail: oystein.foros@nhh.no .
•• Telenor R&D, Norway .
••• University of Tromso and Telenor R&D, Norway.
21 Introduction
We analyze competing mobile telephony providers' incentives to invest in, and share
infrastructure. Furthermore, we analyze whether the regulator should intervene into
the firms sharing agreements, and whether the regulator should allow the firms to
coordinate their investments. The infrastructure investment we have in mind is
upgrading of the mobile networks from second generation (2G) to third generation
(3G) systems. Agreements on sharing infrastructure are called roaming in mobile
markets.
The main improvement of 3G networks (e.g. UMTS) compared to the current 2G
mobile networks (e.g. GSM) is to increase the speed of communication in the access
network and thereby give access to new services and new functionality for existing
services. Investments will consequently increase consumers' willingness to pay for
mobile access. The basic mechanism driving our results is that investments carried out
by one firm increase the value of the service provided by other firms when there is a
roaming agreement between the firms.
An analysis of consequences of coordinating investments and infrastructure sharing
seems to be more relevant in 3G as compared to 2G networks. First, while the
providers of 2G networks (GSM) made their investment non-cooperatively, we now
see that several providers of UMTS are coordinating their investments in
infrastructure (e.g. in Sweden and Germany). There has been a heated debate whether
the regulator should allow the firms to cooperate at the investment stage. Second, the
benefit from sharing agreements through roaming seems to be higher in 3G than 2G
networks. In current 2G networks the consumers have access to a given capacity (9.6
kbit/s), while in 3G the available capacity for data transmission may be allocated in a
more dynamic way. If there are free resources in the network, a consumer may be
given a capacity of up to 2 megabit/so However, as the number of users in a given area
at a given time increases, each user will have less capacity available. This may
increase the value of infrastructure sharing agreements. There are in general potential
gains from sharing network capacity when the load in two networks is not perfectly
correlated. Let us illustrate this by a simple example. At a given time, operator A has
no free capacity in its network whereas operator B has idle capacity. Suppose now that
3a subscriber of A tries to download a huge amount of content and needs 2 megabit/so If
there is no capacity sharing agreement between A and B, the customer will not be able
to access such services at that time. However, if a sharing agreement is established
between the operators, the service will be available to the consumer. In this situation,
it is obvious that an investment in capacity by B will increase the willingness to pay
for subscriptions from firm A.
We analyze a stylized multi-stage model where the firms first agree on roaming
quality, second choose their investment non-cooperatively or cooperatively, and
finally compete il la Cournot. We investigate whether it is welfare improving to let the
firms semi-collude by choosing their investment cooperatively before they compete in
the downstream market. Alternatively we may have semi-collusion where the firms
compete at the investment stage and collude in the retail market such as in Brod and
Shiwakumar (1999), Fershtman and Gandal (1994), and Steen and Sørgard (1999).
More generally the latter form of semi-collusion seems realistic since the firms
typically will collude on the most observable variable. Usually this will be the price in
the retail market. However, our motivation is that we observe collusion at the
investment stage in the market we consider, and the effects of allowing such collusion
are what we want to investigate. Therefore, we do not consider collusion in the final
product market.'
In our basic model we assume that there are two symmetric facility-based firms. If the
investments are set non-cooperatively we show that voluntary roaming leads the firms
to agree on a too high roaming quality compared to the social optimum. Moreover, the
investments are strategic complements, and firms will then invest less with voluntary
than mandatory roaming. In contrast, ifthe investments are set cooperatively, the
firms' choices on the roaming quality coincide with the regulator's interests. We show
that the firms should be allowed to semi-collude in the way described above, since
this yields the highest welfare.
In an extension of the basic model we assume that there is a non-facility-based firm,
or a virtual operator, in addition to the two facility-based firms, Whether the virtual
operator should be allowed to enter the market and to which extent the presence of
1 See Busse (2000) and Parker and Roller (1997) for analysis of tacit collusion in the mobile market.
4such an operator will affect the incentives to invest in infrastructure has been a hot
topic in the industry and amongst regulators. This debate started when the
Scandinavian virtual mobile operator Sense Communication attempted to get access
to the facility-based mobile operators' networks. The facility-based firms were
reluctant to grant Sense Communication access.' A much more friendly reception was
given to Virgin Mobile in the UK.
The roaming quality between the entrant and the two-facility-based firms in our
model is assumed to be weakly lower than the roaming quality between the two
facility-based firms, We show that when the investments are set non-cooperatively
between the facility-based firms an increase in the roaming quality of the incumbents
may now increase the investments. This is in contrast to the basic model.
We analyze a type of semi-collusion where the firms may collude at the investment
stage and compete in the retail market. Our model is an extension of the multiple
stage models of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992)
considering R&D investment. Through the roaming agreements the investments in
infrastructure give rise to spillover effects similar to those considered in models of
strategic R&D investments. In the majority of these models, the externality is
exogenous. In our model, we focus on the situation where the level of the externality
is endogenously determined.' Furthermore, in contrast to the majority of the R&D
literature we introduce asymmetry between the firms. That is, there are firms that
invest in infrastructure and firms that do not invest."
We also make some other key assumptions in our model. First, for the sake of
simplicity we ignore the issue of interconnection (agreements that give access to
2 Sense wanted to issue their own SIM cards, but the Scandinavian facility-based operators refused this.
Sense filed a complaint to all national regulators, but only the Norwegian regulator supported it.
Telenor's appeal to the Norwegian regulator was still pending when Sense filed for bankruptcy in
March 1999 (Matthews, 2000). Now, Sense Communication, along with several other virtual
operators, has an agreement with Telenor to resell airtime.
3 Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998a,b) introduce endogenous levels of spillovers between firms. Contrary to
their models we assume that the investments undertaken by firms result in product innovation with
probability one. Furthermore, our focus is on a context where firms (or a regulator), in the
terminology of Katsoulacos and Ulph, choose the degree of information sharing and not research
design. We are accordingly examining investments with firms operating in the same industry, but
pursue complementary research.
4 See e.g. De Bondt (1997) for a survey of the R&D literature of strategic investments.
5,
rivals' customer bases) and focus on roaming only. We give roaming a wider
interpretation than pure geographical coverage. Roaming agreements extend
availability, such that (i) subscribers can make and receive calls via the infrastructure
coverage of a rival operator, (ii) when there is congestion a customer may take
advantage of the infrastructure of the rival, and (iii) give access to new
functionality/services in the rivals' network.
Second, to simplify we make the assumption that there is no side payments between
firms engaged in roaming. If firms have the ability to write complete contracts in all
dimensions of the infrastructure sharing (roaming), all external effects from the
investment can in principle be internalized through the price mechanism. Then, the
problem of spillovers through roaming analyzed in this paper may vanish. Since
sharing agreements in the next generation systems should ensure a dynamic capacity
allocation, it is however rarely possible to write complete contracts in all dimensions.
Thus, even if a price mechanism for roaming is implemented, it will 'not be able to
internalize all external effects. This is similar to what we see in the Internet, where
infrastructure sharing of backbones is common (Cremer, Rey and Tirole, 2000). Note
that regulation may also constrain the firms' ability to internalize external effects
through pricing. In particular, this will be important in the interaction between the
facility-based firms and the non-facility based firm (virtual operators).
Third, we make the simplifying assumption that consumers only pay for subscription,
not for usage. On the one hand this is evidently a restricting assumption since mobile
providers typically employ various types of nonlinear pricing. On the other hand, it is
far from evident what the alternative is, and in particular, whether mobile providers
will choose to price discriminate between calls originated off-net and calls originated
on-net. 5 The focus in our model is however on how availability in various dimensions
(capacity, speed etc.) affects the choice of supplier. Consequently, our focus is on
S In addition to the pricing issues, by introducing a call volume dimension we will have to model the
cost structure for calls originating and terminating on the same net by a subscriber of that network.
Under such a generalization of our model it would also be natural to relax assumption 2 and
introduce a volume price on roaming (as well as a volume price on interconnection). A proper
modeling of all these pricing and cost components will lead to a very complex model. By
disregarding both the revenue and the cost side of traffic we also avoid the so-called "bill and keep
fallacy".
6demand for subscriptions, not usage and then it is sufficient to consider pricing as a
fixed per period fee.
Fourth, we assume Coumot competition in the retail market. We interpret the quantity
firms dump in the retail market as the number of subscriptions they sell. A
justification for assuming Coumot competition is that, due to the fact that the amount
of radio spectrum available is scarce, there are both physical and technologicallimits
to capacity. Furthermore, the firms must choose a capacity level which is built (or
rented) in both the backbone network and the access network (number of base
stations) prior to the competition in the retail market," This will be more important
with 3G systems where the capacity needed increases. However, as shown by Kreps
and Scheinkman (1983), strong assumptions are required to ensure that a capacity
constrained price game result in identical results as a Coumot game. Nevertheless,
this seems more appropriate than assuming a Bertrand game without capacity limits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the model with only
facility-based firms is presented and analyzed. In section 3, we provide an extension
to the basic model by introducing a virtual operator. In section 4, some concluding
remarks are made.
2 The model
In our basic model we will look into a duopoly case where we assume the following
three-stage game:
Stage 1: Either the firms or the regulator determines roaming quality
Stage 2: The firms determine infrastructure investments either non-
cooperatively or cooperatively
Stage 3: Coumot competition
6 The basic structure in a mobile network is that coverage in a given area is achieved through a number
of base stations covering given areas (cells). Hence, a mobile network consists of a net of such cells.
The spectrum band allocated for mobile use limits the total bandwith a cell can handle at a given
point of time. Thus total capacity measured is limited and one bandwith hungry user occupying 2
Mbitls is crowding out approximately 200 ordinary voice calls. In situations with capacity problems
7There are four different variants of the game depending on the stage 1 and stage 2
strategies:
Stage 1:
Roaming
tage ves en s
Competitive Collusive
Voluntary Gamel Game3
Mandatory Game2 Game4
S 2In tmt
Figure l Thefourvariams o/the game
The choice of whether firms cooperate when determining their investment levels will
depend on whether such cooperation is approved by the competition authorities.
Regarding stage 2 and 3 the structure in our model is fairly similar to Kamien et al.
(1992) and d' Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). The generic feature of the investment
is that it leads to product innovation increasing the quality of the service.
One interpretation of the timing in our model is that roaming policy may be part of the
licenses to the operators in the case where the degree ofroaming is mandatory, and
therefore chosenprior to investments taking place. When roaming is voluntary, we
assume that firms can commit to a policy on roaming prior to undertaking the
investments. Indeed, the timing of the roaming quality decision relative to
infrastructure investments can obviously be different. To be more specific, the
infrastructure investment may be decided prior to a decision on roaming quality. Such
timing may involve problems with investment hold-ups, but this will not be our main
focus. Thus, in our choice of timing we implicitly assume that the firms/the regulator
can credibly commit to a given policy on roaming. As far as the regulator is
concerned, the issued licenses may serve as a commitment device, whereas the
commitment problem under voluntary roaming is solved, e.g. if a given roaming
policy is embedded in the network design (e.g. type of interfaces). 7
it is possible to invest in higher capacity through what is called cell splitting. Cell splitting implies
that a given area is served with a higher number of smaller cells.
7 Poyago- Theotoky (1999) considers a model of R&D where the degree of spillover is endogenous. In
her model, the timing of the game is different from ours, in that the R&D investment decision (which
is equivalent to our infrastructure investment decision) is made prior to the decision on how much
information to share with competitors. In addition, she allows firms to choose different levels of
82.1 The demand side
When firm i invests in its infrastructure it impacts on the quality of the services its
own customers are offered, but there may also be an impact on the quality of the
services offered by the rival firm), and vice versa. Given a roaming policy p and
investment decisions x.; we can now write the total quality offered to consumers by
firm i:
aj =a+xj + f1xj
where x, is network investment undertaken by firm i, and Xj indicates the investment
by the rival. We assume that fJ E [0,1] is a parameter indicating the degree of roaming.
This parameter measures the externality effect from sharing infrastructure. If fJ = 1,
there is an agreement on full roaming, while fJ =O implies minimum roaming quality.
(1)
The inverse demand function faced by firm i:
The price.p., is the subscription fee for availability (i.e., a monthly fee). The
externality introduced above is such that when firm i invests in infrastructure, the
marginal willingness to pay for the final products produced by both firms is
increasing.
2.2 The supply side
We assume a linear cost function in the final stage for firm i, given by C,=cqj. The
cost c is the direct cost associated with access connection of one user. We assume that
firms face quadratic (network infrastructure) investment costs, given by
TCj (xj ) = {/1Xj2 /2, where
<p> 4/3. We willlater demonstrate that the restriction on <p ensures a unique and stable
equilibrium. Overall profit for firm i is then:
(2)
spillover. In our model, the degree of spillover (interpreted as roaming quality) is reciprocal, in that
the degree of spillover is identical in both directions. When firms choose R&D cooperatively they
choose to fully disclose their findings, whereas when there is competition in R&D firms choose
minimal disclosure. The latter result is very different from what we find in our model.
92.3 Welfare
We assume that the regulator maximizes welfare given by the sum of producer and
consumer surplus:
W=CS+1&t +1&2
Since firms are symmetric and the inverse demand functions are linear with identical
slopes, we can write consumer surplus as CS = 2q 2 , where q is the symmetric
production level of each firm.
(3)
2.4 Cournot-competition (stage 3)
At stage 3, firm i maximizes the profit function: n, = (pj - Cj )qj . Combining the first
order conditions for the two firms we obtain equilibrium quantities:
Note that in a symmetric equilibrium (aj =aj)' the equilibrium quantity is given by
qO = (aj -c)/3.8 This quantity is monotonously increasing in aj = aj' and this implies
that consumer surplus is monotonously increasing in aj. Firm i obtains stage 3
equilibrium profits given by x, = (q 0j)2 •
2.5 Infrastructure investment (stage 2)
When firms invest in infrastructure at stage 2 of the game, they take into account the
effect such investments has on the stage 3 equilibrium.
2.S.l Non-cooperative solution
At stage 2, the firms maximize the profit function (2), subject to Cournot equilibrium
quantities at stage 3, which implies that the (symmetric) equilibrium investment is
given by:
8As it turns out, the unique equilibrium in investment is indeed the symmetric equilibrium.
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• (4-2fJ)(a-c)
x =
ne 9rp- 2(2 - fJ)(1 + fJ)
In equilibrium, firms' profits are non-negative for all permissible parameter values,
and consequently firms will participate in the game. Furthermore, the symmetric
equilibrium is the unique equilibrium," Our result is analogous to d' Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992), and is summarized in the following
lemma:
(4)
Lemma 1 If P > 1/2, then Xi and X j are strategic complements; that is,
CdXJdXj )nc >O. Reversing the inequality makes Xi and xj strategic substitutes.
When one firm invests in its infrastructure, the equilibrium quantity of the other firm
mayor may not increase as a result of the spillover through the roaming agreement.
As pointed out by Kamien et al. (1992), the spillover externality (or investment
externality) is positive if and only if P> 1/2 . In other words, the spillover externality
is positive only when Xi and xj are strategic complements.
2.5.2 Cooperative solution
In the cooperative case the two firms coordinate their infrastructure investments at
stage 2, and compete a la Cournot at stage 3 in the same way as above. When
determining the profit-maximizing choice of investments at stage 2, firm i maximizes
the joint profit of the two firms (Le. industry profits):,
The following first-order condition yields the equilibrium investment for a given firm
under collusion: 10
• 2(a - c)(1+ fJ)
X = __;.-_;.....;.._.......:...~
e 9rp- 2(1+ fJ)2 (5)
9 The second-order condition requires that 2(2- øY -9f/J<O. In order to have a stable equilibrium the
slope of the reaction function has to have an absolute value below unity. It is straightforward to
demonstrate that this condition is fulfilled for q> > 4/3. Hence, the second order condition is also
fulfilled when we have assumed that q> >4/3. Finally, it can be shown that the symmetric equilibrium
is indeed unique.
10 In the same way as in game 1, the second-order condition, 2(1+ /1)2 - 9rp <O, is satisfied with our
parameter restrictions.
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The cooperative solution yields lower infrastructure investment than the non-
cooperative, x; < x:c ' if and only if P < 1/2. This is equivalent to the results obtained
by d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992).
Observe furthermore that for p < 1/2 , equilibrium quantity in the final stage of the
game is lower under collusion relative to the non-cooperative case. Consequently,
consumer surplus is, on the one hand, lower under collusion relative to non-
cooperation if the roaming quality is sufficiently low. If,on the other hand, p > 1/2 ,
consumers' surplus is higher under collusion at the investment stage. In addition,
firms'profits under collusion are always at least as large as under non-cooperation.
For p = 1/2firms are indifferent between collusion and non-cooperation at stage 2.
Consequently, a welfare-maximizing regulator would, provided that the roaming
quality is sufficiently high (Le. p > 1/2 ), choose to allow collusion at stage 2 and
such collusion would be in the firms' interests. In the next section we examine which
level of roaming quality a welfare-maximizing regulator would choose.
2.6 Roamingquality (stage1)
In this section, we extend the model by considering the two cases where: 1) Firms
decide roaming quality (voluntary roaming) and 2) the regulator decides roaming
quality (mandatory roaming). These two cases combined with the two ways of
determining investments at stage 2 yields four different games (see Figure 1). The
analysis in this section can be seen as an extension to the basic model with exogenous
R&D spillovers to examine endogenous spillovers.
2.6.1 Game 1, voluntary roaming when investments are determined non-
cooperatively
Recall that equilibrium infrastructure investment (under non-cooperation) is given by
equation (4). Direct differentiation of (4) yields the following result:
Lemma 2 When firms determine the investments non-cooperatively, the infrastructure
investment decreases as the roaming quality increases since ax:c 1ap <O.
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is as follows: We are considering the equilibrium with
reciprocal spillover levels, implying that both firms' final products increase in value
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to consumers by the same proportion (contrary to what is the case in section 3).
Hence, there is no product differentiation gain from investments for any of the firms.
When firms do not cooperate at the investment stage, they do not internalize the effect
of the investment on the other firm's profit, An increase in the degree ofroaming
quality is thus affecting the marginal revenue from investing in infrastructure
adversely, due to the fact that the investing firm is unable to capture the effect on the
rival' s profit. When examining the stage 3 equilibrium we observe that equilibrium
quantities increase in both the degree of roaming quality and the investment level.
Since quantities are strategic substitutes, the rival firm will increase its production if
you reduce yours. Each firm will then have to be more cautious and ration its
production of the final product more than is the case if they collude in the investment
stage. To achieve a substantial enough reduction, any given firm will have to limit its
production even more. Consequently, since qi increases when p increases and
(qi +qj) increases when Xi increases, the investing firms can ration the final product
market by reducing the level of investments when the degree of roaming quality
increases.
The competitive equilibrium infrastructure investment is given by equation (4);
x:c = xnc(Ø). From Lemma 2 we know that x~c(Ø) <O. Using the symmetry ofthe
problem the equilibrium profit is accordingly:
(7)
By differentiating equilibrium profitwith respect to p, we find the roaming quality
preferred by the firms,
~(a-c+(l+ P)xnc(p))(xnc(P)+(l+ P)x~AP))- rpx~c(P)=O9
It can be shown that the optimal P for the firms is independent of (a-c). The solution
to equation (8) will be a function of the convexity of the investment cost function, Le.
of the value for rp. The profit maximizing choice with respect to p is increasing and
concave in rp and strictly larger than 9/10. As an example; when rp = 3/2 the
expression given by equation (8) is concave over the interval where it is defined and
the first order condition is satisfied for p = 0.941. If the firms determine roaming
(8)
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quality, the firms will accordingly agree on p = 0.941 as the preferred level of
roaming.
However, there may be a commitment problem for the firms. After firms have chosen
their level of expenditure on network infrastructure (at stage 2), both firms have an
incentive to renegotiate the roaming quality between stages 2 and 3. The reason for
this is that for a given level of xi; the (stage 3) Cournot-equilibrium profit of both
firms is strictly increasing in p. If firms cannot commit to the roaming quality chosen
at stage 1 of the game, we may thus experience hold-up problems in network
infrastructure investments.'! As indicated earlier, this commitment problem is solved
if roaming policy is embedded in the network design, such that the firms cannot
change roaming policy after the investments have been made. Furthermore, in section
3, we demonstrate briefly that the introduction of a virtual operator can eliminate the
potential commitment problem for the firms,
2.6.2 Game 2, mandatory roaming when investments are determined non-
cooperatively
In this section we investigate the roaming quality a welfare-maximizing regulator
would choose, which can either be considered as a benchmark case or as the chosen
roaming quality under mandatory roaming. We assume that the regulator maximizes
the objective function given by equation (3). Producer surplus is calculated above
(equation 7). Consider now the roaming quality preferred by consumers. We know
that the equilibrium is symmetric in the sense that the two firms invest in the same
level of infrastructure and that they offer the same quantity at stage 3 of the game. Let
X * and q* denote the profit-maximizing choices of investment and quantity,
respectively. In the equilibrium, we have the following equilibrium price:
p =a + (1+P)x * - 2q *
Inserting for the non-cooperative equilibrium investment given by equation (4), and
q* = (a-c)+(l +P)xnc·)/3 the consumer surplus becomes:
11 Since the firms' profit is increasing in roaming quality for a given level of investment, firms have
incentives to increase p to its maximum after the investments are sunk. The hold-up problem arises
because we know that when investments are made non-cooperatively, the marginal revenue of the
investments is reduced when p increases. Thus, if firms know that, ultimately, roaming quality is
chosen to give perfect roaming, they will hold back on investments.
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2[( a - c)+ (1+ P)xnc (P)y
CSnc = 9
By differentiating consumer surplus given by equation (9) with respect to p, we find
that the first order condition is satisfied for roaming quality p = 0.5.12 Consequently, a
roaming quality determined at p = 05 is the consumer surplus maximizing quality
level.13
(9)
The roaming level maximizing consumer surplus can be compared to the roaming
quality maximizing profits for the firms, (equation 8). In section 2.6.1 we
demonstrated that the roaming level maximizing producer surplus is strictly larger
than 9/10. It is accordingly evident that the firms prefer a roaming level exceeding the
roaming level preferred by consumers. Since welfare is the sum of consumer and
producer surplus, the welfare maximizing roaming level (game 2) is below the level
preferred by the firms (game 1). This result is summarized in Proposition 1: .
Proposition 1 Assume that investments are undertaken non-cooperatively. Voluntary
roaming induces firms to choose a higher level of roaming quality relative to the
social optimum. Consequently, in a voluntary roaming regime firms invest less in
network infrastructure than in a mandatory regime.
The intuition behind this result is as follows: For a given quantity of the final product,
the consumers benefit from high levels of infrastructure investments. Firms also
benefit from high levels of investments, ceteris paribus. However, the investing firms
cannot capture all of the benefits from the investments (due to the spillover externality
through the roaming agreement) and, in addition, firms face convex costs of investing.
Consequently, firms will choose a lower level of investment compared to the level
that maximizes consumers' surplus. Furthermore, from Lemma 2 we know that
incentives to invest in infrastructure are worse the higher the degree of roaming
quality. In a situation with high roaming quality, each of the investing firms will
attempt to be a free rider on the other firm's investments. Consequently, the
equilibrium investment level will be lower. On the other hand, a welfare-maximizing
regulator will be able to internalize all the externalities of roaming. Thus, when
roaming is voluntary firms choose a high level of roaming quality to reduce
12 The solution that ~ = 0.5 maximizes consumers' surplus is also independent of the convexity of the
investment cost function, i.e. of the value for rp .
13 The second-order condition for CS is satisfied for all permissible values of p.
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investment incentives. When roaming is mandatory, a lower Ievelof roaming quality
is chosen to induce higher levels of investment in network infrastructure.
If firms are not allowed to collude at the investment stage, regulatory intervention
may be needed. In this case, firms would set a higher roaming quality than the socially
optimal level. Consequently, firms would agree on more compatibility than what
would be beneficial to consumers and society as a whole. For consumers, an increase
in roaming quality has two potentially opposing effects. Increased roaming quality
implies (under non-cooperation) that investment is reduced. This implies that the size
of the market is reduced (the inverse demand function is shifted inwards). For a given
quantity, this results in a reduction in the price charged to consumers. This has a
positive impact on consumers' welfare. However, a reduction in infrastructure results
in a reduction in quantities sold in the last stage of the game. This has a negative
impact on consumers' welfare. The overall effect of increasing quality is positive for
low levels of roaming quality, and negative for high levels. For a sufficiently high
roaming quality, an increase in roaming quality reduces consumers'welfare. Firms, on
the other hand, can by setting a high roaming quality restrict the size of the
infrastructure investments. As a result, the output of the final product in stage 3 of the
game is also restricted, with an increase in equilibrium price.
2.6.3 Game 3 and 4, voluntary and mandatory roaming when investments are
determined cooperatively
Recall that the equilibrium investment as a function of roaming quality is given by
equation (5). Direct differentiation yields the following result:
Lemma 3 When firms collude at the investment stage, the infrastructure investment
increases as the roaming quality increases since ax; / ap >o.
Contrary to the case of non-cooperative investment, the incentives to invest are in fact
higher when the roaming quality is high. In this case, firms achieve a better
coordination due to the fact that the effect on the other firm's profits is internalized.
Thus, all benefits from the investments are credited to the investing firm, which
changes investment incentives qualitatively. There is no longer the problem that each
of the investing firms will have incentives to free ride on the other firm's investments.
If firms determine a high (low) level of roaming quality, each firm's investment
presents a large (minor) positive external effect the firms jointly can internalize. By
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inserting for the collusive equilibrium investment, x; (given by equation 5), and third
stage equilibrium quantities, we obtain consumer surplus (under collusion), CSc:
(lO)
When firms decide on infrastructure investments collusively, consumer surplus given
by equation (10) is increasing and convex in roaming quality over the relevant interval
for p. Consequently, the optimal p for consumers is equal to unity (or maximal
roaming quality). Quantity is increasing in roaming quality both directly and through
the effect of roaming quality on investment. Furthermore, consumer surplus is
increasing in quantity. Thus, a higher roaming quality implies a higher level of
consumers' surplus.
Firms maximize their equilibrium profit under collusion with respect to ~, which
results in:
dK =2 .(x; +(l+PYX:)_ .dX;
dP qc 3 3 dp· f/JXc dP (lI)
where q; is the stage 3 equilibrium quantity for each firm if firms collude at the
investment stage. In the collusion case, the profit function is increasing and convex in
p over the interval [0,1]. This implies that the optimal roaming quality for firms
corresponds to the maximal roaming quality. We summarize our findings in
Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 Assume that firms collude at stage 2. The (unregulated) profit
maximizing choice of roaming quality is identical to the choice of a regulator
maximizing welfare. Consequently, the level of investments in infrastructure is
identical in both the voluntary and mandatory roaming regimes.
Since firms' and consumers' interests coincide there is no reason for governmental
intervention and there is no need for considering game 3 and 4 separately. As in the
non-cooperative case, consumers benefit from high investments in infrastructure for a
given production level. However, to achieve high levels of investments, consumers
now choose a high level of roaming quality. The main reason for the difference in our
result is that firms, when they are allowed to coordinate their investments, are able to
capture all benefits from the investments. Because ofthis, firms' investment
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incentives are changed and they now seek high roaming quality to induce high levels
of investments, whereas in the non-cooperative case they seek high roaming quality to
induce low levels of investments.
2.7 Collusive and competitive investments compared
At stage 2 of the game the level of investment in the network infrastructure.is
determined. As already stated, firms can either compete (games 1 and 2) or they can
collude when determining the investment level (games 3 and 4). We may think of the
decision to allow firms to collude or not as a decision taken by the competition
authorities prior to commencement of the 3-stage game we analyze above.
Assuming that roaming is voluntary we can compare equilibrium under collusive and
competitive investments, respectively (i.e. we compare games I and 3), to determine
whether the investing firms should be allowed to collude or not at the investment
stage. Under voluntary roaming the firms set the p so as to maximize profits, Firms
are evidently better off under collusion as compared to competitive investments."
Furthermore, it follows from the calculations above that equilibrium consumer surplus
is higher under collusion (game 3 and 4) as compared to equilibrium consumer
surplus under competitive investments and mandatory roaming (game 1).15 The
intuition behind this result is as follows: Consumers' surplus increases, both in
roaming quality for given investments and in investment for a given roaming quality.
Since we have demonstrated that roaming is at the highest possible level under
collusive investments and that investments are higher under collusion provided that
~> 0.5, consumer surplus will indeed be higher under collusion.
14 When firms collude they can always mimic the outcome under competition, if they choose to deviate
from this outcome it is because they are better off.
IS This result is derived by fust observing that consumer surplus (CS) is higher in game 2 as compared
to game 1. Then a sufficient condition for demonstrating that CS is higher in game 3 and 4 as
compared to game 2 is to assume that the regulator in game 2 determine the roaming at the level
maximizing CS (13 = 0.5). Then we can compare CS under collusion, equation (lO), for 13 = 1 and
compare it CS under competitive investments, equation (9), for 13= 0.5. Then we find that CSgame 3 and
4 ;;:: CSgame 2 ;;:: CSgame 1·
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In the figure below we illustrate the welfare effects of chosen roaming policy for a
regulator under the two investment regimes for the parameter values a = 3, c = 1, and
rp=3/2>4/3:
fildbrl Collusive Investments
3.S
Competitive Investments
0.6 0.$ l.
t.S Optimal roaming in game 2
Figure 2 Welfare comparison of collusion versus non-cooperation
It is evident from the figure above that social welfare is maximized when the regulator
allows firms to collude at stage 2, provided that the quality of roaming is sufficiently
high (Le. for fl higher than 0.5). We know from the analysis above that a welfare
maximizing regulator indeed will set the quality of roaming equal to unity when firms
collude at the investment stage. The figure is also illustrating the, perhaps, counter
intuitive results that it is detrimental to welfare to determine mandatory roaming at too
high a level under competitive investments.
Consequently, the competition authorities (or a regulator) can never do worse than
allowing collusion at the investment stage, provided that the firms/regulator can
commit to a sufficiently high roaming quality. The reason is that allowing collusion
allows the positive external effects to be internalized.
3 Entry of a non-facility-based firm
In this section we analyze a situation where there are two different types of firms. One
type isfacility-based and invests inits own infrastructure. We assume that there are
two incumbents which both are facility-based as in the previous section. The other
type is an entrant that is a virtual operator. The timing of the game is the same as in
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the above analysis, but it is of course only the facility-based firms which undertake
investments at stage 2 and we assume that the facility-based firms have all the
bargaining power in determining·the quality ofroaming for the virtual operator.
The model is amended to incorporate the fact that there are now two types of firms, In
the case where the entrant is a virtual operator we have:
aj =a + x, +pl X j
av =a+ PV(xj +xj),
where subscript i, j = 1,2, i:;:. j represents the two incumbents, and subscript v
represents the virtual operator.i" The parameter pi represents the degree of the
roaming quality between the facility-based firms, while pv is the roaming quality
from a facility-based operator to a virtual operator. We restrict the analysis to the case
.where pi ;;::pv .17 The parameters pv and pi can also be interpreted as the virtual
operator' s and facility-based operator' s capabilities of transforming the inputs into a
fmal product of high quality, respectively.
The profit functions of the facilities firms are equal to equation (2), while the profit of
the virtual operator is n; =t». -c)qv' By combining the stage 3 first order conditions
for the three firms we obtain the following equilibrium quantities:
q; =[(a-c)+xj(3-PI -PV)+xj(3PI -PV-l)]/4
q; =[(a-c)+(xj+xj)(3pv_pl -1)]/4
16 Ceccagnoli (1999) gives a similar formulation with process innovation. In contrast to us he only
focuses on the case where the R&D-investment is set non-cooperatively.
17 This seems to be an appropriate assumption if the virtual operator is simply a reseller of airtime (e.g.
Sense Communication in Scandinavia). However, if the virtual operator has a well known brand
name and possesses detailed knowledge about certain segments of the market (e.g. Virgin in the UK),
it may be reasonable to assume that investments benefit the virtual operator more than they benefit
the incumbents.
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3.1 Incumbents set the investments non-cooperatively
When the two facility-based firms set their investment non-cooperatively, we use the
symmetry between the two firms, and we find the equilibrium investment for each
facility-based firm: 111
(12)
We now examine how the equilibrium investment level x changes when pi and pv
change:
Proposition 3 When introducing a virtual operator and the investments are made
non-cooperatively by the facility-based firms, increased roaming quality between the
investingfirms may result in a higher equilibrium investment level; i.e. ax / apl > o if
and only if (Pi + pv ) < 2# - 3. Furthermore, increased roaming quality to the
virtual operator reduces investment incemives, ax / apv < O.
Proof:
ax -(a-c)[8qJ-2(3-pl _PV)2]
=apl [8qJ-2(3- pl _ PV)(l+ p.t _ PV)]2
_ax_ = -(a-c)[8qJ+2(3-pl -r es <O
apv [8qJ-2(3-pl _PV)(l+pl _pv)]2
The first expression is positive if and only if [8qJ- 2(3 -IJf - pV)2] < o. This implies
that pi +pv < -3± 2# . Since pi +pv E [0,2] the only root possibly satisfying the
inequality is (Pi + pv) < 2# - 3 .QED.
Recall the basic model with only two facility-based firms, Then, if investments were
undertaken non-cooperatively, the incentives to invest were lower the higher the
degree of roaming quality was. For sufficiently high values of the roaming qualities
we obtain a similar result in the presence of a virtual operator. We observe from
Proposition 3 that, contrary to the basic model, the incentives to invest may in fact be
improved the higher the roaming quality is between the facility-based firms. This will
18 The second order condition is fulfilled if qJ>9/8, which also ensures stability.
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be the case given a combination of a small sum of (Pi + pv ) and sufficiently large
rp.
In stage 1 of the game, either the investing firms or the regulator choose the level of
roaming quality. Our findings suggest that if roaming is voluntary and investments are
made non-cooperatively, the investing firms will choose to set the roaming quality
between the investing firms as high as possible ( pI = 1). The roaming quality
between an investing firm and the virtual operator is set as lowas possible (PV =O).
It may however be the case that profit for the virtual operator is negative in this
solution. A sufficient condition for ensuring non-negative profits for the virtual
operator is that the convexity of the investment cost function is sufficiently large (i.e.
for <p sufficiently large). It can be shown that <p > 2 ensures non-negative profits for
the virtual operator under competitive investments. The intuition behind this result is
that when (3pv - pi -1)< O any investments in infrastructure undertaken by the
facility-based firms will reduce the equilibrium output of the virtual operator, and
consequently, infrastructure investments may be used to deter entry. If, however, the
cost of investing is sufficiently convex, then the equilibrium level of investment is
low enough not to deter entry by the virtual operator.
We only consider the case where the facility-based firms choose accommodation of
entry by the virtual operator. In order to ensure this we assume that the costs are
sufficiently convex (high value of <p). As long as we have accommodation of entry
proposition 3 holds. However, for lower values of <p, it may be optimal for the
facility-based firms to invest such that the virtual operator is foreclosed from the
market. In this case, the higher the pv compared to pl, the more the facility-based
firms have to invest in order to deter entry."
When roaming is mandatory, a welfare-maximizing regulator decides the appropriate
levels. The regulator will choose a roaming policy that corresponds to the voluntary
roaming case. This seems to correspond well to intuition. By keeping pv lowand pi
19 In a similar context, the case where a facility-based firm over-invests to deter entry is analyzed by
Foros (2000).
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high, firms have better incentives to invest in infrastructure. Furthermore, a higher
level of investment leads to more output being produced in the final product market,
which is a direct benefit to consumers. Consequently, there is little scope for
regulatory intervention in this case. The main result in this section then suggests that
the provision of the right investment incentives is of greater importance than allowing
the virtual operator entry at equal terms to the incumbents.
3.2 Incumbents set the investments cooperatively
When the facility-based firms set investments cooperatively they maximize the joint
profit, and by inserting for optimal stage 3 quantity we obtain the following
equilibrium investment level: 20
(a-c)(l+pl -PV)x = _;_-....;....;:....._....:.....,:--....:.....,~
4rp - 2(1+ pl _ pV)2
Hence we have the following results:
(13)
Proposition 4 When facility-based firms invest in infrastructure cooperatively, the
investment level is unambiguously increasing in the degree of roaming quality
between the cooperating firms, ox lopl >O, and decreasing in the roaming quality
between factlity-based firm and the virtual operator, ox lopv <O.
The proof is straightforward and hence omitted.
Similar to our findings when investment is undertaken non-cooperatively, we observe.
that the equilibrium investment level is reduced whenever the roaming quality
between the investing firms and the virtual operator increases. The intuition is the
same as in the non-cooperative case. One important reason for investing in
infrastructure is to differentiate its product from that of the competitor. If the roaming
quality between the investing firms and the virtual operator is sufficiently high, the
importance of the differentiation effect diminishes. As mentioned above, the degree of
roaming quality may be interpreted either as the quality of the access provided to the
virtual operator or as the virtual operator' s capability of transforming the product
innovation resulting from the investment made by the facility-based firms into high
20 Note that for the equilibrium investment level to be positive, the investment cost needs to be
sufficiently convex; this requires rp > 2.
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quality fmal products. Consequently, our findings suggest that any increase in the
quality of input or in the virtual operator' s capabilities reduces the facility-based
firms' incentives to invest in infrastructure.
Our results for both voluntary and mandatory roaming when investments are
undertaken cooperatively suggest that there is little scope for regulation. This is also
the case when investments are undertaken non-cooperatively. Both the investing
firms' interests and the interests of a welfare-maximizing regulator coincide. When
the facility-based firms cooperate at the investment stage, they maximize joint profit
with respect to (pI ,pv), whereas a welfare maximizing regulator chooses (PI ,pv)
to maximize the sum of profits and consumers' surplus. The solution in both cases
yields maximum roaming quality between the facility-based firms and minimal
roaming quality between facility-based firms and the virtual operator. In order to
ensure nonnegative profits for the virtual operator when ~v = O we must however
make further restrictions on the convexity of the investment cost function. A sufficient
condition is that <p > 4.
For a given investment level, an increase in the degree of roaming quality to the
virtual operator is a social benefit and adds to consumers' surplus. However,
increasing the roaming quality to the virtual operator adversely affects the facility-
based firms' incentives to invest in infrastructure, and higher levels of investments is
also a benefit to consumers. When a virtual operator is allowed to enter and
investments are undertaken collusively the trade-off is the same as when investments
are undertaken non-cooperatively, and the investment incentives dominate.
3.3 Some remarks on entry of a virtual operator
One remaining question is whether the competition authorities (or a regulator) should
allow a virtual operator to enter or not. It is reasonable to assume that such entry
should be encouraged if the entry implie~ that welfare is higher than is the case in the
absence of a virtual operator. We assume that the decisions to allow entry by a virtual
operator and whether to allow collusion are taken prior to commencement of the
three-stage game analyzed above. Without going into details, it can be shown that
welfare is higher if collusion at the investment stage is allowed (as is also the case
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without a virtual operator), and the reason is again that the positive externality can be
internalized more easily under collusion.
Furthermore, it can also be shown that welfare is indeed higher when entry of a virtual
operator is allowed when collusion is allowed. Since we know that welfare under
collusion is higher than in the non-cooperative case, we need to show that welfare
under collusive investments with a virtual operator is higher than without the virtual
operator. Then, we have essentially proven that the subgame-perfect equilibrium
policy for the government is to allow entry by a virtual operator and allow facility-
based firms to cooperate at the investment stage." Furthermore, we have seen that the
optimal roaming policy implies that the virtual operator is only given minimal
roaming quality, which means that the entry for the virtual operator is not on
particularly generous terms.
A final point to be made is that the introduction of a virtual operator can eliminate the
commitment problem for firms. Note that firms choose the roaming quality prior to
undertaking investments, and in the absence of a virtual operator firms may have
incentives to change the quality of roaming after investments have been sunk. When a
virtual operator is allowed to enter, this commitment problem is eliminated, and firms
have no incentives to change the quality of roaming after investments are sunk.
4 Concluding remarks
We have discussed roaming policy (both voluntary and mandatory), and we have also
briefly discussed some competition policy aspects related to sharing infrastructure in
the mobile communications market. In particular, we have focused on the interaction
between roaming policy and investment incentives in the third generation mobile
networks (e.g. UMTS). We have shown that all involved are better off under collusion ,
provided that roaming quality is set sufficiently high. Furthermore, in our model, the
chosen level of roaming quality is indeed sufficiently high in all cases. This implies
that when a regulator or competition authority chooses whether collusion at the
investment stage should be allowed, they know that in whatever policy they choose
with respect to roaming, they can never do worse than allowing collusion. In some of
the Nordic countries, major players in the mobile communications market have
21 The proof of this result involves messy, but straightforward algebraic manipulations.
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decided to cooperate in the process of setting up the next generation mobile networks,
which corresponds to the collusion case in our model. In danger of stretching our
model a little too far, we have shown that such collusion is actually beneficial in terms
of welfare. Consequently, competition authorities should not interfere with such
cooperation.
When we introduce a virtual operator into the game relying on the facility-based firms
for infrastructure access, we fmd that the relationship between roaming quality and
investment incentives is qualitatively different. Furthermore, our findings suggest that
there is little scope for regulation of roaming quality when there is a virtual operator
present, both under cooperative and non-cooperative investments. This is also
different from the case without the virtual operator present, where the social optimum
does not correspond to the unregulated outcome if investments are undertaken non-
cooperatively.
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